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The dissertation is focused on the conflict
between the Congress and the executive branch for
supremacy in the formulation of foreign policy for
the United States. Particular attention is centered
on the effects this conflict had on U.S. -Latin
American relations in view of the restrictions
Congress developed and imposed on conventional arms
transfers to Latin America.
During the decade 1967 to 1976, Congress created
a series of restrictions which applied wholly or in
part to the transfer of conventional arms to Latin
American nations. This congressional action was in
response to a number of events, factors and influences.
Primary among the events was the war in Vietnam. Other
events included the Watergate break-in, the 197 3 coup
in Chile, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Cyprus crisis,
and the civil war in Angola. Blended with reaction to
these major international events was the influence of
various factors on the Congress and the perception by
the Congress of the proper direction for U.S. foreign
policy. These factors included the growing congressional
concern for human rights, distrust of the executive,
the influence of new members of Congress, and
li

growing concern that the executive was too powerful
in foreign policy matters and that the Congress was
not being properly consulted.
Several perceptions developed that also entered
into the development of the restrictions. These
included the perception that no serious threat to U.S.
interests existed in the region. Another impression
held that such a strong "special relationship" existed
between the United States and Latin America that Latin
America would remain compliant with U.S. policies.
These events, factors and influences inter-
mingled to result in a series of restrictions on
arms transfers to Latin America. The announced
objectives included congressional desires to prevent
resource diversion among recipients, stop the spread
of sophisticated weapons, prevent an arms race,
prevent coups, and support human rights. The results
of the congressional restrictions on arms transfers to
Latin America were often ineffective or counterproductive
and had distinctly negative effects on U.S. -Latin
American relations.
Review of this decade leads to the conclusion
that a congressional desire developed to "do something
—
anything" to reassert its proper place in the field of
U.S. foreign policy formulation. For a number of reasons
Latin America was on the margin of U.S. interests and
111

became the target for new restrictions on arms
transfers. However, the executive branch was as
much of a target of the restrictions as was Latin
America, if not more' A second conclusion is that
improvement is necessary in foreign policy consul-
tation and development between the Congress and the
executive in order to enhance the effectiveness of
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
For nearly 200 years there has been a struggle
in the United States. This struggle centers on the
separation of powers between the U.S. Congress and
the executive branch over which branch will achieve
dominance in the field of foreign policy. The Con-
stitution explicitly assigns certain powers to each
branch but does not specify which branch has the
ultimate responsibility for the formulation and the
conduct of foreign policy. As a result of this vague-
ness in the Constitution, deliberate or not, the rela-
tionship between the Congress and the executive has
alternated between cooperation and conflict on issues
of foreign policy throughout the history of the
United States.
One instrument of U.S. foreign policy which grew
in importance after World War II was the transfer of
conventional weapons to foreign nations. The objec-
tives ranged from rearming war-torn Europe to obtain-
ing rights to overseas bases for U.S. forces. By the
1960's, however, the use of this foreign policy
instrument was seriously questioned by the Congress
and resulted in a series of legislative restrictions
on the use of conventional arms transfers by the

executive as a means of achieving U.S. foreign policy
goals overseas. By prescribing legislative limits on
the range and flexibility of executive branch action,
the Congress was only adding to the continuum which
has been the history of the contention for dominance
in foreign policy in the United States.
It was, therefore, not too unusual for Congress
to assert itself in prescribing limits or making pre-
cise boundaries within which the executive was to
operate in certain areas of foreign policy. What does
appear unusual is that the restrictions adopted by
Congress would weigh so heavily on nations and regions
who were friends and allies. Latin America was such a
region; it was bound to the United States by a long
history of association and friendly relations as well
as by the United States' oldest mutual security treaty,
the Rio Pact of 1947. During World War II, the U.S.
provided military equipment to Latin America through
the Lend-Lease program. After the Korean War started
in 1950, the U.S. formulated new methods under the
Mutual Security Program to furnish arms to these same
nations. For the first time, these methods included
grant (or free) military assistance. The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 and its annual amendments pro-
vided the continuing authority for the grant and sale
of weapons and related services to Latin America.

Through the two decades after World War II there
was a tendency for both the Congress and the executive
to treat Latin America somewhat differently from
other regions with respect to arms transfers. Several
legislative restrictions were formulated over the years
which applied to Latin America and in 1959 a regional
dollar ceiling was adopted to limit the amount of
arms which could be transferred in any one year. In
1967, however, a precipitous change in policy was
brought about by a number of factors which led Congress
to approve a series of restrictions on the supply of
U.S. arms to Latin America. By 1970, some 21 differ-
ent articles of legislation applied in one way or
another to restrict the transfer of conventional
weapons to Latin America. The results included a
predictable deterioration in the political and mili-
tary relationships between the U.S. and the various
nations of Latin America.
It is the thesis of this dissertation that the
series of restrictions on arms transfers initiated
by Congress in 1967 and following years were largely
either ineffective or counterproductive. Whether
intentional or inadvertent, the results of the
Frank Church, "Toward a New Policy for Latin
America," U.S., Congress, Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd
sess., 10 April 1970, Congressional Record , vol. 116,
p. 11212.

4restrictions contributed to the deterioration of
United States-Latin American relations and were not
to the benefit of the interests of the United States.
In order to focus more clearly on this facet of U.S.
foreign policy beginning in 1967, the purposes of
this dissertation will be to (a) examine the reasons,
rationale, and objectives of congressionally legislated
restrictions on the transfer of conventional arms
specifically as applied to Latin America; (b) to
compare the aims of the restrictions with the actual
results; and (c) to evaluate the accomplishments of
the restrictions on the conduct of foreign policy as
prescribed by the Congress. The purpose here is not
to argue what United States security interests should
have been in Latin America over time. However, the
variances in the U.S. evaluation and appreciation for
the Latin American contribution to U.S. security form
a background for one of the central issues of the
dissertation; that is, the effect certain policies
adopted by the Congress had on U.S. -Latin American
relations.
The purpose of the dissertation is not to contest
whether or not Congress was overstepping its bounds
but, rather, to see if in this episode of foreign
policy it was to the United States' advantage that
Congress did assume such a dominant role. As Senator

J. William Fulbright has said on a similiar subject,
"I am not arguing the Constitutional right or wrong
of Congress to hem in the program with page after
page of restrictions; I am only challenging the
wisdom of such a course."
2
J. William Fulbright, Old Myths and New






The background for United States' security
interests in Latin America goes back to the early
days of this country. At a relatively early stage
in the life of the United States, there was a dawning
awareness that U.S. security and self-defense were
intimately related not only to land contiguous to
the U.S. but also to Latin America and indeed to
the entire Western Hemisphere.
It is the purpose of this chapter to briefly
describe, up to the year 1967, the events leading to
the early appreciation of U.S. security interests in
Latin America. The chapter will also describe the
major events in the evolution of U.S. policy toward
conventional arms transfers to Latin America, in
support of this security.
This review will show that the U.S. was moved
to action only when a definite external threat
materialized to hazard its security interests in
Latin America. National security interests were
significantly threatened by feared German expansion

into the hemisphere at the time of World War II and
again by dreaded communist expansion at the time of
the Korean War. This resulted in a policy of arming
Latin America. In both cases, as the threat dissi-
pated, other latent concerns of the U.S. became pre-
dominant over security interests and resulted in
alterations of this policy and restrictions on the
transfer of arms to Latin America.
Early Events in the Evolution of U.S.
Security Interests in Latin America
A primary interest of a national government is
the physical security of the nation. This primary
or vital interest is fundamentally involved in
a nation's protection of its borders. For several
decades after its independence, the United States
was preoccupied with such problems as Indians
challenging the national authority on the frontiers
and disturbances at British and Spanish outposts
along the borders. By 1803, one of the justifica-
tions for the controversial Louisiana Purchase was
to enhance the security of the nation's Western
frontier. After the Louisiana Purchase, according
to Albert Weinberg, the feeling grew in the U.S.
that because of its fortuitous detached location

and sense of mission, it had a "preordained right to
ideal security."
Combined with the quest for ideal security through
expansion was the principle of self-defense. In order
to be able to defend the U.S. in time of crisis, it
became necessary to exclude foreign powers from
territory contiguous to it. The concept also grew
that the security interests of the U.S. extended
beyond its actual borders. As President Thomas
Jefferson said in 1808 in a letter to the governor
of the Louisiana Territory, the policy of the U.S.
"must be to exclude all European influence from
2this hemisphere."
Major events in the evolution of this policy of
expansion of security interests throughout the
Western Hemisphere were: the No Transfer Resolution
of 1811, the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819, and
the Monroe Doctrine announced in 1823. As problems
with Great Britain grew, which finally resulted in
the War of 1812, the U.S. came to fear occupation of
Spanish possessions in Florida as a British base
Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny. A Study
of Nationalist Expansionism in American History
(Chicago: Quadrangle, 1963; Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1935 [original], p. 385.
2
Paul L. Ford, ed
.
, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
,
vol. 9, 1807-1815 (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1898).
p. 213.

for conducting hostile operations against the United
States. As a result, Congress passed a resolution
on January 15, 1311, which stated that the U.S.
"cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part
of the said territory pass into the hands of any
foreign power" because of a concern for its
3
"safety." This No Transfer Resolution has been
called by Professor Samuel Bemis, "the first
significant landmark in the evolution of United
States' Latin American policy."
Another significant step in this evolution
was the Trans-Continental Treaty of 1819. As a con-
sequence of the French invasion of Spain in 1808,
which sapped Spanish military resources in Latin
America, independence movements broke out through-
out Latin American nations. Venezuela and Mexico
achieved independence in 1821; Brazil in 1822;
and by 1825, there were 19 Latin American states
3The Annals of Congress. The Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States .
11th Congress, 3rd Session, 1810-1811 (Washington,
D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1853), p. 376.
4 Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of
the United States. An Historical Interpretation (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1943), p. 30.
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who had gained their independence. 5 Because of the
exertions and requirements of the War of 1812, as
well as other factors, the U.S. remained neutral
with respect to the independence struggles in Latin
America. Relations with Spain were maintained on a
sufficiently proper level to result in the Trans-
Continental Treaty of 1819. By this treaty, the
U.S. gained all of the present Florida; definition
of the Western boundary of the Louisiana Territory;
Spain surrendered its claim to the Oregon Territory
to the U.S.; and the U.S. gained unquestioned control
and rights of free navigation on the Mississippi
River
.
The next major event became one of the most
famous announcements in U.S. diplomatic history,
the Monroe Doctrine. By 182 3, many of the Latin
American countries had obtained independence or were
in the throes of struggling to obtain it. Since
the Latin American nations had been European colonies
at the time the No Transfer Resolution was declared,
some of the premises on which the resolution was
based had changed. It was with these nations in
such precarious status that President Monroe,
DArthur P. Whi taker, The Western Hemisphere
Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1954), p. 20.

11
apprehensive that European powers might attempt to re-
acquire once again these nations, delivered his now
famous message on December 2, 1823. The President
said, in part, that the U.S. would consider any
attempt by European powers "to extend their poli-
tical system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety."
As the U.S. expanded, eventually to the
Pacific, one of the primary motivations for this
expansion was to provide greater security for the
United States. After the Monroe Doctrine was
announced, it gradually became clear that the
independence of the Latin American nations and the
maintenance of a friendly relationship with them
were important factors to the security of the
United States.
One year after President Monroe's announce-
ment of policy, Simon Bolivar issued invitations
William MacDonald, ed., Documentary Source
Book of American History, 1906-1913 (New York:
Macmillan, 1916), p. 320. This mention and descrip-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine and the considerations
leading up to it are necessarily brief. A great
deal has been written on the subject of the Monroe
Doctrine and one of the better known accounts is
Dexter Perkins , A History of the Monroe Doctrine
,
rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963).




to the newly independent nations of Latin America
to meet in Panama to form a security system to
protect themselves against any future attack from
European states. The U.S. was belatedly invited
to attend, but because of a protracted Senate debate
on confirmation of the proposed delegates, the Panama
Congress was completed in July 1826, before the
United States' delegates could arrive on the scene.
Few concrete accomplishments resulted from the Congress
because none of its resolutions were ever ratified by
a sufficient number of states. Nevertheless, it
does mark the beginning of a Pan American concept
of Western Hemisphere nations forming together for
8
mutual security and protection.
18 8 9 to the End of World War I
A new period of inter-American relations began
in 1889 and continued until the completion of World
War I. In 1889, representatives of the Latin
American republics met in Washington, D.C. at the
7
Alexander DeConde , A History of American
Foreign Policy , 2nd ed. (New York: Scribners, 1971),
pp. 142-143.
8
J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter -
American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 45-47.
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invitation of the United States. The purpose was to
discuss such issues as customs regulations, a uniform
system of weights and measures, and adoption of
a silver coin to be used in inter-American financial
9transactions. The one concrete result of this first
conference was the establishment of the International
Union of American Republics, which later became known
as the Pan American Union.
Four such inter-American conferences were held
between 1889 and the outbreak of World War I. They
were oriented primarily toward the promotion of trade,
not security, and did not seriously consider what the
joint reaction of the American republics would be to
a major European war. As a result, there was little,
if any, coherent or coordinated action on the part of
the Pan American nations to improve their defenses
against the hazards of the war which began in August
1914. Due to the lack of concerted action, one
9U.S., Congress, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1888 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1889), Part II, p. 1658.
"First International Conference of American
States. Washington, October 2, 1889-April 19,
1890," James B. Scott, ed
.
, The International Confer -
ences of American States, 1889-1928 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 36.
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commentator has placed the burden of initiative with
the U.S. since it was the only nation capable of
taking serious action, and faulted the U.S. for
its neglect as "a betrayal of its responsibilities
of leadership." The one unanimous action by the
American republics was to individually declare their
neutrality.
On February 3, 1917, when President Wilson
announced the breaking of diplomatic relations with
Germany, he stated his hope that all neutral nations
would follow the example of the United States, un-
doubtedly having in mind the other American republics
His hope was only partially achieved. Nevertheless,
two months later when the United States had become so
involved as to declare war on Germany on April 6,
1917, more than half of the Latin American nations
were able to take some diplomatic action, but their
record was far from unanimous. Eight countries
declared war on Germany: Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rico,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
Five more severed diplomatic relations: Bolivia,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay;
J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter -
American Security, 1889-1960, p. 80.

15
seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
xMexico, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela. 12
Several reasons can be given for this lack of
unity. The first is that the war events in Western
Europe and the war on the Western front just did not
represent a credible threat to the physical security
of some Latin American nations. A second reason is
that several Latin American republics were reluctant
to follow the example of the United States, which
since the advent of the Wilson administration, had
sworn never to intervene in the internal affairs of
its sister American republics. Contrary to official
pronouncements, however—clearly in recent memory--
were the examples of the occupations of Nicaragua in
1912, Haiti in 1915, the Dominican Republic in 1916,
and the landings at Vera Cruz in Mexico in 1914.
Because of the difference between its stated policies
and its actions, the U.S. was perceived by some Latin
American nations not to be the star by which to steer
their ships of state.
Even though 13 of 20 nations took some overt
action, there was a decided lack of unity. Of those
nations that declared war, only Brazil was in South
12 • •Graham H. Stuart and James L. Tigner, Latin
America and the United States , 6th ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice Hall, 1975), p. 5.
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America. The remainder were in Central America or
were in the Caribbean area. Three of the primary powers
in Latin America, Argentine, Chile and Mexico, remained
strictly neutral. Indeed, of all of Latin America
only Brazil and Cuba took an active part in the war.
Brazil sent two cruisers and four destroyers to assist
the British navy in European waters, and both Brazil
and Cuba sent aviators, who entered the action on the
Western front. Cuba was readying troops, but the war
ended before they could be sent to Europe.
On the positive side, even the neutrals, with
the exception of Argentina, sold vital raw materials,
products and resources to the Allied governments. The
13 nations that declared war or severed diplomatic re-
lations with Germany were qualified to take part in
the Peace Conference at Versailles, and 11 signed the
treaty. Eventually all 20 Latin American republics
became members of the League of Nations and comprised
a significant portion of an organization which totaled
1463 members in its lifetime. The termination by the
war of many European sources of commerce, capital and
13John H. Latane, A History of American Foreign
Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1927), pp.
661-662.
14
U.S., Department of State, The Treaty of Ver -
sailles and After. Annotations of the Text of the





expertise made the Latin American nations more self-
reliant and more aware of their interdependence.
Also through increased contact with the United States,
improved relations, which survived the pressures and
expediencies of the war, were established in social
15and economic fields. These events served to make
these nations more aware of the part they could play
in international affairs and how their acting in
concert with other American nations might enhance
their security and economic gain in the future.
The Inter-War Period
Throughout the inter-war period, the U.S. showed
little interest in or appreciation for Latin America
in its role in the security of the United States.
One factor causing this lack of interest was the
conviction that after World War I, little or no
threat from Europe existed toward Latin America. It
was not until the events leading to World War II posed
a clear threat to U.S. security interests that the
U.S. displayed an appreciation of the Latin American
contribution to this security. The following will
describe the growth of U.S. awareness of the need
to arm Latin America and the dilemma this need
15Percy A. Martin, Latin America and the War




presented in view of previous U.S. policy expressed
in its neutrality legislation.
In 1920, after the U.S. Senate voted for the
seconc time to reject ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles and U.S. entry into the League of Nations,
President Baltasar Blum of Uruguay made an original
proposal for an Ar.erican League cf Nations as a re-
gional security alliance based on the Monroe Doctrine.
Isc thing rare cf his proposition until it was formally
introduced to the Fifth Inter-American Conference at
Santiago, Chile in 1923. Even chough Blue's plan
see-ed to coincide vrith President Wilson's 1916 plan
to Pan Arr.ericanize the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. was
net in favor cf the Blur, overture, and it never cave
to a :crca_ vote. In viev; or tne _ . ~ . senate s
handling cf the Treaty of Versailles, descite Presi-
dent Wilson's efforts, it is not surprising thai
Blue's plan v;as shunted aside by the U.S. delegation
at Santiago. The Senate had been toe aroused against
entanqlinq alliances" by its recent debates and too
Baltasar Bluir., American Solidarity (Montevideo,
Uruguay: Imprenta Nacional, 192 C. , pp. 2 4-2 5.
'Wilson's plan was contained in his address on
January 6, 1916, tc the Second Pan American Scientific
Congress in Washington, D.C. See Jav.es 3. Scott, ed.,
President Wilson's Foreign Policy. Messages, Addresses,




intent on a return to the security of continental
isolation to become involved in a military coalition.
Part of the reasoning was, first, the defeat of
Germany seemed to send any possible security threat.
Second, the military and naval strength of recent allies
could prevent any serious challenge from crossing the
oceans into the Western Hemisphere. 18 In particular,
Britain's Royal Navy with its prestige and potency was
seen as the most significant factor in the equation of
power insulating the Americas from foreign threats.
Until the late 1930' s, the security policy of
the U.S. rested on the bedrock concept that national
defense consisted of protecting the continental United
States and the Panama Canal. While the U.S. Navy's
battle fleet was judged adequate to counter a threat
in either ocean, the Canal was required to permit the
fleet the mobility to concentrate in one ocean or
the other since the fleet was insufficient to meet
19
serious threats in both oceans simultaneously.
The events in Europe during the 1930' s coupled
with the technological advances in weapons developments
1
8
J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States -




19Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The United
States Army in World War II. The Western Hemisphere .
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 15.

20
led U.S. planners to expand the previously held con-
cept of continental defense. The lessons from the
demonstrations of the new capabilities of air power
during the Spanish Civil War which began in 1936, were
not confined within the Spanish borders. The destruc-
tion of Guernica on April 26, 1937, by elements of the
German Luftwaffe was not lost as an example on Ameri-
can planners responsible for the defense of the
Panama Canal. For decades the defense of the fragile
locks and mechanical apparatus of the Canal had relied
on coastal artillery. Now it became obvious that the
Canal was vulnerable to combat aircraft or air-trans-
ported paratroops flying from land bases within Latin
America or sea-based aircraft launched from an aircraft
carrier out of sight but nearby in international waters.
Proper defense of the United States now included pre-
venting access of any enemy to aircraft landing zones
within Latin America as well as the sea approaches to
the Panama Canal in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.
At the time, some observers questioned the
German capability for actually launching an attack
across the Atlantic, but initially at least, military
planners saw the threat as real. In early 1939,
20 Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron
Fairchild, The United States Army in World War II .
The Western Hemisphere. Guarding the United States
and its Outposts (Washington, D.C. : Government Print-
ing Office, 1964), pp. 302-303.

21
Major General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Chief of Staff
of the Army Air Corps, testified to the Senate military
committee that Germany had 1,700 aircraft capable of
flying across the South Atlantic narrows from Africa
21to Brazil, a distance of some 1,600 miles. It was
brought out in the questioning that the planes could
not carry a bomb load across, but that was one reason
that bases in South America would be so important--to
serve as replenishment bases for possible later attacks
on the U.S. He admitted that the Germans did not
have the capability of directly attacking the United
States. 22 In 1940, Army Chief of Staff General
George C. Marshall credited the crucial factor as
resting with the navies. He asserted, ". . .as long
as the British fleet remains undefeated and England
holds out, the Western Hemisphere is in little danger
of direct attack," but added that if the British fleet
were sunk or surrendered, the situation would be
23
"radically changed." In their authoritative book
on this period, William Langer and Everett Gleason
have said:
21
"Testifies on Base for Nazi Attack," New York
Times , 22 February 1939, p. 3:5.
22
Ibid.
23George C. Marshall, quoted in Conn and




Of all the problems and dangers that confronted
President Roosevelt and his advisers in the
critical months of May and June, 1940, the
issues of Latin America and of hemisphere de-
fense appeared the most urgent. Though it seems
somewhat strange in retrospect, it is a fact that
the United States Chiefs of Staff at the time
regarded the Nazi threat to South American
countries as perhaps the most immediate danger
to national security. They therefore assigned
questions of hemisphere defense the highest
priority. 24
The U.S. was slow to realize the threat to its
security in the hemisphere as the indications of war
grew in Europe. However once the U.S. appreciated the
threat, it moved quickly to replace European military
missions in Latin America and encourage hemispheric
solidarity in face of the threat.
The first foreign military mission to Latin
America began in 1885 when Chile extended an invitation
to the Imperial German army to send a mission to reor-
25ganize and train the Chilean army. The first U.S.
military mission to Latin America was a naval mission
2 fi
established in Peru on July 20, 1920. Later in 1922,
a U.S. naval mission was established in Brazil after a
24William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The




25 ....Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin
America (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 32.
U.S., Congress, House, Inter-American Military
Cooperation Act, Hearings , before the House Committee




formal request from the Brazilian government. During
World War I, Brazil had obtained the assistance of a
number of U.S. naval officers to assist in readying
the Brazilian ships for European duty, but this was
27not a formal mission. An act of Congress in 1926
further authorized missions to Latin America from all
2 8of the U.S. armed services. The first U.S. Army
mission, however, was not sent until 1938, when it
went to Colombia after the U.S. became concerned about
the contribution of Latin America to U.S. security as
2 9the threat of war grew in Europe. During the inter-
war period, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain had
military missions in 12 Latin American countries,
but they had all been withdrawn by 1941 and replaced
30with U.S. military missions.
It was not until 1938 that the United States
authorities became sufficiently alarmed over the pos-
sibility that events in Europe would form a security
27 . .Julius A. Purer, Administration of the Navy
Department in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1959), pp. 683-685.
2 8Public Law 247, Statutes at Large of the
United States of America , December 1925 to March 1927,
vol. XLIV, pt. 2, p. 565.
29Lieuwen, Arms and Politics
, p. 188.
30U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Contributing to the Effective Maintenance of
International Peace and Security , H. Rept. 966, 80th
Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 8.
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threat to the United States and the Western Hemisphere,
that they began to take the serious action of actual
preparations. This slowness is understandable in light
of reports, as late as 1937, that a majority (61.4
percent) cf Americans appeared to be against "defend-
ing by force any Latin American country from foreign
attack." By 1938, however, State Department offi-
cials became concerned by reports from foreign service
officers in Latin America that there were indications
of Xazi and Facist activities in that region. Because
cf these apprehensions, in his message to Congress on
January 28, 1938, President Roosevelt requested new
funds fcr defense and stated that, "Our national de-
fense is . . . inadequate for the purposes of national
32
security ana requires increase for that reason." He
defined adequate defense as "simultaneous defense of
33
every part of the United States of America."
Later that year, on November 14, 1938, the
President assembled the nation's principal milirary
and civilian leaders and advisors at the White House
Dexter Perkins, "The Monroe Doctrine Today,"
Yale Review , vol. 30 (June 1941), p. 694.
32Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Message of the Presi-
dent to the Congress, January 28, 1938," U.S., Depart-
ment of State, Peace and War. United States Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1943), p. 404.
Ibid




for a conference which centered primarily on the
problem of aircraft. The next day he told newsmen
that the concept of the defenses of the United States
had been expanded and now extended "from Canada to
Tierra del Fuego." 34
A month later on December 24, 19 38, at the
conclusion of the Eighth International Conference of
American States at Lima, Peru, the 21 American repub-
lics stated in the "Declaration of Lima" their re-
affirmation of their "continental solidarity" and
their determination to defend "against all foreign
intervention or activity that may threaten." 35 The
chairman of the U.S. delegation, Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, later wrote that he was very pleased
with the outcome at Lima because "the danger to
the Western Hemisphere was real and imminent. It was
not limited to the possibility of a military invasion,
It was more acute in its indirect form of propaganda,
penetration, organizing political parties, buying
34 Samuel I. Rosenman, compiler and collator,
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D .
Roosevelt . 1938 vol., The Continuing Struggle for
Liberalism (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 599.
35U.S., Department of State, Report of the Dele -
gation of the United States of America to the Eighth
International Conference of American States, Lima
,
Peru, December 9-27, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1938), p. 190.
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some adherents, and blackmailing others." 36 This idea
of mutual help and protection was evident in President
Roosevelt's mind during the Cabinet meeting on Septem-
ber 1, 1939, the day Germany invaded Poland and World
War II began. He told his Cabinet, "whatever
happens, we won't send our troops abroad. We need
only think of defending this hemisphere." 37
At this point it was becoming clearer that the
arming of the Latin American nations would be in the
best interests of the U.S. and would serve as a counter
to the Axis threat in this hemisphere. The question
then became how this transfer of arms could be legally
accomplished. As the threat of war increased in
Europe, serious apprehension grew in this country that
any such war would dangerously affect or even involve
the U.S. It became increasingly clear to the Adminis-
tration that for the best defense of the U.S., it
would be necessary to provide military equipment to
the nations of Latin America. The provision of arms
created a significant problem because of the specifi-
cations of the U.S. neutrality laws.
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull
,
vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1948)
, p. 602.
37Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in Joseph Alsop
and Robert Kinter, American White Paper. The Story
of American Diplomacy and the Second World War (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1940), p. 65.
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One authoritative source explained:
These [Latin American] nations were free to buy
in the United States whatever they could find
available. On the other hand, there was no
legal way of supplying them with United States
Army or Navy equipment unless it has first
been declared obsolete and surplus, and unless
there existed no market for it in the United
States. 38
Thus the dilemma was formed. In order to provide arms
to Latin America, the weapons had to be declared out-
moded and in excess of U.S. needs which could not be
done by any stretch of the imagination in view of the
pressures and considerations of the time.
President Roosevelt tried to spur the Congress
out of this predicament in his State of the Union
address of January 4, 1939, in which he urged the
alteration of the neutrality laws. He stated that as
far as the Hemisphere was concerned, "we propose to do
our share in protecting against storms from any
39quarter." He went on to stress that "we have
learned that when we deliberately try to legislate
neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly
38William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The
Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1952), p. 275.
39Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Address Delivered by
President Roosevelt to the Congress, January 4, 1939,"
U.S., Department of State, Peace and War. United
States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 448.
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and unfairly—may actually give aid to an aggressor
and deny it to the victim."
As a result, the Congress began consideration of
legislation which would permit the sale of military
equipment to Latin America. This bill became known as
the Pittman Act, named after the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Despite repeated urging
by the Administration, the Congress demurred and the
legislation was not approved for nearly a year and a
half. A serious problem with the Pittman Act was that
it was amended to include the proviso that "no trans-
action authorized herein shall result in expense to
the United States, nor involve the extension of credits
41by the United States." Any transfers, therefore,
had to be for cash. The legislation prevented the ex-
tension of credit, and the Latin American nations did
not have the funds for outright purchase even if the
arms had existed and could have been declared surplus.
The Pittman Act was signed by President Roosevelt
on June 15, 1940. It permitted the U.S. to manufac-
ture and sell coastal artillery and anti-aircraft
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republics. Since the U.S. had no spare capability
at the time for the manufacture of such items, only
a few thousand rifles were eventually transferred
under the Act. Nevertheless, it was a "significant
psychological step toward Lend-Lease." The Lend-
Lease Act finally solved the dilemma which faced the
U.S. as the Nazi threat became clear in this hemi-
sphere, while the U.S. was still constrained by the
restrictions of the neutrality legislation.
When the Lend-Lease Act was signed on March 11,
1941, Latin American nations were included as eligible
recipients under Section 3.a(l), which author-
ized, "any defense article for the government of any
country whose defense the President deems vital to
44
the defense of the United States." In April, the
President approved the recommendation of the Secre-
taries of State, War and Navy for a delivery program
of $400,000,000 of war material to the Latin
42 Ibid., pp. 173-175.
Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act .
Lend Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1969), p. 53.
44
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American nations under the authority of the Lend-
45Lease program.
By the end of the war, $247 million of equip-
ment had actually been delivered to Latin American
allies, which represented less than one percent of all
46Lend-Lease aid. Argentina is the one Latin American
nation that did not receive any Lend-Lease aid due to
its pro-German sympathies. Brazil and Mexico received
71 percent of the Lend-Lease aid sent to the 19 Latin
American nations, primarily because they took the most
active parts in supporting the Allied cause. Brazil
provided anti-submarine patrols in the South Atlantic
and sent one division of 25,000 men to combat in Italy,
Mexico sent one squadron of P-4 7 Thunderbolt
fighters to the Pacific theatre where they entered
combat in the Philippines.
45
U.S., Department of State, "The Under Secre-
tary of States (Welles) to President Roosevelt,"
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941. The
American Republics , vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office), p. 138.
46
U.S., President, Twenty-First Report to Congress
on Lend-Lease Operations. For the Period Ended Sep -
tember 30, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government








During World War II, a high point was reached
in U.S. security interests in Latin America, but by
the end of the war this interest declined as the
defeat of the Axis powers removed the threat to the
hemisphere. The following describes the build-up of
U.S. security interests at the beginning of the war
and the reduction of these interests after victory
became assured.
The increase in U.S. appreciation of Latin
America as a benefit to its security at the beginning
of World War II is evidenced by the commitments at
the early hemispheric conferences and the eagerness
with which the U.S. pursued Latin American coopera-
tion in defending this security. The Declaration of
Lima of 1938 served as the foundation for coordination
and cooperation among the hemispheric nations during
World War II. It provided for the convening of con-
sultations whenever the peace of the hemisphere was
threatened. As a result, in accordance with the
Declaration, immediately after the Germans attacked
Poland on September 1, 1939, a conference of foreign
ministers was called.
This first conference of foreign ministers was
held in Panama a few weeks later, from September 2 3
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to October 3, with Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles as the U.S. representative. One of the most
notable results of the conference was Resolution XIV,
the Declaration of Panama, which stated that a secur-
ity zone of some 300 miles was established around the
American republics south of Canada and was to be
4 8clear of belligerent actions. Professor Bemis has
called the Declaration of Panama an "historical
and juridical curiosity" which had no effect on the
49belligerents. Nevertheless the conference and the
Declaration served the purpose of helping to weld
together the American republics in a common enter-
prise. Sumner Welles was impressed by "the extra-
ordinary feeling of inter-American unity displayed"
by the delegates.
48
Pan American Union, Report on the Meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics
Panama, September 23-October 3, 1939 (Washington, D.C.
Pan American Union, 1939), pp. 19-21.
49 . . .Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of
the United States. An Historical Interpretation
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1943), pp. 365-
366.
50 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York:
Harper & Row, 1944), p. 211. Even if the Latin
Americans displayed unity, there was discontent at
home about the security zone. Assistant Secretary of
State Berle has described the dissatisfaction of
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. See Beatrice B.
Berle and Travis B. Jacobs, eds . Navigating the
Rapids, 1918-1971. From the Papers of Adolph A.




Resolution XII of the Panama meeting called
for another meeting in Havana on October 1, 1940,
but due to the events which unfolded with such
rapidity and magnitude in Europe, the date was ad-
vanced to July. The preceding months had seen the
invasion of Norway by Germany; the fall of Holland,
Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg; the British evacua-
tion of Dunkerque; and in June the fall of France.
Because of the German occupation of European nations
with colonial holdings in Latin America, the spectre
of German entry into the Western Hemisphere became
even more real. This eventuality had been foreseen
in Resolution XVI of the Panama meeting and was even
more explicit in Resolution XX, The Act of Havana,
in 1940. The Act of Havana provided for the admin-
istration of European colonies in the Western
Hemisphere by an Inter-American Commission for
Territorial Administration to prevent their occupa-
tion by non-American and presumably German forces.
While the Act of Havana gained more attention
at the time, of perhaps more long-lasting significance
was Resolution XV, entitled "Reciprocal Assistance and
51 Pan American Union, Report on the Second Meeting
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics. Habana , July 21-30, 1940 (Washington, D.C.:
Pan American Union, 1940), pp. 37-38.
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Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the
Americas." In part the resolution stated:
Any attempt on the part of a non-American
State against the integrity or inviolability
of the territory, the sovereignty or the poli-
tical independence of an American State shall
be considered as an act of aggression against
the States which sign this declaration . 52
This agreement by the American States is notable
because it "contemplated aggression by non-American
powers only and, consequently, was the first inter-




As a result of the first two meetings of foreign
ministers, the U.S. and Latin American nations had
already agreed on a policy to employ when the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The
mechanism operated smoothly to organize the third meet-
ing of foreign ministers at Rio de Janeiro in January
1942, in response to the Japanese attack.
The Rio meeting approved a number of resolutions
which became the basis for the defense of the nations
of the hemisphere, including reiteration in Resolution
I that an act of aggression "against any one of them"
52
Ibid.
, p . 35
.
5 3
J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter -
American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1961), p. 189. [emphasis in the original]
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would be considered as "an act of aggression against
all of them." 54
One of the primary objectives of the U.S. at
this conference in Rio was to obtain a unanimous
resolution requiring all American republics to sever
diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Argentina
and Chile refused to approve such a compact, but all
finally agreed to a resolution which "recommended"
5 5such a severance of relations. As a result, all
except Argentina and Chile did immediately sever diplo-
matic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan.
Eventually, before the end of the war, all American
republics severed diplomatic relations and declared
war on one or more of the Axis powers. This was
quite an improvement in the display of hemispheric
solidarity over the record of diplomatic action against
Germany in World War I when Brazil was the only nation
54Organization of American States, "Third Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the American Republics. Rio de Janeiro, January 15-28,
1942," The International Conferences of American States
,
Second Supplement, 1942-54 (Washington, D.C.: Organi-
zation of American States, 1958), pp. 10-11.
J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States -
Latin American Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1965)
, pp. 146-147.
"The Americas and the War," Bulletin of the Pan
American Union , vol. 79 (October 1945), p. 585. This
convenient source maintained a box score of the diplo-
matic undertakings of all American republics toward the
Axis powers from April 1942 until the end of the war.
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in South America to declare war and seven in Latin
America remained neutral.
Concerning the accomplishments of the confer-
ences at Lima and later, Dr. Francis Wilcox has said:
The result of these deliberations has been to
make the peace and security of the Americas, not
the unilateral concern of Washington, but the
collective concern of all the American states.
This move to convert the Monroe Doctrine into a
common hemispheric defense policy paid rich
dividends after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 57
This new cohesiveness was noteworthy because the
"general awareness of this common danger led all the
republics of the hemisphere to endorse the defensive
principles of the Monroe Doctrine—considered as a
basis for collective, rather than unilateral, action."
Before World War II was completed, however, there were
signs that Latin America had fallen in priority among
the interests of the U.S. Perhaps as a shadow of things
to come, the Latin American nations might have perceived
a coming change in the U.S. attitude toward their
57Francis 0. Wilcox, "The Monroe Doctrine and
World War II," The American Political Science Review
,
vol. 36 (June 1942), p. 435.
58 David H. Popper, "The Rio de Janeiro Conference
of 1942," Foreign Policy Reports
,
15 April 1942, p. 26.
This article is an excellent review of the factors and
considerations at work at the time. Of value by the
same author is "Hemisphere Solidarity in the War Crisis,"
Foreign Policy Reports , 15 May 1942, pp. 50-63. Also
see Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine
,




importance in post-war U.S. policy when they found they
had been excluded from the Dumbarton Oaks conference.
The conference, which met in Washington from August
to October 1944, was convened to formulate a tentative
draft charter for the yet unborn United Nations or-
ganization. Officially entitled "Conversations,"
the Dumbarton Oaks conference was attended only by the
Unites States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
59
and China. Since so many Latin American nations had
participated actively in the League of Nations and
most had declared war on at least one of the Axis
powers by this time, many felt that they should have
had a part to play in the conference. Additionally,
of the 26 signatories to the United Nations Declara-
tion of January 1, 1942, nine (35%) were from Latin
America. During the war, additional nations specified
their adherence to the declaration, bringing the total
to 47; among these, 19 (40%) were from Latin
60America
.
After becoming aware of the Latin American
nations' displeasure at their exclusion, Secretary
59
"Washington Conversations on International
Organization. Statement by the President," Department
of State Bulletin , vol. 11 (8 October 1944), p. 365.
"Declaration by United Nations, January 1,
1942," U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic







of State Stettinius held periodic briefings for repre-
sentatives of Latin American governments while the
conference was in progress. The arrangement proved to
be of little substance and was unsatisfactory to the
Latin American diplomats who could have probably
gleaned more information from New York Times articles
by James Reston.
In accordance with policy adopted before the
war, the U.S. did not want to build Latin American
military capabilities to the point that they would be
able to actually provide forces for combat. After the
fortunes of war turned to clearly favor the Allies,
"the Army's policy during 1944 was to reduce lend-
lease aid to Latin America to the greatest possible
extent." As it became clear that victory in the war
was only a matter of time, the U.S. became involved in
matters other than the defense of the hemisphere and
the status of Latin American allies. Problems of
rehabilitating Europe, forming the international
c
1
Mr. Reston was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for
1945 for his work in reporting the Dumbarton Oaks
conference. Stewart Alsop credits Mr. Reston 's ex-
ceptional access to privileged information from inside
the conference to "some communicative Chinese dele-
gates." Stewart Alsop, The Center. People and Power




Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemi -
sphere Defense, p. 236. [emphasis added]
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security apparatus, and providing for the occupation
of former enemy territory became more pressing than
the demands of Latin America. Early in the war,
"after the fall of France and during the dark days
following Pearl Harbor, the United States had ardently




After World War II ended, the primacy of U.S.
security interests in this hemisphere remained at a
relatively low level until revived as the threat of
Communist expansion grew with the advent of the Cold
War. This period demonstrates the normally low inter-
est of the U.S. in Latin America's potential contri-
bution to U.S. security, except at times of dire
threat to the hemisphere. This period also demon-
strates the beginnings of differences between execu-
tive and congressional perceptions of this threat.
An example of the growth of differences between
executive and congressional evaluation of the threat
can be seen in the handling of legislation proposed
by the President in 1946 and 1947. President
Laurence Duggan, The Americas. The Search






Truman's proposed Inter-American Military Cooperation
Act was forwarded to Congress on May 6, 1946. It
would have permitted the training of Latin American
military personnel, repair of equipment, and transfer
of military equipment. The only proviso was "that
such transfers shall be consistent with the military
and naval requirements of the United States and with
. 54the national interest." In his forwarding letter,
President Truman said:
This Government will not, I am sure, in any way
approve of, nor will it participate in, the
indiscriminate or unrestricted distribution of
armaments, which could only contribute to a use-
less and burdensome armaments race. In executing
this program it will be borne in mind, moreover,
that it is policy of this Government to encourage
the establishment of sound economic conditions
in the other American Republics which will con-
tribute to the improvement of living standards
and the advancement of social and cultural wel-
fare. Such conditions are a prerequisite to
international peace and security. Operations
under the proposed legislation will be conducted
with full and constant awareness that no encour-
agement should be given to the imposition upon
other people of any useless burden of armaments
which would handicap the economic improvement
which all countries so strongly desire."
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Army
Chief of Staff, testified in favor of the act during
U.S. , President , Inter-American Military Cooper -
ation Act, U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, H. Doc. 548, 79th Cong., 2nd sess, 1946,
p. 3.
65 Ibid., p. 2.
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congressional hearings and stated:
It is my opinion that the Inter-American Cooper-
ation Act is militarily sound from the viewpoint
of our national interest, will add to the peace
and security of this hemisphere, and will make
a distinct contribution to the peace and
security of the world. 66
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported
favorably on the bill with only minor amendments and
recommended to the House that the bill pass. 6 '
However, the House did not act on the bill and it
died with the end of the session.
Only one year after V-E Day and eight months
after the end of V.'orld War II, the President in his
forwarding letter had mentioned several subjects which
were raised countless times in the following years
involving the controversy of the transfer of conven-
tional arms to Latin America: (1) the possibility of
stimulation of an arms race, and *(2) the desire for
establishment of stable economic conditions which
would foster the advancement of social welfare and an
improved standard of living for all.
U.S., Congress, House, Inter-American Military
Cooperation Act, Hearings , before the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946,
p. 17.
fi 7
U.S., House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
The Inter-American military Cooperation Act , H. Rept.
2230, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946, p. 1.
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Despite the lack of results by Congress in 1946,
the President resubmitted the Inter-American Military
Cooperation Act to Congress in May 1947. In his for-
warding letter President Truman emphasized that "world
developments during the year that has passed give
still greater importance to this legislation." 68
During executive session hearings, Army Colonel
Godwin Ordway of the War Department General Staff out-
lined the objectives of the program. The first was to
protect the territorial integrity of the continental
U.S. He pointed out that "in this age of long-range
aircraft and the guided missile, the security of any
point in the Western Hemisphere is essentially synony-
mous with the security of the United States." The
second objective was to exclude European or Asiatic
influence from the hemisphere. Thirdly, he pointed
out that a modest expenditure in peacetime preparations
would prevent exorbitant costs in the event of a
crisis. Fourth was to safeguard the strategic re-
sources essential in a wartime situation. The fifth
U.S., President, Inter-American Military Coop -
eration Act
,
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, H. Doc. 271, 80th Cong., 1st sess.,
1947, p. 1.
69U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Inter-
national Relations, Selected Executive Session Hear -
ings of the Committee, 1943-50. Military Assistance




reason was modernization and standardization of Latin
American military services so they could make a con-
tribution to hemispheric security in the future. 70
In an effort to ensure passage of the proposed
bill and to prevent the stagnation of 1946, the Admin-
istration assembled a most impressive array of its
talented spokesmen to testify in favor of the legis-
lation. Testimony was heard from General of the Army
George C. Marshall as Secretary of State, James
Forestal as Secretary of the Navy, General of the
Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Army Chief of Staff,
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as Chief of Naval
Operations, and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway
as U.S. Representative and Chairman of the Inter-
71American Defense Board.
But not all of the testimony heard by the
committee favored passage of the bill. In both execu-
tive and open sessions an issue was made of Under
Secretary of State Dean Acheson's secret letter to
Secretary of War Robert Patterson opposing passage
of the bill. In spite of being classified secret,
Acheson's letter was somehow leaked and reprinted
70 Ibid., pp. 474-475.
71 ...
U.S., Congress, House, Inter-American Military
Cooperation Act, Hearings , before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.
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in the press. In his letter, Acheson explained his
opposition, in part, by stating that the bill would
have undesirable consequences such as:
We shall encourage expenditures for arma-
ments by the other American Republics which
will weaken their economies and therefore their
political stability, and we shall be called upon
by the poorer countries to subsidize the program
at great cost to this Government. . . . Encour-
agement of expenditures on arms by the Latin
American countries runs directly counter to our
basic economic and political policies which aim
to encourage an improvement in the living
standards and economic welfare of those coun-
tries .
The sacrifices which all of the Latin Ameri-
can countries would be required to make under
the proposed program would drastically limit
or defer their effectuation of plans for industri-
alization, improvement of transportation, pro-
duction of stretegic materials needed by the
United States, and correction of presently
poor conditions of public health, education
and social welfare. '*
The committee assumed the letter was actually
written by Spruille Braden, serving as Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs,
and that it represented the considered opinion of
the entire Latin American division in the State
Department. Congressman Chiper field stated: "We
72Letter from Acting Secretary of State Dean
Acheson to Secretary of War Patterson, dated
19 March 1947, quoted in part in Frank C. Hanighen,




all know that Mr. Braden has publicly been against
this program for years." 73
Braden was reported to be against the legislation
because "it would not strengthen defenses to the south
of us, but might start an arms race that would
strengthen non-democratic elements and operate to the
advantage of those countries that are the richest." 74
Such interpretations were not new. Earlier criticism
of the Lend-Lease program made many similar points.
Frank Tannenbaum argued in 1944 that receipt of arms
by Latin American governments had increased the
"danger, if not the likelihood, that these new tools
may be used in older quarrels between Latin American
75
nations." He went on to point out that by support-
ing present regimes, the U.S. would be held respon-
sible for "saddling the present 'tyrannies' upon the
people" and for impeding the "natural process of
Latin American 'democracy.'"
73U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interna-
national Relations, Selected Executive Session Hearings
on the Committee, 1943-50. Military Assistance Pro -
grams. Historical Series
,
vol. 6, pt. 2, 1976, p. 508.
74 Spruille Braden, quoted in Bertram D. Hulen,
"Move to Arm Americas Has a Double Motive," New York
Times , 1 June 1947, pt. 4, p. 7:1.
75Frank Tannenbaum, "An American Commonwealth of
Nations," Foreign Affairs , vol. 22 (July 1944), p. 586.
76 Ibid., p. 587.
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Among those testifying against the bill was
Norman Thomas, Chairman of the Postwar World
Council. He was involved in one humorous exchange:
MR. THOMAS. H.R. 3836, the so-called Inter-
American Military Cooperation Act should be
entitled "An Act to foment discord, stir up
wars, strengthen dictators, provide Communists
with material for anti-American propaganda,
aggrandize American military establishments at
the expense of the people, and swell the pro-
fits of the makers of arms."
MR. EATON. [Chairman of the Committee] Would
you allow me to ask a question at this time:
Are you against this bill?
MR. THOMAS. No. I am just trying to conceal
my support. 7 '
Mr. Thomas went on to refer to the proposal as
"this amazingly dangerous bill" and strongly urged
7 8that the measure not pass. Despite such contrary
views, the Committee on Foreign Affairs voted favorably
on the bill with slight modifications and recommended
to the full House that the bill be passed. In its
endorsement the committee said:
77 ...U.S. Congress, House, Inter-American Military
Cooperation Act , Hearings , before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 101
Mr. Thomas was referring to the subtitle of the bill
which was "A bill to contribute to the effective main-
tenance of international peace and security pursuant
to the objectives and principles of the United Nations,
to provide for military cooperation of the American
States in light of their international undertakings,




The defense of Latin America can be provided in
a number of ways. The old system of competitive
arms sales by a commercial interest for private
profit may be largely dead, but it could all too
readily be supplanted by an eager offering of
arms—by European powers in barter or related
deal's-for Latin American exports. Another al-
ternative is to seek through inter-American
action to maintain the lowest possible level of
armaments, throughout the hemisphere, with no
replacement of present established equipment.
The third alternative is to provide an adequate
defensive establishment in the Americas, in addi-
tion to whatever armaments the United States
finds necessary for its own commitments in the
world. The most efficient means of doing so,
with the greatest limitation of arms for each
nation, is to provide for armed forces that can
work together in joint activities to meet any
future threat from outside the hemisphere . "79
The full House was less impressed with the merit
of the proposal than the committee; so again, as in
1946, the House failed to act and the bill died with
the end of the session. The New York Times estimated
that since the 1946 legislation had not reached the
Congress until the month of May, it was too late in the
session for proper consideration and action on such a
major program. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
was portrayed as "dubious" about the 1947 legislation
8because it had reached the Congress even later in May.
In the end, it met the same fate as its predecessor.
79 .U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Contributing to the Effective Maintenance of
International Peace and Security , H. Rept. 998, 80th
Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 6.
8 Bertram D. Hulen, "Move to Arm Americas Has




One reason the Truman Administration wanted the
Inter-American Military Cooperation bill passed was to
be able to give dramatic evidence of U.S. dedication
to hemisphere security when the Rio Conference met in
August, 1947. Even without this package in hand for
the U.S., the conference produced the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This Rio Treaty
became the cornerstone of the hemisphere defense system
and is the oldest collective defense system of which
the U.S. is a part. In its Article 3, the treaty
plainly states that "An armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an
8
1
attack against all American States."
On March 30, 1948, the Ninth International Con-
ference of American States met in Bogota, Colombia, to
formally establish the Organization of American States
(OAS)
. The charter of the OAS placed the inter-Ameri-
can system on a permanent basis, whereas previously
it was sustained only by the resolutions of the Inter-
American conferences. Dr. Robert Osgood pointed out
that the regional system established by the Rio Treaty
and the charter of the OAS is unique among U.S. alli-
ances because it was not spawned by pressures of
8
1
Pan American Union, Report on the Results of the
Conference, Inter-American Conference for the Mainten -
ance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro
,
August 15-September 2, 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Pan
American Union, 1947), p. 62.
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the Cold War but rather grew from the heritage of the
Pan American system and the experience of World War
8 2
II. Although not born in the Cold War, this hemi-
sphere security system was soon to be involved in its
far-reaching ramifications.
Despite the obvious indication by the Rio Treaty
of interest in Latin America, after World War II the
U.S. became involved in world issues that seemed to
eclipse a serious concern for Latin America. This
trend in U.S. policy was altered by the increasing
tensions of the Cold War. Events such as the Russian
blockade of Berlin in 1948, the Soviet demonstration
of their first atomic weapon in August 1949, the
Communist takeover in China later that year, capped
with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950,
all led U.S. officials to be convinced of the eXpan-
sionary threat of Communism.
This same threat had been pointed out a few
months earlier in a joint report from the Departments
of State and Defense, known by its serial number,
NSC-68. In this report it was cautioned that
8 2
Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American




8 3Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power. Constancy and
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"The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its con-
trol is the elimination of resistance to its will and
the extension of its influence and control." 84
In response to this growing perception of the
Communist threat, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act
of 1949 had authorized nations of Latin America to
purchase American arms equipment but only on a cash
reimbursable basis. Grant aid of $500 million was
authorized for the North Atlantic area, with additional
grant aid authorizations for Iran, Korea and the
Philippines. Authorizations even included $75 million
for an emergency fund for the President's use in China
several months after its fall, but no funds were
designated for grant aid for Latin America. Latin
America was not specifically mentioned but was
included in Section 408(e), which stated that the
President could sell equipment, material, or resources
"to a nation which has joined with the United
States in a collective defense or regional arrange-
8 5
merit." The nations of Latin America, therefore,
"NSC-68. A Report to the National Security
Council by the Executive Secretary on United States
Objectives and Programs for National Security,
April 14, 1950," Naval War College Review , vol. 27,
May-June, 1975, p. 61.
8 5Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 ,




became eligible to purchase arms if they had ratified
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
the Rio Treaty, of 1947. Nonetheless, grant aid was
not available. As a result of the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949, six of the Navy's light
cruisers were refurbished and sold at reduced prices:
two to Argentina, two to Brazil, and two to Chile. 86
Additionally, three destroyer escorts were sold to
Peru, two destroyer escorts to Uruguay, and a frigate
o n
was sold to Colombia. As of June 30, 1952, nearly
$42 million in orders for military equipment had been
received from Latin American nations under the pro-
o o
visions of the Act.
The Korean War started in June 1950, and
Congress conducted extensive hearings on proposed new
legislation which would form the U.S. response. As a
consequence of the impetus of the Korean War and the
threat of worldwide communism, Congress passed the
U.S., President, Third Semi-Annual Report to
Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program
,
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
H. Doc. 179, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, pp. 38-39.
8 7
U.S., President, First Report to Congress on
the Mutual Security Program, December 31, 1951
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952),
p. 40.
8 8
U.S., President, Second Report to Congress on
the Mutual Security Program, June 30, 1952 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 35.
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Mutual Security Act of 1951. For the first time,
funds were authorized in the amount of $38,150,000
for grant military aid to Latin America. The act
stipulated that, "Such assistance may be furnished only
in accordance with defense plans which are found by
the President to require the recipient country to
participate in missions important to the defense of
90the Western Hemisphere." President Truman issued a
Presidential Determination in December 1951, which
stated that the participation of a number of Latin
American nations was important to the defense of the
hemisphere. This was followed by signing of bilateral
defense treaties with each of the Latin American
nations designated by the President. The first was
91
with Equador on February 20, 1952. By signing
the bilateral agreements, the Latin American nations
became eligible for the grant military equipment and
aid. With regard to the grant and reimbursable aid
being sent to Latin America, President Truman noted
that, "In the event of a conflict, the United States
89
Mutual Security Act of 1951, Statutes at
Large , vol. 65, sec. 401 (1952), p. 377.
Ibid.
91
"U.S. Signs Military Assistance Agreements
with Ecuador and Peru," Department of State Bulletin ,
vol. 26 (3 March 1952), p. 336.
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will be relieved to a substantial extent of the
necessity for using its own forces in certain areas
important to the defense of the hemisphere." The
experience of World War II was still within recent
memory when more than 100,000 U.S. military personnel
were needed to man the defense positions and bases in
93Latin America.
By 1957, 12 Latin American nations had entered
into bilateral defense treaties with the U.S. These
were: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
94Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay.
92U.S., President, First Report to Congress on
the Mutual Security Program, December 31, 1951
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952),
p. 40.
93U.S., Department of State, "Military Assist-
ance to Latin America," Background , January 1953,
p. 5. The total U.S. troop commitment to Latin Amer-
ica reached 119,246 on December 31, 1942. See U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on International Relations,
Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee
,
1943-50. Military Assistance Programs. Historical
Series
, vol. 6, pt. 2, (1976), p. 487. This source
lists a more explicit breakdown of U.S. troop totals
in Latin America throughout World War II.
94 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, "Disarmament and Security in Latin
America," Staff Study No. 7, Control and Reduction





After 1951 and the advent of the Mutual Security
Program, the Congress and the executive generally
agreed on a policy to be applied to arms transfers to
Latin America. In 1958, however, the views of the
two branches of government started to seriously
diverge. These differences in perception became
gradually a major influence on the development of U.S.
policy toward conventional arms transfers to Latin
America. Therefore, these executive-congressional
differences are a major focus of this dissertation,
particularly after 1967.
This section will review the major developments
in the controversy between the executive and congress
over the basic rationale supporting the transfer of
arms, the development of a regional dollar ceiling
on transfers, and the advent of punitive articles of
legislation which applied specifically or largely to
Latin America.
During the annual hearings considering the pro-
posed Mutual Security Act of 1958, questions arose
concerning the presidential determination of the
importance of the contribution of Latin American
countries to hemisphere defense. Senator Mansfield
asked: "How often does the President review his
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findings under this section?" 95 Secretary of Defense
Neil McElroy did not have a ready answer but later
provided one for the record. The Secretary's response
concluded, "The general policy and the military plans
have been under constant review since that date and
it has not been felt necessary to require further
9 6specific finding by the President." Later in the
hearings the same question was asked by Senator Wayne
Morse of Colonel Thomas B. Hanford. The Colonel
replied, "While the President himself has not per-
sonally reviewed the plan, it has been reviewed by
97agencies under his direction."
The answers provided were apparently not satis-
factory to Senator Morse because he proposed an amend-
ment to the Mutual Security Act, which was approved by
Congress and specifically stated that "The President
annually shall review such findings and shall determine
98
whether military assistance is necessary." This
95
U.S., Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act
of 1958, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign




Ibid., p. 453. Colonel Hanford was serving
as Director, Western Hemisphere Regional Office,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs.
98Mutual Security Act of 1958, Statutes at
Large, vol. 72, sec. 103, pt. 1 (1959), p. 262.
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amendment was notable because it singled out Latin
America as the only region for which such a review
was necessary in the eyes of the Congress.
Another issue arose during the 1958 hearings
which resulted in an additional restriction on U.S.
foreign policy toward Latin America. It concerned
internal security of the Latin American nations as
justification for U.S. military aid. As mentioned
previously, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 listed
only hemispheric defense as the basis for such aid.
Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ) started the dis-
cussion :
SENATOR SMITH: How is military assistance to
Latin America related to United States strate-
gic planning? How can we insure that the arms
that are sent to Latin America are used for
hemispheric defense and not just for local
civil wars?
SECRETARY McELROY : The program for Latin Amer-
ica, both Central and South America, is of course
a very modest program and is primarily for the
purpose of the maintenance of internal security
and also a very modest preparation for defense
against any incursion from offshore. I suppose
the maintenance of internal security could be
said to involve some of the internal conflicts
which seem to plague that part of the world, but
it is important to this country that internal
security should be maintained for the interests
of our country militarily, and that is the rea-
son that there is this very modest program down
in that part of the world.
SENATOR SMITH: I have always thought from my
studies, that we really are more concerned with such
things as technical assistance than we are with
military assistance, because they are not mili-
tarily as much in need for defense as other
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parts of the world. But we have been criti-
cized by some for our program. I have had
South Americans ask me why do we discriminate
in our military aid between South America and
some countries in the Far East or in Europe.
SECRETARY McELROY : The reason is, Senator
Smith, that in our judgment the large threat is
not there . The threat there in the judgment
of our military advisers is in the area of
internal security.
That, of course, does not require large
military equipment and large forces. It is
simply to avoid subversion by a small but well-
organized subversive nucleus, and it would be
very unfortunate from the standpoint of our
military position if a country were subverted
in that manner. That is the reason we do have
this limited program in the Central and South
American countries. 99
Despite the assertion by the Secretary of Defense
McElroy to the Senate committee that the maintenance of
internal security was the primary reason for military
aid to Latin America (which was not provided for in
the Mutual Security Act), a member of his staff,
Colonel Hanford, testified to the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs that, "The maintenance of internal
security is, of course, primarily the responsibility
of the Latin American Republics themselves, and we do
not propose in this program to provide grant assist-
ance for that purpose." Later in the
qq _
U.S., Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act of
1958, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, p. 24 [emphasis added]
U.S., Congress, House, Mutual Security Act of
1958, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, pt. 2, p. 1504.
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House hearings, Colonel Hanford was again quizzed on
this subject:
MR. ZABLOCKI. Colonel, you stated that it is
the policy of the military assistance program
—
specifically now for Latin America--not to use
our aid for internal security.
COLONEL HANFORD. Unless there is specific
evidence of Communist subversion in the area.
MR. ZABLOCKI. That is pretty difficult to
ascertain. 101
This conflicting testimony and apparent confusion as
to the Administration's true rationale for grant mili-
tary aid to Latin America resulted in a second specific
restriction on U.S. policy. Senator Morse's amendment
also included the limitation that, "Internal security
shall not normally be the basis for military assistance
102programs to American Republics." The following
year this restriction was made even more specific by
removal of the word "normally" and was altered to
read: "Internal security requirements shall not, un-
less the President determines otherwise, be the basis
for military assistance programs to American
101 Ibid., p. 1565.
in?




103Republics." This restriction is exceptional in
applying only to Latin America, especially in light
of the fact that "internal security" of allied nations
was listed as one of the primary justifications of the
entire Mutual Security Program. Even though "internal
security" had been previously listed as a legitimate
reason for sending military aid to the rest of the
oworld, it was not to be a rationale for assistance t
104Latin America. Senator Morse said that his amend-
ment concerning internal security "... was offered
with the intent of eliminating that consideration
from hemispheric defense plans . . ."in order to
"... reorient the emphasis of the mutal security
program and to curb the administration's tendency to
arm too many dictators around the world for no reason
other than that they are said to be 'anti-
105
ust.'" He continued by saying:commun:
The way military assistance has been carried
out in Latin America has a great deal to do
with the difficulties into which we have fallen
in that part of the world. What this
Mutual Security Act of 1959, Statutes at
Large , vol. 73, sec. 101(b) (1960), p. 247.
104Mutual Security Act of 1954, Statutes at
Large
, vol. 68, sec. 105, pt. 1 (1955), p. 834.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act of 1958 , S.
Rept. 1627, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, pp. 41-42
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administration seems unable to realize is that
not every revolutionary is a Communist. State
Department officials have testified time and
again to our committee that the United States
(
must not intervene or interfere in any way in
the internal affairs of our South American
neighbors. Yet military assistance aimed pri-
marily at preserving internal security is the
most direct kind of intervention. That it is
intervention on behalf of the status quo does
not change that fact. Unfortunately, the status
quo in some of these countries has been so ob-
noxious and so oppressive of freedom that the
United States has suffered from being associated
with it.
I approve of the doctrine of noninterven-
tion; but where we depart from it, then let us
intervene on the human side of freedom. Let us
intervene on the side of the tradition of Thomas
Jefferson and Simon Bolivar. They are the real
revolutionaries, whereas communism is a reac-
tionary doctrine. It is one of the tragic
ironies of history that the United States, which
was the birthplace of the Jeffersonian ideal,
has gotten so far away from it that it is the
Communists who are able to pose as representing
the hope for the future. 106
As a reflection of this congressional concern,
in 1959 Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, offered an amend-
ment to limit the amount of military assistance to
Latin America to no more than had been involved in
107
that current year. This Fulbright amendment was
106 tk-^Ibid.
10 7
This Fulbright Amendment did not specify an
actual dollar figure but stated that the amount for
1960 "... for furnishing military assistance to
American Republics shall not exceed the . . .
amount . . . for 1959." In the actual event, the
amount transferred in 1959 was $67 million and thereby
formed the regional ceiling. Mutual Security Act of
1958, sec. 101(b), p. 248. (NOTE: When the author
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approved by the Congress and formed the first regional
ceiling on U.S. military aid of Latin America of $67 mil-
lion. As initially written, it applied only to grant
aid but was broadened in scope in later years.
The Mutual Security Act had been oriented primarily
toward the provision of military assistance to foreign
friendly nations. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
reoriented the administrative machinery and the policy
to include both economic and military aid. This new
act stressed economic aid to lesser developed countries
in consonance with President John F. Kennedy's new ini-
tiative toward Latin America, the Alliance for Progress.
The President mentioned Latin America in his inaugural
address with "a special pledge" for "a new alliance for
progress, to assist free men and free governments in
10 8
casting off the chains of poverty." He then speci-
fically proposed such an alliance as a ten-year plan
109during a White House speech. This was formalized at a
refers to Latin America, it includes all of the Western
Hemisphere and excludes the United States, Canada, and
Greenland. After 1959, Cuba will not be included in
this definition because of its unique status and poli-
cies under the regime of Fidel Castro.)
10 8John F. Kennedy, "First Inaugural Address,
January 20, 1961," U.S., Congress, House, Inaugural
Addresses of the Presidents of the United States , H
.
Doc. 91-142, 1969, p. 268.
10 9John F. Kennedy, "Alianza Para Progreso," Depart -
ment of State Bulletin, vol. 44 (3 April 1961), p. 472.
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meeting at Punte Del Este, Uruguay. 110 The purpose
of military assistance was to assist in support of
the internal security and stability necessary for the
growth of the economic conditions foreseen in the
Alliance
.
Despite the emphasis on positive relations with
Latin America in the Alliance for Progress, the policy
toward arms transfers to Latin America was confused
and negative in the new Foreign Assistance Act. The
act's statement of policy, which listed the numerous
intentions of Congress in approving the act, included
"assisting friendly countries to maintain internal
security" as one reason. In the specifications
for utilization of assistance, the act stated that
"military assistance to any country shall be furnished
solely for internal security, for legitimate self-
defense, to permit the recipient country to participate
in regional or collective arrangements or measures
Organization of American States, Alliance
for Progress . Off icia 1 Documents Emanati ng from the
Special Meetin g of the Inter-American Economic an d
Social Council at the Ministerial Level
.
Held in Punta
del Este, Uruguay, from August 5 to 17, 1961 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1967).
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Statutes at
Large , vol. 75 (1961), p. 436. The act was originally
titled "Act for International Development of 1961,"
but was changed by Section 111 of the Foreign Assist-
ance Appropriations Act of 1962.
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consistent with the Charter of the United Nations."
Yet, a separate portion, Section 511, was entitled
"Restrictions on Military Aid to Latin America" and
included the proviso that "internal security require-
ments shall not, unless the President determines other-
wise ... be the basis for military assistance programs
113for American Republics." Here was a clear contra-
diction in policy between the Alliance for Progress
and the Foreign Assistance Act. The obvious contra-
diction was even contained within the Foreign Assist-
ance Act itself! This only could have resulted in
confusion for foreign policy guidance.
A new restriction in the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1962 was the Hickenlooper amendment. This speci-
fied termination of all aid to any nation who ex-
propriated U.S. property without proper compensation
within six months. This also applied to taxes or
other conditions which would have the gradual effect
of expropriation. The amendment was made even more
restrictive because it forbade any waiver by the
114
President for any reason. The previous decade
112
Ibid., p. 436.
113 Ibid., p. 438.
Foreign Assistance Act, Statutes at Large ,
vol. 76 (1962), pp. 260-261. A similar provision
which applied strictly to expropriations was contained
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had seen significant expropriations of U.S. property
in Latin American countries. In 1952 Bolivia had
taken over tin mines; in 1953 Guatemale had expro-
priated a quarter million acres of land from the
United Fruit Company; Argentina expropriated power
companies in 1958; and Brazil expropriated property
in 1959 and 1962. Even though the language of the
Hickenlooper amendment was universal, in view of the
outbreak of expropriations in Latin America there
can be little doubt where it was to apply primarily.
According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
the purpose of the amendment was not to be punitive,
but it was an attempt to protect U.S. investors
against losses and to create a stable environment for
investments in the lesser developed nations which
would serve to further their development.
Although the Administration and many members of
the Congress became concerned for the internal security
of Latin American countries after the advent of Castro
in Cuba in 1959, this concern was not reflected in
the Foreign Assistance Act until 1963. The Cuban
in the Mutual Security Act of 1954; however, this was




U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 , S. Rept.
1535, 87th Cong., 1st sess. , 1962, pp. 36-37.
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Missile Crisis of October 1962, focused an unusual
amount of attention and concern on the Latin American
region, and as one result, internal security was
formally approved by Congress as a reason for mili-
tary assistance. Previously, this reasoning had been
expressly forbidden, but due to the fear of Communist
inspired subversion which might be exported by the
Castro regime, it was now approved. As the Confer-
ence Committee report stated, this change provided
official recognition to what had actually been prac-
ticed for the past several years.
Even though the internal security restriction
was removed in 1963, a new amendment applied strictly
to Latin America. It stated:
That, except (1) to the extent necessary to
fulfill prior commitments or (2) to the extent
that the President finds, with respect to any
Latin American country, that the furnishing of
military assistance under this Act is necessary
to safeguard the security of the United States
or to safeguard the security of a country asso-
ciated with the United States in the Alliance
for Progress against overthrow of a duly consti-
tuted government ... no further military assist-
ance under any provision of this Act shall be
furnished to any Latin American country.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 , Conference
Committee, H. Rept. 1006, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963,
p. 24.
117Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Statutes at
Large
,
vol. 77, sec. 202(b) (1964), p. 384. The
regional ceiling was set at $55 million, but for

The regional ceiling on the dollar amount of aid
that could be transferred was varied from time to time,
but in 1966 it was increased to $85 million by
Congress. Formerly, the ceiling had applied only to
grant aid, but in the 1966 legislation the scope of
the restriction was expanded to include sales which
118had previously been unlimited. At first glance,
the $85 million appears to be a raising of the ceil-
ing. However, in view of the grant aid limit averaging over
$58 million per year, the combined limit for grants
and sales was actually a more severe restriction.
Another legislative restriction was to limit to 40 the
number of nations eligible for grant military assist-
119
ance. Since 20 of the Latin American nations had
received military aid in the past, the effect of such
the first time, Latin America was not alone. A regional
ceiling on grant aid was also prescribed for Africa in
the amount of $25 million.
118Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Statutes at
Large , vol. 80, pt. 1, sec. 201 (f) (1967), p. 803.
The regional ceiling for Latin America had varied as
follows
:
1960 - $67 million
1961 - $57.5 million
1962 - $57.5 million
1963 - $57.5 million
1964 - $55 million
1965 - $55 million
These ceilings applied only to grant military aid.
119 Ibid., sec. 103(a)(3), p. 797.
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a law could easily be seen as possibly applying pri-
marily to Latin America. If every Latin American
nation continued to receive aid, then only 20 other
nations in the remainder of the world would be eli-
gible.
In summation, from the time of Thomas Jefferson,
the U.S. had a varying level of consciousness of and
appreciation for any contribution the nations of the
Latin American region might make to the national
security of the United States. The evolution of the
Monroe Doctrine brought a conviction that Latin America
was important, but it was often taken for granted
because Latin America was not seriously threatened.
U.S. concern over the importance of Latin America to
U.S. national interests came to a high point during
the early days of World War II. At that time both the
Executive and the Congress shared a similar view of the
threat and feared German entry into the Western Hemi-
sphere and a possible direct attack on the U.S. from
Latin American bases. This brief peak of fear and
concern had started to wane even before the end of
World War II was reached. After the war, the U.S. was
more interested in the problems associated with Europe
than any involving Latin America. This decline con-
tinued, despite the signing of the Rio Treaty in
1947, until the tensions of the Cold War started to
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build in the late 1940 's. The advent of the Korean
War and the threat of Communist expansion into the
hemisphere again spurred U.S. interest in Latin America,
This is evidenced by the arms aid transferred under
the Mutual Security Program for reasons of hemisphere
security. In the late 1950' s, the rationale used by
the executive and the Congress started to diverge with
respect to the justifying of arms transfers to Latin
America. This was caused by a differing appreciation
or interpretation of the threat, the seriousness of
this threat, and a lack of agreement on priorities or
objectives of foreign policy. From 1958 on, the
Congress seemed to shift into the driver's seat with
respect to formulating changes in U.S. foreign policy
toward conventional arms transfers to Latin America.
The executive appeared thereafter to be reacting to
congressional initiatives which increasingly restricted
normal executive prerogatives in this area of foreign
policy. Even though the Congress had taken the ini-
tiative and had given evidence of deep displeasure with
the Foreign Assistance Act in general and arms trans-
fers in particular, it had not really attacked the
program in a concerted, substantive way. Due to a




LATIN AMERICAN ARMS IN PERSPECTIVE
Before proceeding to the events of 1967 and
later, it is of benefit to briefly review two other
related considerations. The first is to examine the
factors and influences behind the Latin American
demand for arms, and the second is to place this
demand in perspective. The purposes are to gain an
appreciation from the Latin American viewpoint as to
why modern weapons are necessary and to establish the
magnitude of Latin American arms receipts in relation
to the level of procurement in other geographic regions
or political combinations. These two aspects will be
of importance in later discussions which will focus
on an evaluation of statements in support of, or
opposition to, the transfer of arms to Latin America.
In the midst of the controversy concerning the
congressional restrictions on arms transfers, it is
instructive to assess the validity of the Latin
American demand for arms. At the outset, however, a
note of caution is necessary because of the variances
between the nations of Latin America. The
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differences of history, resources, and interests do
not readily conform to generalizations that are
applied throughout the region. As one author has
said
:
Every book on the Hemisphere, whether the focus
be law, politics, history, or wildlife, warns
somewhere in the first chapter or introduction
that, of course, there are twenty-one independ-
ent countries, that the differences are greater
than the similarities, and that one really can-
not speak of "Latin America." From Chapter 2 ,
on, however, nearly every book does just that.
Because of the limit of space, it is necessary
to speak of "Latin America" here. It would not be
feasible to assess each nation individually because of
the numerous factors that enter into the nation's
specific desire to obtain new and additional armaments.
With the above warning in mind, it is possible to
briefly review the overall primary and secondary
reasons why the nations of Latin America would
create a demand for weapons. \ The satisfaction of
locally perceived needs to ensure national security is
paramount. Associated with this are other primary
reasons for arms requirements, such as the obsoles-
cence of arms in the national inventories, an attempt
to reach a degree of modernity in the local armed
forces, and a desire to achieve flexibility in their
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ed
.
, Expropriation in the
Americas (New York: Dunellen, 1971), p. 10.
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decisions and independence from U.S. influence.
Among the lesser factors bearing on arms demands are
the considerations of heightened nationalism, in-
creased affluence, aggressive salesmanship on the
part of third country suppliers, and other needs such
as a requirement to patrol increased territorial or
economic zones at sea.
One aspect of modern sovereingty is the neces-
sity to maintain a military force capable of at least
the appearance of being able to provide for the defense
of the state. ! The factor of national defense is of pri-
mary and fundamental importance in any nation's pursuit
of military preparedness. Although the threat to Latin
American countries from an external source is remote,
almost every Latin American nation has routinely re-
quired the existence of armed forces. The reasons con-
sistently given in justification for these forces has
been the necessity to defend the parent country against
2
external as well as internal threats. Nearly every
country has some degree of disagreement over boundaries
with one or more neighbors, and this is used as rationale
for justifying its armed forces. Disputes between
Peru and Chile, Chile and Argentina, or Guatemala and
2An exception is Costa Rica which has no armed
forces. It maintains only a para-military police force.
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Belize are only a few among the numerous examples.
The only substantial war in this century was the Chaco
War of 1932-35 between Bolivia and Paraguay, although
there were wars in the 1800' s which still highlight
frictions that may exist to heighten a sense of need
for military security among Latin American nations.
One example would be Chile's War of the Pacific in
1879-84 against Peru and Bolivia.
(Another significant major factor in the demand
for arms has been the block obsolescence of a great
amount of the material in Latin American military in-
ventories, j By the mid-1960 's, the bulk of the tanks,
ships and planes possessed by Latin American military
forces were of World War II and Korean War era manu-
facture obtained during the 1945-1955 time frame.
A nominal life of an aircraft is approximately ten
years, 20 years or more for a tank or a naval vessel.
The Latin Americans have been known, however, to keep
some items in their military inventories operating
much longer. In 1950 for example, Brazil was operat-
ing a battleship built in 1908; Chile was using a
light cruiser built in 1898, and Uruguay was using
3
a training ship built in 1879.
3Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed. Jane's Fighting
Ships, 1950-51 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.,
pp. 131, 144, 486.
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Related to the obsolescence factor is the effect
of earlier U.S. arms transfer policies in postponing
the Latin American demand for new weapons. During
the 1950' s the U.S. had a surplus of various equip-
ment suitable for grant transfer, which served to fill,
even if not completely satisfy, Latin American
demands. The U.S. transferred surplus, used, obsoles-
cent, but fully operable equipment. This served to
postpone the acquisition of truly modern equipment.
Later in the 1960's, the stocks of surplus equipment
were depleted; U.S. granting of military aid declined,
and congressional policy made the acquisition of re-
placement equipment less likely. As a result, the
resurgent demands for modern equipment could be satis-
fied only with the procurement of new items.
In spite of the problems of maintenance and
logistic support, as late as 1974 the venerable C-47
was still in the inventory of 17 Latin American air
forces. Five nations still flew F-51 Mustangs; three
were flying the PBY Catalina; Honduras had a squadron
of F-4U Corsairs, and Venezuela had a squadron of
B-25 bombers, the same type that General Doolittle
4flew over Tokyo in 1942 1 Despite such feats of
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 1974-1975 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974), pp. 62-69.
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maintenance magic, the fact remained that so much of
the equipment was old, worn out, uneconomical to
maintain, or even unsafe to operate.
' A third major factor in the demand for arms is
a desire by the Latin American military forces to have
at least a few items of advanced equipment. Obsolete
and outmoded ships, planes, and tanks are seen by the
military as evidence of low esteem by the governments
and the populations this equipment is supposed to
protect. Display of such low regard is also not
conducive to attracting high quality young people to
the military service and is not helpful in convincing
others that a career is worthwhile. It is somewhat
understandable that Latin American governments would
desire several pieces of modern advanced equipment in
order to bolster the image of the government and
enhance national concepts of modernity, dignity, and
prestige
.
The fourth major factor is a strong desire to
display independence from perceived U.S. hegemony.
The influence of the U.S. has been so great on Latin
American governments over the years that there is a
tendency among these governments to want to display
independence from this inferred domination whenever
possible. Increased affluence is one ingredient which
has permitted these governments the flexibility to
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display their assertiveness and freedom from U.S.
control. Such a policy obtains significant local
domestic support and is a popular method of gaining
support for any Latin American government. A reflec-
tion of this striving for an appearance of independ-
ence can be seen in a deliberate shift in the
selection of arms suppliers from the U.S. to third
nation sources, primarily Western Europe. This policy
shift, of course, has been accelerated by the U.S.
restrictions and the resultant anxiety among Latin
Americans about the reliability of the U.S. as a
supplier in the future. Another consideration related
to this theme of independence is a desire for closer
identification with other Third World nations as the
pattern of international political relationships has
become more diversified.
Among the important but lesser factors behind
the demand for arms is the element of a heightened
sense of nationalism in Latin America. Even though
the concept of nationalism is "vague and complex,"
Samuel Bailey has asserted that "It is indeed the most
important single force operating in Latin America
5today." An exact definition is illusive, but as
part of it, the dictionary includes: "devotion
5 ...Samuel L. Bailey, Nationalism in Latin America
(New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 4.
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to the interests of one's own nation" and "desire for
national advancement or independence." Through
modernization, industrialization, and an increased
perception of the part their nations play in the
international political arena, the people of Latin
America have become more aware of how their personal
interests and their national interests coincide. They
have also become more aware of the benefits of national
advancement within the world community of nations.
This increased sense of nation did not just appear
wholly from within Latin America but was aided by
external events. The noted Argentine economist Raul
Prebisch has stated that the modernization and indus-
trialization of Latin American nations was "... forced
upon them by events. Two world wars in a single gen-
eration and a great economic crisis between them have
shown the Latin American countries their opportuni-
ties." 7
Other stimuli to this sense of nationalism in
Latin America have been technological improvements and
political developments. Through more widespread use
Clarence L. Barnhart, ed., The American College
Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1947), p. 809.
Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of
Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York:
United Nations, 1950), p. 5.
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of transportation advancements and communications im-
provements, the populace has become more aware of a
national identity. Through increased international
trade, the appreciation has grown that only a national
government could provide some of the services, regu-
lations, and representation necessary for this trade.
Improved roads, air transport, and commercial trans-
portation has given the rural populace an access to
urban influences never before experienced. Widespread
use of radio and television has exposed Latin America
to the rest of the world with inevitable comparisons
and demands to fill newly perceived needs.
On the political side of the nationalism factor,
there have been the effects of the Cold War, the rising
expectations of the Third World, and the North-South
controversy. Additionally, it is realized that only
national governments can participate in international
organizations such as the United Nations and the
Organization of American States and that benefits can
be derived from their participation as a national
entity
.
Although nationalism is a major force in Latin
America, its effect on the demand for armaments has
Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, Nation -





not caused any major increase in the demand for arms.
Nonetheless, it is a consideration when there is a
desire to replace existing obsolete equipment with
more modern versions.
Increased affluence is also a contributing factor
in the increased demand for arms in Latin America.
With this increased affluence came the ability
of these nations with sufficient resources to pur-
chase arms of their own choosing. Due to increased
trade, price increases for local products, plus devel-
opment of indigenous capital facilities, Latin
American nations came to have the cash or credit
necessary to purchase modern weapons from numerous
sources rather than wait for grant aid of older weapons
from the U.S. According to World Bank statistics, the
growth rate of gross national product (GNP) per capita
for the 1960-1975 period is positive for all Latin
American countries except the Netherland Antilles. The
annual rate of increase in per capita GNP for the
United States is listed at 2.5 percent, but this is
surpassed by 16 countries in Latin America, including
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
9
Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. Latin American
World Bank, Atlas. Population, Per Capita
Product, and Growth Rates (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 1977)
, pp. 20, 22.
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nations gradually became more able to decide for them-
selves what was needed to meet their defense needs.
Aggressive salesmanship by other arms suppliers
is also a factor in the equation of Latin American arms
procurement. When the factors combined in the mid-1960'
s
to give rise to Latin American arms demands, Western
European nations were ready and eager to respond. Dur-
ing the six years, 1967-72, Latin America purchased more
than $1.6 billion of military equipment and services.
Of this total, Great Britain provided 34.5 percent;
France, 22.2 percent; and Western European suppliers
combined supplied 74.8 percent. During the same period,
the U.S. provided 13.3 percent of the total.
In 1966, the British Defense Minister Denis
Healey told Parliament:
While the Government attaches the highest
importance to making progress in the field of
arms control and disarmament, we must also take
what practical steps we can to ensure that this
country does not fail to secure its rightful
share of this valuable commercial market .
H
Later he established a new position under his juris-
diction which would be specifically charged with the
promotion of arms exports in order that Britain
U.S., Department of State, Arms Sales in Latin
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would "have a proper share of the international
market.
The French also entered the arms sales business
with dedication. In 1961, an office was created in the
Ministry of Defense for the oversight of the sale of
French weapons. In 1965, this office was expanded and
named Direction des Affaires Internationales (DAI).
It was specifically tasked to encourage and support
the efforts of French arms manufacturers in their over-
13
seas export programs. In 1966, President de Gaulle
of France paid a state visit to Peru and pledged "any-
thing reasonable" in the way of military equipment and
14
support. In 1967, France introduced supersonic jet
aircraft to Latin America through the sale of Mirage
jet fighters to Peru and added to the controversy
which is part of the subject of this dissertation.
Concering the French, one commentator has said:
The French export arms sales policy, it is clear,
is currently being pushed heavily. In order to
undercut the United States and Great Britain and
to increase its own influence, France is
12
Parliament, Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates
(Commons), 11 May 1966, 5th series, vol. 728 (1966),
p. 404.
] 3
John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, The Interna -
tional Trade in Arms (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 94.
Interview with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Washing-
ton, D.C., 18 April 1978. He was President of Peru from
1963 to 1968. During the interview he reminded the
author of the good relations between France and Peru and
that there had been a French military mission there.
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currently willing to sell any weapon, except
its atomic arsenal, anywhere there is a market.
Its arms salesmen have the least scruples of
any Western ally, and there is some indication
that, could it get away with it, France would
sell arms to Eastern bloc nations. 15
For both Great Britain and France the motivation
for arms sales is clearly economic— sales mean jobs,
and neither is bothered with the conscience displayed
by the U.S. Congress with regard to the recipient.
But there are other considerations too. For example:
The European governments all faced the same
basic problem: their arms industries were too
small and fragmented to provide their own
defence needs, so that they had to import ad-
vanced weapons from America; while to make their
own companies viable and to recoup the cost of
their own purchases, they felt impelled to sell
to the Third World. 16
Therefore, to provide sufficiently for their own defense
through the purchase of the latest equipment and to
maintain their own defense industries' operations and
a high enough level to be profitable, sales abroad
were mandatory.
Another element which must be considered in rela-
tion to increased demands for equipment from Latin
America is the establishment of the 200-mile
George Thayer, The War Business. The Inter -
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for by orders from the six major Latin American nations
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and
1
8
Venezuela. These figures by themselves, however,
do not give a proper appreciation of Latin American
demands for arms with relation to the rest of the
world.
One of the indicators used to measure the burden
of arms purchases on a domestic economy is the ratio
of military expenditures to gross national product
(GNP) . Over the ten-year period 1966 to 1975 for
example, the overall Latin American average was 1.8
percent--the lowest average for any region of the
world. The world average for the same period was 6.5
percent. The world's average military expenditure per
capita (in constant 1974 dollars) during these ten
years was $83.30, while Latin America spent $14.04.
This is compared with the Warsaw Pact nations who
spent $316.28, the highest in the world. Latin
Americans, on the average, spent $3,468 per year per
member of their military services for this period,
while the world average was $12,499, and the average
for the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation was $23,272. In Latin America, approximately
U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Arms Sales in Latin America (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 2.
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four military personnel were maintained for every
1,000 of population, whereas the nations of the Near
East maintained nearly 11, and the Warsaw Pact
19countries had 16. As pointed out by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the
military budgets of the Latin American countries ac-
counted for 23.5 percent of total government expendi-
tures in 1947. By 1966, this figure had been halved
20to 12.7 percent. He went on to highlight the fact
that actual military hardware accounted for only about
one-tenth of the relatively small budgets— "The rest




The U.S. portion of Latin American arms procure-
ment has also been modest. For the period 1962 to
1976, the U.S. transferred 3.3 percent of its world-
wide military assistance budget to Latin America
through loans or grants. The largest for any single
19 U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966 -
1976 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1977)
, pp. 14-17.
20Covey T. Oliver, "Our Continuing Commitment in
the Home Hemisphere," Department of State Bulletin , vol




year was 6.7 percent in 1975 and has ranged down to
.85 percent in 1970. 22
Of course, mere statistics do not give a com-
plete picture, but they are valuable as an indicator,
which shows that Latin America is and has been a rela-
tively quiet region of the earth with respect to arms
demands and receipts. The statistics also show that
U.S. arms transfers have not pushed Latin America
into an arms race, and neither have the weapons pur-
chases made by Latin American nations in countries
other than the U.S.
22 U.S., Agency for International Development,
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from
International Organizations Obligations and Loan
Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1976




territorial zone. This applies particularly to in-
creased naval and air forces who must patrol, maintain
a presence, and be able to respond with governmental
authority in this vastly increased national area.
As an example close to home, the U.S. Congress passed
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
which established a 200-mile fishing zone off the U.S.
coasts. As a direct result of this new law, the U.S.
Coast Guard ordered 41 Falcon jets for a price of $221
million. The explicit justification for this purchase
of multi-purpose jet aircraft was to patrol the large
new space for which the Coast Guard has responsibil-
17 .lty. The same consideration would be present in
the deliberations of Latin American governments with
past or planned extensions of economic or territorial
zones
.
In order to place the Latin American arms pro-
curement in perspective, it is necessary to compare
that level of magnitude with the levels of other
regions or with the level of the rest of the world as
a whole. During the six-year period 1967-1972, Latin
American nations placed orders for $1.6 billion of
new arms. Of that amount, 97 percent was accounted
1 7
Interview with David W. Dyke, Director,
International Marketing, Falcon Jet Corporation




EVENTS, FACTORS AND INFLUENCES LEADING
TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS
Historically, Latin America has been a region of
allies with a tradition of strong political and cul-
tural ties with the United States. However by 1970,
more than 21 articles of U.S. legislation applied in
one way or another to restrict the transfer of con-
ventional weapons to the nations of Latin America.
By 1976, a number more had been added. The development
of such restrictions would appear more normal and
understandable between enemies rather than friends
.
Before reviewing the restrictions in the next chapter,
it is useful to review the environment in which the
restrictions were developed. It is helpful to gain
an appreciation for the considerations at work at the
time as a framework for analysis in reviewing the
Frank Church, "Toward a New Policy for Latin
America," U.S., Congress, Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
10 April 1970, Congressional Record , vol. 116, p. 11212.
The increasing interest in foreign policy by the Con-
gress is the subject of two excellent books: John
Lehman, The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy :
Studies of the Nixon Administration (New York:
Praeger, 1976), and Francis 0. Wilcox, Congress, the




restrictions themselves. In this chapter, the major
events, factors and influences will be reviewed brief-
ly since they had an effect on the development of the
congressional restrictions on arms transfers to Latin
America.
During the ten-year period from 1967 to 1976, when
so many of the legislative restrictions were being con-
structed by the Congress a separate evolution was taking
place. This was a definite resurgence of interest by
the Congress in the foreign policy formulation and exe-
cution for the U.S. This led to increasing disharmony
in the relations between Congress and the executive as
the two branches of government struggled for dominance
in the area of foreign policy. This increasing fric-
tion served as a constant thread in the fabric of the
time and became an inseparable part and a contributing
element of the environment which led to restrictions.
Major Events
In reviewing this ten-year period, a series of
international and domestic events can be discerned
which served to increase alienation between the
Congress and the executive. These major events will
be delineated as they occurred. Of these events, by
far the most significant was the Vietnam War. The
effects of the war were to permeate and predominate
the relationship between the Congress and the executive
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The growing dissatisfaction within the Congress toward
the war and against the executive's direction of the
conflict cannot be overstressed as the primary factor
in the deterioration of the relationship between
these two branches of government.
By 1967, the war in Vietnam had already cost
the U.S. more than 16,000 dead and 100,000 wounded.
South Vietnam had lost 60,000 killed and 118,000
wounded. The North Vietnamese losses in deaths were
2listed at 255,000. In dollars, the war was costing
the U.S. more than $25 billion a year. The growing
discontent with the Vietnam portion of U.S. foreign
policy could be seen in the report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee after its deliberations
on the foreign aid bill for 1967. It spoke of "wide-
spread dissatisfaction" among its members about
various aspects of the program. These aspects in-
cluded the repercussions of the war, the apprehension
that the U.S. was overcommitted abroad, and the fear
3
of future Vietnams . In its report, the Foreign
2
"Combat Casualties in Southeast Asia," Congress
and the Nation , vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Service, 1973), p. 937.
3U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 , S. Rept.
499, 90th Congress, 1st sess., 1967, p. 4.
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Relations Committee said its deliberations were
"inevitably influenced by the war in Vietnam--a war
which cast a very long shadow" which was now "far
4longer and darker" than the year before. Military
and economic aid were viewed as "tending to involve
the United States unnecessarily in the political and
social affairs of other countries, making it more
likely that the United States would in the future
find itself involved in more Vietnams .
"
The opposition which grew against U.S. policy
was not localized in Congress, but gradually spread
across all sectors of U.S. society--the public, the
press, the clergy, members of the military, even some
members of the executive branch. An example was the
letter of protest submitted to the Secretary of State
It was signed by more than 250 members of the State
Department, who were critical of U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia. Opposition to U.S. policies was also
voiced by allies of long standing and previous asso-
ciation with U.S. policies. As the congressional









Peter Grose, "250 in State Dept. Sign a War
Protest," New York Times, 9 May 1970, p. 1:3.
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grew, it gathered support in the public domain, which
independently brought influence to bear on the execu-
tive. As this support for its view developed, the
Congress became more self-confident in opposing the
executive's lead in foreign policy and the direction
in which that policy was leading the nation. The
Congress also became more assured of the propriety of
its goals and the purity of its motives.
Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) , when
speaking of U.S. involvement in Vietnam for over a
decade and of the dissatisfaction with the direction
of U.S. foreign policy, portrayed a growing conviction
of his colleagues:
The distrust of the executive branch runs so
deep in this chamber that members are afraid
that any discretion, any grant of authority,
to the executive branch will open the door to
allow the executive branch to again try to make
one more effort to do what 10 years failed to
do. 7
It was this growing distrust of the executive that was
a prime factor in the increased aggressive behavior of
the Congress. This was reenforced by Senator Frank
Church, who stated that congressional "disagreement
with policies followed by the President is the
7 Donald M. Fraser, "Vietnam Humanitarian
Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975," U.S., Congress,
House, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 23 April 1975,
Congressional Record
,
vol. 121, p. 11489.
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fundamental reason for the renaissance of congressional
o
powers since 1965."
The evaluation of two other men who were part
of the process in the Congress was that:
Congress is still too deeply into the policy
execution - -and this has come about largely
because of the hangover of frustration over
not having been adequately consulted in
policy formulation
, from Vietnam on. This
factor, more than any other, lies behind the
degree of unhealthy tension that exists.
9
They went on to say that there was "no question that
Vietnam was the single most important event in the
transformation" of the interest of Congress in foreign
policy. Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY) described
Vietnam as "the archetypal presidential war" and as
"the gravest and most costly mistake of this
century." The managing editor of the Council on
Foreign Relations also concluded that there was "no
Frank Church, "American Foreign Policy in
Transition: Who Will Shape It? The Role of
Congress," SAIS Review
,
vol. 17 (Summer 1973), p. 18.
9 Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. Van Dusen,
"Making the Separation of Powers Work," Foreign
Affairs
,
vol 57 (Fall 1978), p. 27. Mr. Hamilton
(D-IN) was a member of the House of Representatives




U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Inter-
national Relations, Congress and Foreign Policy ,
Hearings , before the Special Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p. 197.
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doubt the legacy of Vietnam is largely responsible for
12congressional activism in the realm of foreign policy."
In spite of the fact that Vietnam was the primary fac-
tor, Senator Church said, "Vietnam set a direction, but
many other events sustained it and moved far beyond
13that single question." Indeed, in addition to Vietnam,
there was a series of events that hardened this govern-
mental dissatisfaction, added to the congressional con-
viction it must become more aggressive in the field of
foreign policy, and resulted in congressional restric-
tions on arms transfers to Latin America.
This decade was more than filled with major
events that provided the occasions for increased debate
between the executive and the Congress over the proper
role for each branch in the field of foreign policy.
That a decade would be filled with significant events
is not unusual. But it is unusual for the events to
serve in almost a "ratchet" arrangement on this
Washington relationship in which everything seemed to
make it worse and nothing seemed to make it better.
A second major event related to the Vietnam War
but which also affected the friction between the
12James Chace, "Is a Foreign Policy Consensus
Possible?" Foreign Affairs , vol. 57 (Fall 1978),
pp. 1-2.
13Frank Church, SAIS Review, p. 1.
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Congress and the executive occurred in April 1970 when
U.S. forces invaded Cambodia. The purpose of the in-
vasion was to prevent the use of Cambodia as a sanc-
tuary and supply base by the North Vietnamese forces.
The operation was planned and executed in great secrecy.
This was carried out without the prior knowledge of,
or consultation with, the Congress. The result only
added to the dissatisfaction of the Congress toward
the executive's independent foreign policy. At that
time, the result of the invasion on public opinion was
characterized by the description that "emotions have
been aroused, polarization has increased and trust
14has weakened .
"
An unexpected domestic event resulted from the
Cambodian invasion which added to the overall contro-
versy over U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and the
conflict between the Congress and the executive over
the setting of proper foreign policy direction for
the U.S. This event occurred at Kent State University
on May 4, 1970. Hundreds of students who assembled to
protest the Cambodian invasion were opposed by Ohio
National Guard troops. In the resulting confronta-
tion, four students were shot and killed and nine
Steven V. Roberts, "Grass Roots Views Shaken
by Cambodia," New York Times, 9 May 1970, p. 7:1.
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others were wounded. In the growing dispute over
the executive's foreign policy, the seriousness of
the domestic opposition could be highlighted by the
events at Kent State. The deaths of the students be-
came a rallying cry for the increasing numbers of
people opposed to the war in Southeast Asia.
The next major event was the Watergate break-in
which was to have far reaching effects. In June 1972,
five men were apprehended during an attempt to
burglarize the Democratic Party national headquarters
in Washington, D.C. Ensuing investigations revealed
direct connection between the burglars and the White
House staff of President Nixon and led to the suspi-
cion of the President himself. Later events impli-
cated the President personally in an attempt to "cover
up" White House involvement and indicated other mis-
conduct. The result was a House Judiciary Committee
recommendation for the impeachment of the President
which led to his resignation on August 9, 1974, which
became effective on August 10th. As the debacle of
John Kifner, "4 Kent State Students Killed by
Troops," New York Times , 5 May 1970, p. 1:2. This
initial report by the New York Times stated that
eight other students had been wounded. However, later
reports confirmed at least nine had been wounded.
James Michener, Kent State. What Happened and Why
(New York: Random House, 1971), p. 398. Mr.




Watergate unfolded, it came to have catastrophic
effects on President Nixon personally and disastrous
consequences on the relationship between the Congress
and the executive. To the Congress, the Watergate
revelations gave proof that the executive was mis-
guided, could not be trusted, and was not providing
proper and sufficient national leadership.
Events in Chile provided another in the series of
incidents which brought the Congress and the executive
into confrontation. In 1970, Salvador Allende was
elected as Chile's president and became the first
elected Marxist to head a government in the Western
Hemisphere. In September 1973, he was overthrown and
killed in a bloody coup. Suspicions grew that the U.S.
was deeply involved in the engineering of the overthrow
and had contributed to its success through the Central
Intelligence Agency and through economic sanctions
directed by the White House. A number of members of
Congress were upset at the handling of the situation,
mainly because the executive had taken such an active
1 6
Numerous articles reported aspects of the U.S.
involvement in the overthrow of the Allende government.
See for example, Elizabeth Farnsworth, "More Than
Admitted," and Paul E. Sigmund, "Less than Admitted,"
in "Chile: What was the U.S. Role?", Foreign Policy
,
no. 16, (Fall 1974). pp. 126-156. Also see Richard R.
Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and




involvement in a foreign policy initiative without
the proper consultation with the Congress. Other
members were concerned over reports of the conduct of
the succeeding government of General Augusto Pinochet.
These reports indicated widespread violations of human
rights in the form of executions, torture, and in-
definite imprisonments.
In October 1973, the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War
occurred, which added to the bitterness of the U.S.
governmental conflict. The executive was faulted for
inadequacy in its diplomacy because supposed U.S. allies
would not permit the use of their bases for aerial re-
fueling or logistics staging in the U.S. resupply
efforts for Israel. Turkey and Greece declared them-
selves neutral but permitted overflights by Soviet air-
craft supplying Egypt. England and West Germany declined
some U.S. requests for use of facilities. The U.S. Mili-
tary Airflight Command was not permitted to use bases in
England, Germany, Spain, Turkey, or Greece, and restric-
tions were placed on the movement of U.S. military
17
supplies located in stockpiles in Europe. The
failure of allies and friends to support U.S. interests
Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Jets for Israel Took
Route Around Some Allies," New York Times , 25 October
1973, p. 1:2. Craig R. Whitney, "U.S. -NATO Dispute




in aiding Israel was often interpreted to mean that
U.S. security arrangements and overseas commitments
were not as strong and worthwhile as represented by
the executive. Additionally, the responsibilities for
the dramatic price increases for oil and the energy
shortage which followed the war were often laid at the
executive's doorstep because of lack of foresight,
inadequate preparations, and absence of diplomatic
finesse
.
The crisis concerning Cyprus in 1974 provided
yet another international event that was to have reper-
cussions on Capitol Hill. In this case, Turkish
forces invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974, in response
to a Greek-engineered coup on July 15th. Both Greece
and Turkey had been armed predominantly with U.S.
weapons. Both were NATO allies and held important
positions in defending NATO's southern flank.
Sanctions against either antagonist would have been
difficult. Congress grew to favor a cut-off in mili-
tary aid to Turkey, while the executive wanted more
time to negotiate a solution without having to take
sanctions that would have such negative results for
other U.S. interests. After a see-saw confrontation,





Turkey went into effect on December 10th. The con-
troversy continued and the embargo was eventually
lifted, but the lesson was clear: the Congress had
stood up to the executive and had dictated its own
solution to a foreign policy problem in direct oppo-
sition to the wishes of the executive.
Still another in the list of events was the
crisis in Angola in 1975, which reopened unhealed
wounds in the relationship between the executive and
the legislative branches. In this instance, the
executive favored support of two pro-Western groups
who were struggling against a Marxist group for con-
trol of Angola. Cuban troops entered the fighting to
support the Marxist faction, and on December 19th
Congress voted to terminate military aid to the pro-
19Western group. In this case, the parallel with
Vietnam was too clear. The Congress did not favor
Cubans, Marxists, or the take-over of Angola by
revolutionaries, but above all, it did not want to
U.S., Congress, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 11
December 1974, Congressional Record , vol. 120,
pp. 39137-39142. Also see "U.S. Military Aid to
Turkey Cut Off," New York Times , 11 December 1974,
p. 6:1. For a more detailed review of this case, see
Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy
by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979),
pp. 34-35.
19
David Binder, "Senate Votes to Cut Off Covert
Aid to Angolans; Ford Predicts a Tragedy," New York
Times, 20 December 1975, p. 1:1.
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become committed to a problem with no favorable end
that could be foreseen. Senator Charles H. Percy
(R-IL) , a member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, summed up the feelings of his colleagues:
I do not think that there is any question
of what we need to demonstrate to the Soviet
Union. Just let them try to interfere as the
Japanese did in Hawaii or Guam or any place like
that and they will see we have enough national
resolve to do anything that was necessary to put
a stop to it.
The question here is whether or not Angola
is the right place for such a response. Just
because the Soviets are in there, do we have to
go in? That was our problem in Vietnam. Our
vital interests were not at stake, really. It
is a long way away logistically , extraordinarily
hard to back it up and we were backing a side
that did not have the moral strength, did not
have the necessary resolve or sense of unity.
They were filled with corruption, and we simply
could not support them. We were embarrassed
that we had backed the wrong horse, in a sense,
although the alternative was also pretty bad. 20
The example of Angola is another instance of the
Congress reversing the aim of the executive and dis-
playing the growing power of the Congress to set and
enforce its own foreign policy for the United States.
Interwoven through the chain of major inter-
national events were also a number of issues, factors,
and influences which served to interact with or be
accentuated by the events. Each of these had effect
20
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Angola. U.S. Involvement in Civil War in
Angola, Hearings , before the Subcommittee on African
Affairs, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p. 85.
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on the relationship between Congress and the execu-
tive. One of the foremost influences which affected
the focus of congressional thinking during this period
was the issue of human rights. The human rights
issue seemed to grow independently, but supporters of
human rights also found allies in those who were advo-
cates of other issues. Those who opposed the war in
Southeast Asia could also support human rights as could
those opposed to Secretary of State Kissinger's poli-
cies of "Realpolitik , " which they viewed as too
insensitive. Supporters for human rights could be
found among those who were shocked by the CIA's involve-
ment in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile,
among those who opposed aid to dictators, and among
those who opposed arms transfers in general. The issue
came to include foreign policy, arms transfers, re-
strictive legislation, and Latin America. In many
respects, the human rights issue became "more an ar-
gument over unrelated questions than a substantive
,,21issue
.
The issue of human rights as an influence in
U.S. foreign policy has a history as long as the
21Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, Invita -
tion to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign






United States itself. It has, however, received
varying degrees of attention. By the 1970' s, the issue
of human rights came more clearly into focus and was
to result in congressional legislation which had an
effect on U.S. foreign policy. This issue was also
to influence U.S. policy concerning the transfer of
conventional arms, particularly toward Latin America.
Because human rights developed into such a major
issue, it is worthwhile to review the subject briefly.
The chapter will then proceed into the details of
how it came to influence U.S. foreign policy in general
and policy toward conventional arms transfers to Latin
America in particular.
The concept of the natural rights of man goes
back to early antiquity in the writings of the Greek and
Roman Stoics. Individual rights were espoused by the
early Christian teachings. One of the first codifica-
tions of the rights of individuals was the Magna Carta,
signed in 1215 by King John of England. Clause 39
stated that, "No freeman shall be . . . imprisoned or
dispossessed . . . except by the lawful judgment of
22his peers or by the law of the land." In the 17th
century the writings of John Milton and John Locke
continued to advance the idea. In the United States,




the concept of human rights is normally considered to
stem from the earliest days of the Republic, codified
in the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the
Constitution in 1787, and further supported by the
Bill of Rights in 1791. The Emancipation Proclamation
continued in line with support for human rights in
1863. In 1945, the Charter of the United Nations
reaffirmed
:
. . . faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small. 23
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was es-
tablished in 1946 with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt as its
first chairman, and in 1948 the United Nations adopted
24the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the
Western Hemisphere, the Organization of American
States (OAS) signed the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man in 1948, and the OAS addi-
tionally created the Inter-American Commission on
25Human Rights in 1959.
23United Nations, Charter of the United Nations
and Statutes of the International Court of Justice
(New York: United Nations, 1968), p. 1.
24Glenn A. Mower, Jr., The United States, the
United Nations, and Human Rights. The Eleanor Roose -
velt and Jimmy Carter Eras (Westport, CT. : Greenwood
Press, 1979), pp. 11-12.
25Organization of American States, Handbook of
Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights, OEA/Ser
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It was easy to be for human rights because it
was politically safe. Members of Congress who were
already antagonistic toward the White House for any
reason could use the human rights issue as an easy
opportunity to hobble the executive. The executive
was placed in the uncomfortable position of having to
respond with acquiesence to the various policies pro-
posed by the human rights advocates or their allies or
to attempt to maintain the difficult stance of oppos-
ing human rights for some other higher purpose. The
issue was already well-drawn in the early 1970 's
prior to the advent of Jimmy Carter who made it a
campaign issue in 1976 and an important element of
foreign policy after his inauguration.
Several individuals are credited with bringing
the human rights issue to the forefront of the con-
troversy between the Congress and the executive. The
first individual was Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
who hag been described as the "unwitting catalyst for
a cause in need of a scapegoat." In 1973, Secretary
of State Kissinger made clear his views on human
rights and foreign policy during his confirmation
L/V/II.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 3 (8 June 1977) (Washington,
D.C. : Organization of American States, 1977), p. 5,9.
Sandy Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global
Nightmare. The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), p. 125.
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hearings as Secretary of State. He said that he
believed
:
. . . the protection of basic human rights
is a very sensitive aspect of the domestic
jurisdiction of governments with whom the United
States has to conduct foreign policy. I believe
it is dangerous for us to make the domestic
policy of countries around the world a direct
objective of American foreign policy. 27
In a later speech in 1976, he said:
We have a moral, as well as practical, obliga-
tion to stand up for our values and combat
injustice. Those who speak out for freedom and
expose the transgressions of repressive regimes
do so in the best American tradition. They can
have--and have had--a dramatic and heartening
impact. But there are also times when an effort
to teach another country a moral lesson can
backfire on the values we seek to promote.
This Administration has believed that we
must bend every effort to enhance respect for
human rights but that a public crusade is fre-
quently not the most effective method. Our
objective has been results, not publicity. We
were concerned—and with good reason— that when
such sensitive issues are transformed into tests
of strength between governments, the impulse for
national prestige will defeat the most worthy
goals. We have generally opposed attempts to
deal with sensitive international human rights
issues through legislation, not because of the
moral view expressed, which we share, but be-
cause legislation is almost always too inflexible,
too public, and too heavyhanded a means to
accomplish what we seek. 28
27Henry Kissinger, as quoted in U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Pro -
tection of Human Rights. The Work of International
Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy, Hear -
ings , before the Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions and Movements, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1974, p. 507
2 8Henry Kissinger, "Moral Promise and Practical
Needs," Department of State Bulletin , vol. 75 (15
November 1976), p. 603.
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In other words, the Secretary of State explained,
human rights were the internal affairs of individual
governments and outsiders should not attempt to pre-
scribe or dictate human rights criteria to other
governments
.
A second individual who was instrumental in bring-
ing the issue of human rights to the attention of the
Congress was Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN)
,
who served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations and Movements of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. He was one of the more ex-
perienced members of Congress, having been elected to
the House in 1962. In 1973, Representative Fraser and
his subcommittee held 15 hearings on the issue of the
protection of human rights. The results included some
29 recommendations for the improvement of human rights
29
considerations within the government. Mr. Fraser
agreed with Mr. Kissinger to a point but went on to
explain his total views. Concerning human rights he
said
:
Protection of human rights is essentially
the responsibility of each government with
respect to its own citizens; however, when a
government itself is the perpetration of the
29
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Human Rights in the World Community: A Call
for U.S. Leadership, Hearings , before the Subcommittee
on International Organizations and Movements, 93rd
Cong., 2nd sess., 1974,
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violations, the victim has no recourse but
to seek redress from outside his national
boundaries . . .
The human rights factor is not accorded
the high priority it deserves in our country's
foreign policy . . . Unfortunately, the prevail-
ing attitude has led the United States into
embracing governments which practice torture and
unabashedly violate almost every human rights
guarantee pronounced by the world community .30
He asserted that despite Secretary Kissinger's
"generally unsympathetic concern," the activities of
him and his colleagues had "raised the consciousness of
foreign service officers regarding the relevance of
31human rights to foreign policy." He also expressed
his views of the congressional frustration over the
issue of human rights and gave one reason for the
growing assertiveness of the Congress in the field of
foreign policy. He said:
. . . in recent years, Congress has struggled
with a recalcitrant executive branch over this
issue. When the executive branch failed to
implement the legislative mandates on human
rights the only course open to Congress was
to act on specific situations . 32
A third individual who became closely identified
with the issue of human rights was Representative
30 tu-^ 1 QIbid
. , pp . 1 , 9 .
3 n
''"Donald M. Fraser, "Congress's Role in the
Making of International Human Rights Policy," in Donald
P. Kommers and Gilburt D. Loescher, eds
.
, Human Rights
and American Foreign Policy (Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 252.
32Donald M. Fraser, "Freedom and Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Policy, no. 26 (Spring 1977), p. 156.
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Thomas P. Harkin (D-IA) , who was elected to Congress
in November 1974 at the age of 35. He was not pre-
viously identified with the issue of human rights
but soon became a leader in this growing controversy.
His efforts for this cause resulted in the Harkin
Amendment to the International Development and Food
Assistance Act of 1975. His amendment, which will be
discussed more later, served to terminate any U.S.
governmental assistance to a foreign government who
33denied fundamental human rights for its citizens.
The differences of opinion of these three men
typify the gap of understanding between the Congress
and the executive. One ironic aspect of this lack of
understanding or agreement was the past record of
support for human rights evidenced by the Congress.
Despite the activism displayed by the Congress in the
1970 's in support of human rights, a review of the
record revealed a distinct lack of interest or support
by Congress in the past. Although the U.S. did ratify
the Slavery Convention of 1926 and several other
agreements concerning slavey, by 1973 there were 29
international agreements on human rights which had
33Details of how the Harkin Amendment was
passed and how Mr. Harkin became a leader in the human
rights issue in the Congress are provided in Thomas M.
Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 87-89.

108
not received Senate approval, although some had been
waiting for years. These included the U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the American
Convention on Human Rights of the Organization of
34American States.
In 197 3, the thinking of a growing number of
congressional members on the subject of human rights
was included in the Foreign Assistance Act in the
following statement:
It is the sense of Congress that the Presi-
dent should deny economic or military assist-
ance to the government of any foreign country
which practices the internment or imprisonment
of that country's citizens for political
purposes
.
It is the sense of Congress that (1) the
President should request the Government of Chile
to protect the human rights of all individuals,
Chilean and foreign, as provided in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
and Protocol Relating the Status of Refugees, and
other relevant international legal instruments
guaranteeing the granting of asylum, safe
conduct, and humane treatment or release of
prisoners; (2) the President should support
international humanitarian initiatives by
the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and the International Committee of
the Red Cross to insure the protection and
safe conduct and resettlement of political
refugees, the humane treatment of political
prisoners, and the full inspection of detention
facilities under international auspices;
(3) the President should support and facil-
itate efforts by voluntary agencies to
34
U.S., Congress, House, Human Rights in the
World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership, pp. 20-21
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meet emergency relief needs; and (4) the
President should request of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights to undertake an
immediate inquiry into recent events occurring
in Chile. 35
It should be noted that these articles of legis-
lation expressed "the sense of Congress." They,
therefore, did not have the force of law and were not
binding on the President. Even though not binding,
they did portray a clear indication of the feeling of
a significant portion of the Congress on the subject of
human rights.
In order to repeat its convictions on the sub-
ject, in 1974 the Congress again sent a signal to the
Executive in a "sense of Congress" portion of the
Foreign Assistance Act of that year. As previously
mentioned, a "sense of Congress" was not a
law that absolutely had to be obeyed, but it did repre-
sent an amount of dissatisfaction in the Congress and
indicated the direction it felt foreign policy should
take. The portion of the Foreign Assistance Act read:
It is the sense of Congress that, except in
extraordinary circumstances, the President shall
substantially reduce or terminate security
assistance to any government which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights, including
35Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Statutes at
Large, vol. 87, sec. 32 & 35 (1974), pp. 733-734.
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torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right
to life, liberty and the security of the
person. 36
The act also specifically terminated and pro-
hibited all military assistance to Chile and included
any sale, transfer of excess U.S. defense articles,
or any type of security assistance. U.S. economic
assistance to Chile was specifically limited to
37$25 million for the next year, fiscal year 1975.
These specifications were in response to the revela-
tions and allegations of torture and denial of human
rights in Chile following the takeover of the govern-
3 8
ment by General Augusto Pinochet. As the legislation
was to show, Chile's human rights practices received
special congressional attention and disapproval. The
Washington Office on Latin America described Chile
39
as "Latin America's most brutal regime."
3 fi
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Statutes at
Large
, vol. 88, sec. 46, pt. 2 (1976), p. 1815.
37 Ibid., p. 1802.
3 8 See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Human Rights in Chile, Hearings , before the
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs and the Sub-
committee on International Organizations and Movements
93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, pts. 1 and 2.
39
"Human Rights--Score One," Legislative Update .
Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on
Latin America), September 1975, p. 3.
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An incident concerning the subject of Chile
only added to the already strained relationship
between the executive and the Congress. In September
1974, it was revealed that the CIA had indeed been
involved in covert activities in Chile specifically
designed to lead to the downfall of Chilean President
Allende. The revelations were made by Representative
Michael J. Harrington (D-MA) and were quickly published
40in the New York Times . Mr. Harrington had been an
outspoken critic of the CIA and the Administration's
foreign policy toward Chile. In this case, he broke
congressional ethics and publicly revealed the secret
testimony which had been given by CIA Director William
E. Colby to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Intelligence on April 22nd. The Congress was shocked
at the revelations, and the executive was angered at
the breach of faith by a member of Congress who made
the public revelations possible.
There were still additional items involving
human rights in the Foreign Assistance Act which
served to aggravate the relationship between Capitol
Hill and the White House. In response to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1973, on April 4, 1974 the State
Seymour M. Hersch, "C.I. A. Chief Tells House
of $8-Million Campaign Against Allende in '70-' 73,"
New York Times , 8 September 1974, p. 1:6.
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Department sent a message to U.S. embassies in 68 coun-
tries requesting information and analyses on human
rights practices in their host nations. Instead of
the State Department presenting these reports and
studies of each individual country to Congress, the
Department summarized, under Secretary Kissinger's
guidance, all of the results in a letter to the
42Congress on November 4, 1975.
A number of members of the Congress were
angered by this tactic which they felt was a deliberate
attempt by the executive to withhold accurate inform-
tion from them on the issue of human rights. Senator
Alan Cranston (D-CA) declared that the report was
"unacceptable" and said, "the attitude so prevalent
in the document might well be characterized as
43
'malignant neglect.'" He added that "unfortunately
the State Department and the White House do not seem
to give the attention to human rights in reaching
41
The message is recorded in U.S., Congress, House,
Fiscal Year 1975 Foreign Assisatnce Request , Hearings ,
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Cong.,
2nd sess., 1974, pp. 283-284.
42
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, Foreign Assistance Authorization. Arms Sales
Issues, Hearings , before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Assistance, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1976, pp. 376-380.
43Alan Cranston, "Human Rights and the Military
Aid Bill," U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 1st




foreign aid decisions that majorities in both houses
44
of Congress desire." The State Department letter
read, in part:
Repressive laws and actions, arbitrary
arrest and prolonged detention, torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
unfair trials or other flagrant denials of the
rights of life, liberty and the security of the
person are not extraordinary events in the world
community. These are all too common, occurring
within both those countries receiving U.S.
security assistance and those that do not.
Our security assistance programs are designed
to meet U.S. security interests as well as those
of other countries. The reduction or termination
of security assistance thus can have a direct
effect on our own security.
In particular instances, however, the reduc-
tion or termination of security assistance may
be wholly ineffective so far as improvement of
human rights conditions in a particular country
are concerned or may serve only to impair what-
ever influence we otherwise might have been able
to wield in this regard.
Obviously, if reduction or termination of
security assistance to a country would adversely
affect U.S. security interests and be unlikely to
produce a favorable impact on the human rights
situation there, other means should be sought
to promote human rights and make clear the U.S.
position.
In view of the widespread nature of human
rights violations in the world, we have no ade-
quately objective way to make distinctions of
degree between nations. This fact leads us,
therefore, to the conclusion that neither the
U.S. security interest nor the human rights cause
would be properly served by the public obloquy
and impaired relations with security assistance




of inherently subjective United States Govern-
ment determinations that "gross" violations do
or do not exist or that a "consistent" pattern
of such violations does or does not exist in
such countries.^
The State Department organization to deal with
worldwide questions on human rights issues at the time
consisted of a coordinator, James M. Wilson, and a
staff of two. Wilson's analysis of the reports and
studies on the 68 countries was also presented to the
Congress but was unquestionably not what the interested
members of Congress wished to hear. Mr. Wilson
reported
:
Unfortunately our studies produced little or
no evidence that withholding security assistance
is likely in most cases to lead to improvements
in human rights conditions. Most nations appear
strongly resistant to the prospect of bilateral
threats or pressures to improve their human
rights practices. Indeed, they can be expected
to react to such measures with keen sensitivity
and sharp resentment. The results are likely
to be a diminution in U.S. influence and an
increased sense of insecurity which can lead to
greater repression, rather than the desired
improvement in human rights conditions.
In some cases the most vigorous champions
of U.S. security assistance are those groups or
individuals in a country whose rights are most
strongly threatened. They reason that while the
current situation may not be good, takeover by
an even more repressive regime would be worse.
In the case of two countries where specific
limitations on security assistance were enacted
by the Congress last year, moreover, it does
45 .
U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance





not seem to balance that reduction or termina-
tion of assistance has been effective in secur-
ing a net improvement in the human rights
situation. In these cases other actions need
to be taken over the long term, and indeed are
being pursued by the Executive Branch.
The available evidence thus indicates that
withdrawal of assistance is normally appropriate
only after we have despaired of influencing the
offending government and have concluded that, on
balance, our national interests are better served
by disassociation from that government than by
continued close identification with it. 46
In addition to the Foreign Assistance Act, there
was other legislation in 1974 that added an additional
confrontation between the executive and Congress over
foreign policy. This was the controversial Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. Senator
Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) sponsored the legislation in
the Senate and Representative Charles A. Vanik (D-OH)
sponsored the legislation in the House. This was no
"sense of Congress" statement but dictated foreign policy
for the U.S. and had its roots in human rights concerns
for the emigration of people of Jewish heritage from the
Soviet Union. The act provided that "to assure the con-
tinued dedication of the United States to fundamental
human rights," when the President determined that any
country "denies its citizens the right or opportunity to
emigrate," that country shall not be eligible to receive
46James M. Wilson, Jr., quoted in U.S., Congress,






most- favored-nation treatment, receive credits, or be
47included in any commercial agreement. Even though
the objective was to force the Soviet Union to permit
increased emigration, the opposite occurred. In
defiance of the threat contained in the Trade Act, the
Soviet Union reversed its policy and severely reduced
emigration. Concerning the result, Representative
William S. Broomfield (R-MI), a member of the House
International Relations Committee, concluded:
If I am correct in this analysis, the gradual
passing of the era of Congressional foreign
policy has almost certainly been hastened by its
manifest lack of success. Congress--this Member
of Congress included— forced the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment on a reluctant Executive Branch that
had won substantial gains for Soviet Jewry
through quiet diplomacy. We could not, however,
force the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on the Soviet
Union, and thousands of Soviet Jews are now pay-
ing the price for our well-intentioned but mis-
guided efforts. 48
47Trade Act of 1974, Statutes at Large , vol.
88, sec. 402, pt. 2 (1976), pp. 2056-2057.
48 William S. Broomfield, quoted in U.S., Congress,
House Committee on International Relations, Congress
and Foreign Policy, Hearings , before the Special Sub-
committee on Investigations, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.
,
1976, p. 84. This record of hearings also provides a
valuable bibliography on the subject of "The Role of
Congress in Foreign Policymaking" on pages 340 to
347. This bibliography consists of a listing of some
180 books and articles pertaining to the subject.
These hearings on the foreign policy role of Congress
were held expressly because of the growing concern felt
in the Congress over the deterioration in the Congres-
sional-Executive relationship. As the report of the
hearings stated, "relations between the executive and
the legislative branches need urgent attention and
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A summary of the subject by the House International
Relations Committee stated that "it is probably
accurate to say the Jackson-Vanik amendment's effect
on Jewish emigration was probably greater while it
was being debated than after it became law" and con-
cluded that "it would appear that the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, since its passage, has not really furthered
the interests of Soviet Jews trying to leave the
49Soviet Union.
"
Legislation in 1974 also portrayed another grow-
ing congressional conviction which was to link human
rights and conventional arms transfers. The Foreign
Assistance Act of that year also included:
It is the sense of Congress that the recent
growth in international transfers of convention
arms to developing nations is a cause for grave
concern for the United States and other nations
in that in particular areas of the world it
increases the danger of potential violence among
nations and diverts scarce world resources from
more peaceful uses.
improvement, lest existing frictions seriously impair
the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives." See
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Rela-
tions, Report of the Special Subcommittee on Investi-
gations, Congress and Foreign Policy , Committee Print,
94th Cong~ 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1976), p. 1.
49 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interna-
tional Relations, Congress and Foreign Policy, 1975 ,
Committee Print, 1976, pp. 62-63.
50Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, pp. 1817-1818.
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The apparent effect was the combining of interests
for mutual support--the human rights advocates and
the opponents of arms transfers. The result was
legislation which, although not legally binding, gave
indication of things to come.
The increased discontent between the Congress
and the executive was even more evident in 1975. One
aspect of this growing animosity between the two
branches was the perceived insensitivity of the
executive to the desires of the Congress and the
President's disregard for these wishes. The view was
held by some members on Capitol Hill that "the feeling
exists that if Congress does not specifically pro-
hibit action through legislation, then the executive
branch will feel it can carry out any policy."
This feeling was reflected in 1975 by additional
legislation pertaining to human rights and which re-
stricted the President's flexibility. This was con-
tained in an amendment by Representative Thomas R.
Harkin who had become an activist for human rights.
The Harkin amendment was contained in the Inter-
national Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975
but was actually applied as a change to the Foreign
Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. Van Dusen,
"Making the Separation of Powers Work," Foreign
Affairs, vol. 57 (Fall 1978), p. 23.
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Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended)
. His amendment,
which eventually became law, specified inter alia:
No assistance may be provided under this part
to the government of any country which engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights, including tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged detention without charges,
or other flagrant denial of the right to life,
liberty, and the security of the person, unless
such assistance will directly benefit the needy
people in such country. 52
In 1975, the legislation was no longer a gentle
hint but was an absolute statement of policy in the
new law which gave the President explicit legal direc-
tion for his action and clearly specified U.S. foreign
policy on the subject. The increasingly clear and even
strident tone of the legislation pertaining to human
rights was a reflection of the growing frustration of
the Congress with the seeming unconcern and lack of
progress by the executive on this issue. It also re-
flected a growing confidence on the part of the con-
gressional human rights leaders that they could influ-
ence foreign policy and make strides toward achieving
their human rights goals in spite of an unenthusiastic
executive. The Washington Office on Latin America
52 International Development and Food Assistance
Act of 1975, Statutes at Large , vol. 89, sec. 310
(1977), p. 860. Mr. Harkin's personal views are con-
tained in his chapter "Human Rights and Foreign Aid:
Forging an Unbreakable Link," in Peter G. Brown and
Douglas MacLean, eds., Human Rights and U.S. Foreign
Policy. Principles and Applications (Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath & Co., 1979), pp. 15-26.
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applauded the Harkin amendment and concluded that it
"culminates a long struggle to introduce conscience
53into U.S. foreign policy."
Human rights legislation continued in 1976 and
established new restrictions on the executive's flexi-
bility in determining foreign policy. The restrictions
found new and innovative ways for application in addi-
tion to straight foreign aid or military assistance
limitations or cutoffs. The first innovation applied to
the Inter-American Development Bank and specified how
its loans might be dispersed. The legislation which
was an amendment to the Inter-American Bank Act read:
The United States Executive Director of the
Bank is authorized and directed to vote against
any loan, any extension of financial assistance,
or any technical assistance to any country which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights,
including torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges, or other flagrant denial of the
right to life, liberty, and the security of the
person, unless such assistance will directly
benefit the needy people in the country. 54
Later that summer, the new legislation was put
to the test when the proposal for a $21 million loan
53
"Human Rights—Score One," Legislative Update
Latin America , Washington Office on Latin America,
September 1975, p. 3.
54Amendment, Inter-American Bank Act of 1976 ,




to Chile was brought before the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB)
. Because of the new law and
condemnation by the Inter-American Human Rights Com-
mission of human rights abuses in Chile under the
Pinochet government, the U.S. representative to the
55IADB voted against the loan! The U.S. was the only
member to vote against the loan and from the Latin
American view was again "out of step, seeking to impose
.
. 56political criteria on loans." The results of this
application of the congressional prescription of
foreign policy brought into question the effective-
ness of such restrictions on the overall results, even
though the motives might be laudable.
A second innovative means of applying restric-
tions came through the appropriations legislation
rather than via the Foreign Assistance Act itself.
In this particular case, the Congress voted a prohi-
bition on military assistance to Uruguay. The passage
which became law stated that "none of the fund appro-
priated or made available pursuant to this Act shall
be used to provide military assistance, international
military education and training, or foreign military
55
Lewis H. Diuguid, "U.S. Vote on Chile Loan





c 7credit sales to the Government of Uruguay." The
amendment was proposed by Representative Edward I.
c o
Koch (D-NY) reportedly for human rights violations.
It is interesting to note his rationale for the cut-
off of aid when he said: "I do not believe that the
American people want to continue to support military
despotism where the United States has no security
59interests at stake." What remained unclear in his
statement was the implication that support for despot-
ism might receive approval if U.S. security interests
were involved. Viewed in another light, he implied
that cutoffs of U.S. aid would be invoked in the
name of human rights only when U.S. security interests
were not involved. In this case, Congress singled
out one of the most remote countries in Latin America
which was as far removed as possible from any security
or commercial ties with the U.S.
Chile was also singled out. Under provision of
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
57Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appro -
priations Act of 1976, Statutes at Large , vol. 90,
sec. 505, pt. 1 (1978), p. 1473.
5 8
Lewis H. Diuguid, "Congress Cuts Uruguay Aid;
Rights Violations are Cited," Washington Post , 20
September 1976, p. A8 : 1
.
59 •Edward I. Koch, as quoted in Lewis H. Duiguid,
"Congress Cuts Uruguay Aid; Rights Violations are




Control Act of 1976, no military or security support-
ing assistance could be provided nor any military
education and training. Economic assistance was
limited to $27.5 million.
These cutoffs of military assistance to Uruguay
and Chile for human rights reasons displayed the grow-
ing power of the human rights elements in the Congress
They were undoubtedly fueled by reports such as from
Amnesty International, which reported that 80 percent
of the torture cases worldwide dealt with Latin
America. The restrictions were also part of the
pattern of such cutoffs to countries where the
Congress could assert its influence over foreign
policy, could specify the criteria for the executive
to follow, and could assert its brand of policy with-
out seriously harming U.S. security interests. As one
analysis stated:
These aid termination actions by Congress
appear to be so quixotic and unrelated to the
more carefully patterned response envisioned by
section 502B that they draw into question the
ability of Congress to contribute responsibly
to the promotion of human rights. In fact,
these aid terminations seem to have been moti-
vated by Congress' desire to "do something--
International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Statutes at Large , vol. 90,
sec. 406(a)(2), pt. 1 (1976), p. 758.
6 1
Amnesty International, The Amnesty Interna -
tional Report, 1 June 1975-31 May 1976 (London:
Amnesty International Publications, 1976), p. 84.
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anything" about human rights and by anger at the
State Department's refusal to take less coercive
measures . 62
The International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 contained other important
human rights provisions in a revised Section 502B:
It is the policy of the United States, in
accordance with its international obligations as
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations
and in keeping with the constitutional heritage
and traditions of the United States, to promote
and encourage increased respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
To this end, a principal goal of the foreign
policy of the United States is to promote the
increased observance of internationally recog-
nized human rights by all countries.
It is further the policy of the United
States that, except under circumstances speci-
fied in this section, no security assistance
may be provided to any country the government
of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human
rights
.
In furtherance of the foregoing policy the
President is directed to formulate and conduct
international security assistance programs of
the United States in a manner which will promote
and advance human rights and avoid identifica-
tion of the United States, through such programs,
with governments which deny to their people
internationally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms, in violation of inter-
national law or in contravention of the policy
f> 2
David Weissbrodt, "Human Rights Legislation and
United States Foreign Policy," Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law , vol. 7, Supplement
1977, p. 262. This source provides a detailed and
accurate review of the issue of human rights legisla-
tion. The entire supplement is devoted to aspects of
the human rights question.
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of the United States as expressed in this sec-
tion or otherwise. 63
It is to be noted that the new law stated that:
. . . a principal goal of the foreign policy
of the United States is to promote the in-
creased observance of internationally recog-
nized human rights by all countries. °4
It is also to be noted that there was no mention of
any relevance of this policy to the security or other
interests of the U.S.
The International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 was also important to human
rights because it specified the establishment of a
coordinator for human rights and humanitarian affairs
in the Department of State. This coordinator was
made responsible for matters pertaining to human rights
in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy worldwide. The
law specified that the coordinator was to be appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the
. 65Senate
.
Although of fundamental importance to the develop-
ment of legislative restrictions on arms transfers to
Latin America, the issue of human rights was only one
International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 , sec. 301(a), p. 748.
Ibid.
International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, sec. 301(b), p. 750.
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of a number of factors and influences which contri-
buted to the restrictions. Additional elements of
influence will be briefly reviewed next.
In addition to human rights, a second factor in
the congressional-executive relationship was the
influence of new members of Congress. Prior to 1972,
the common experience and background of a large number
of members of Congress was the Korean War, World War
II and the Depression. It is surprising to note,
however, that as a result of the elections of 1972,
1974 and 1976, more than half of the members of the
.
66
House and Senate were new: The common experience
for many of these new members was the Vietnam War and
many had won their elections by opposing it. The
effect of these new members had significant impact
on the Congress, its majority views, its readiness to
confront the executive, and its eagerness to have a
major voice in the establishment of U.S. foreign policy
A study of the Senate membership found that the change
in view of that body toward opposition to the Vietnam
War came about primarily by the replacement of
U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Printing,
1977 Congressional Directory , 95th Cong., 1st sess.




its members rather than by the change of mind of the
u * 67incumbents
.
A third factor which was related but distinct
from the second was the effect of personalities. Many
individuals--their convictions, their energies, and
their positions of power--were responsible for the
events. Among these influential individuals who con-
tributed to these events must be included the
Presidents Johnson, Nixon and Ford as well as their
Secretaries of State. Special mention must be made
of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's own distinct
personality, views and style. In many episodes of
conflict between the Congress and the executive branch,
Secretary Kissinger served as the proverbial red flag
to the bull in agitating the various congressional
committees. Intentionally or not, he often appeared to
regard the committees with disdain and as a great waste
of time. Individuals in the Congress reacted accord-
ingly. Personalities in the Congress also had great
influence, either overall or on particular issues.
These included Senators Fulbright, Symington, Church,
Morse, Kuchel, and Humphrey, and Representatives
Fraser, Harkin, Hamilton, Pelly, Conte, and Long.
f\ 7
Paul Burstein and William Freudenburg, "Ending
the Vietnam War: Components of Change in Senate Voting





Distrust was a fourth factor which came to in-
fluence the relationship between the Congress and the
executive. During the subject decade, this feeling
of distrust was to grow until it was omnipresent in
later dealings between the two branches. It had its
roots in Vietnam, was fed by such events as the
Cambodian invasion and was given a large boost by the
debacle of the Watergate break-in affair. From this
distrust came other negative aspects of the relation-
ship. The Congress came to doubt the executive's
motives in the conduct of foreign policy; the President
became paranoid with respect to the Congress, and the
legislature grew to have little faith in the explana-
tion of events received from the executive. Through
congressional eyes already biased with distrust, as
events unfolded, it increasingly appeared that it was
the executive that was involving the country in foreign
situations, and it was the Congress that was extricat-
ing the nation from the entanglements. It was almost
as if a senator or representative could ascertain the
executive's view on a foreign policy question, then
take the opposite view and feel quite comfortable
that he was assuming a correct and defendable position.
As the relationship deteriorated between the two
branches, distrust affected each transaction. A
former ambassador , writing on the relationship,

129
stated that "the greatest single obstacle to better
executive-legislative relations is not an absence of
consensus, but an absence of trust . . . for without
trust cooperation becomes impossible even when there
. „68is agreement
.
Another of the considerations which served to
spur the Congress to increased activity in the foreign
policy process was resentment over the "imperial
presidency." After World War II, as international
tensions grew, the development of supersonic jet
aircraft, intercontinental missiles, nuclear warheads,
and improved communications drastically reduced the
nation's time available to respond to threats or
perils. These factors led to a rapid increase in the
powers of decision making which devolved to the
executive. The powers of decision and the direction
of foreign policy came to be described as the "imperial
presidency." In a book by that title, historian
Arthur Schlesinger stated that "the Imperial Presi-
69dency was essentially the creation of foreign policy."
Robert G. Neumann, Toward a More Effective Exe -
cutive-Legislative Relationship in the Conduct of




Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial
Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 208.
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Until the late 1960's and early 1970's, Congress
for the most part, permitted the President to guide
the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In addition to
the new technological developments that made quick
decisions by the President necessary, the Congress and
the public were aligned in support of a general Cold
War philosophy of foreign policy for the United States.
Gradually, however, the Congress became more and more
concerned about the direction of U.S. foreign policy
and apprehensive about U.S. overseas commitments and
the lack of congressional involvement in such deci-
sions. These consternations of the Congress were
reflected in the legislation produced which contained
foreign policy assertions or restrictions on the flex-
ibility of the "imperial presidency."
The major events and the accompanying influences
which grew to distort the relationship between the
Congress and the executive have been outlined. During
the same period, several congressional perceptions
also developed that were to pervade legislation which
applied specifically or primarily to Latin America.
The first of these perceptions by the Congress was the
lack of a serious threat in the region, either internal
or external. There simply was not a foreign power
with the means to present a serious challenge to Latin
American or United States security from that direction.
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Likewise, no Latin American country possessed suffi-
cient military equipment and supplies to mount a
sustained offensive against a neighbor, even if it
had the reason and the serious inclination. Both
internal and external security reasons had been used
at various times to justify the transfer of arms to
Latin America. However, internal security became so
far out of favor with the Congress that it was for-
bidden to be used as justification for the transfer
of arms to the region. In short, the credible threat
just did not exist in Latin America as far as the
Congress was concerned.
The second of these congressional perceptions
that applied to Latin America was the special relation-
ship that existed between the U.S. and Latin America.
It appeared that one aspect of this special relation-
ship meant that Latin America was so indebted to the
U.S. it would remain compliant and obedient to whatever
policy the U.S. devised. It was easy to see how the
concept developed. The U.S. and Latin America were
tied together by long similar traditions of advocacy
of democracy. Their constitutions were patterned
after that of the U.S. We were tied together by the
long relationship in the Organization of American
States (OAS) , formerly the Pan American Union, and we




oldest security treaty, the Rio Pact of 1947. Many
Latin American nations had been allies in World Wars
I and II, and several had sent troops into combat on
the side of the U.S. We were closely bound by economic
ties. Latin /America and the U.S. had been close trad-
ing partners for years. The U.S. was the largest
source of imports for all of Latin America and also
received more Latin American exports than any other
70location. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President
Kennedy spoke of the "special and historic relation-
71
ship between the United States and the area.
Secretary of State Kissinger reaffirmed and emphasized
this relationship during a visit to Latin America in
1976 when he said:
I have come to this continent because the
United States believes that Latin America has
a special place in our foreign policy. . . .
The United States has always felt with Latin
America a special intimacy, a special bond of
collaboration . . .a special readiness to
consider the views of our neighbors. On many
issues of United States policy—economic
,
70 Inter-American Development Bank, Selected Data
on Latin America (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1977),
pp. 6-7. For the 15-year period 1961-1975, the U.S.
varied from 35.6 to 32.6 percent as a destination of
Latin American exports and varied from 41.6 to 34.9
percent as the origin of Latin American imports.
71 . •
John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report
to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup on
Cuba, 22 October 1962," Public Papers of the President
of the United States. John F. Kennedy, 1962 . (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 807.
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political or security— the American people and
Congress give special consideration to our
hemispheric ties.
. . . The United States con-
tinues in this ara to feel a special concern
for its hemispheric relations. 72
In the main, Latin American nations had remained
remarkably docile, with the exception, of course, of
Cuba. They had been recipients of military assistance
and weapons, significant amounts of economic aid, and
large numbers of their military students had been
trained in this country. It is easy to see why a
member of the U.S. Congress would feel that a special
relationship existed between the U.S. and Latin America
Indeed, it was a two-way relationship. But it appeared
that to many congressional members, this special rela-
tionship meant that Latin America was so closely tied
to the U.S. that it would automatically follow the
lead of the U.S. no matter what turns U.S. policy
might take. It was a mistake, however, to attribute
such great influence to the United States. As a RAND
study concluded:
The most serious difficulties for U.S. secur-
ity policies, particularly in relation to arms
transfers and political-military goodwill, appear
to have derived from a major, largely erroneous
assumption: that Latin America is (even ought
72
Henry A. Kissinger, Major Statements on Latin
America
,
U.S., Department of State, Publication No.
8848 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1976), pp. 1-2. His remarks were given in an address
at the U.S. -Venezuelan Symposium at Macuto, Venezuela
on 17 February 1976.
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to be) so dependent upon the United States that--
its policies can guide Latin American behavior.
Many in Congress apparently failed to realize that
"experience shows that while the Latin American govern-
ments are bitterly antagonistic toward each other on
a great number of issues, they display a surprising
unity whenever a confrontation with the United States
„74
arises .
A third fundamental congressional perception was
that Latin America was on the margin or the periphery
of international events or considerations which were
of significant interest to the U.S. To many members
the events in Latin America or U.S. policies toward
Latin America did not have a serious impact on the
larger and more important events and issues which
involved Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the Western
Pacific, Southeast or Southwest Asia.
Since U.S. security interests were not seriously
challenged there, Latin America appeared to be a
geographic area in which Congress chose to exercise
its brand of foreign policy. Latin America appeared
7 3
David F. Ronfeldt, Future U.S. Security Rela -
tions in the Latin American Contexts (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 1975), Study P-5342, p. 15.
74 . •Edmund Gaspar, United States-Latin America :
A Special Relationship ? (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 4.
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to be a training ground available for congressional
experimentation. Since it could not really play in
the big leagues of foreign policy, the Congress could
at least do something in the region of Latin America.
It additionally was an area in which, from the
executive view, the Congress could meddle without
doing too much mischief. No matter what policies the
Congress developed for the region, the result would
not seriously affect the executive's long-term objec-
tives for the United States in the realm of foreign
policy. As Senator J. William Fulbright said, the
Congress did things in Latin America that it could
75
not get away with in other regions.
A fourth perception that was apparent in con-
gressional thinking, certainly among the opponents
of arms transfers, was lack of convincing evidence
that the transfer of arms had been effective in achiev-
ing foreign policy goals. Even though the Administra-
tion could assure the Congress that arms transfers
had been beneficial and productive, the Congress could
cite other examples and counter-arguments. In any
event, the record was not convincingly clear to
congressional opponents that the problems and concerns
75 . .
U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance Act
of 1973, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 44.
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which stemmed from arms transfers were worth the
dubious results achieved.
Throughout the subject decade, the results of
these significant events were intermingled and con-
tinued to operate in varying degrees with the influ-
ences, factors and perceptions that have been
outlined. Next will be reviewed the restrictions
themselves that were the product of the complex




THE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS 1967-1969
A number of factors and events coalesced in
1967 to focus severe congressional criticism on the
United States' policy pertaining to the transfer of
conventional weapons to foreign countries. Latin
America was one region to which this criticism was
particularly directed. As a result, beginning in 1967,
Congress approved a series of laws which served to
limit the transfer of weapons, and these laws applied
particularly to Latin America. Since it is the thesis
of this dissertation that these restrictions on the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy were often ineffective
or counterproductive, it is necessary first to estab-
lish what these limitations were, how they originated,
and what they intended to accomplish. This chapter
will (a) record the major restrictions passed by
Congress in the decade beginning with 1967 which
applied to the transfer of conventional arms to Latin
America, (b) list the rationale and objectives given
for approval of the restrictions, and (c) explore





During 1967, an unusual number of unrelated
events occurred which had effect on U.S. arms transfers
to Latin America. The results of these events, combined
with other factors, served to concentrate the attention
of Congress on the subject of conventional arms trans-
fers. These events and factors included the results
of the revelations of a Senate staff study which
focused attention on the financing of a rapid growth
of arms sales, the sale of F-4 fighters to Iran, the
June 1967 war between the Arabs and Israelis, and
Peru's desire to modernize its air force. Ever present
in the background were factors such as the growing influ-
ence of the war in Vietnam, a mounting sense that the
U.S. was overcommitted abroad, a perception that lesser
developed nations were taking U.S. economic aid, while
wasting resources on military hardware, and frustra-
tion with presidential disregard of congressional
advice in foreign policy.
The first of the events was the appearance of a
small, thirteen-page staff study released without
fanfare by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
January 25, 1967. Although his name did not appear
on the document, it was written by William B. Bader,
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy , Staff Study,
Committee Print, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967.
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a new member of the committee staff, in his mid-30' s,
with a year's experience in the State Department, and
2
with a doctorate in history from Princeton. The
brief staff study, written completely on his own
initiative, immediately attracted attention and served
as a catalyst throughout the year for the controversy
over arms transfers. This controversy resulted in
several significant congressional restrictions on the
transfer of conventional arms which had particular
applicability to Latin America.
Only five days after the January 25th publica-
tion, the New York Times carried an article on the
study with comments by Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN)
.
The article supported the study and criticized U.S.
arms transfer policies. (Dr. Bader's staff study did
not allege any impropriety in U.S. policy but ques-
tioned the adequacy of the governmental administrative
machinery to properly review and pass judgment on the
significant increase in sales requests received from
foreign nations.)
2 Interview with Dr. William B. Bader, staff member,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1966-1969, Washing-
ton, D.C., 30 May 1978. For more information on Dr.
Bader's significant involvement in crucial issues of
the time, see "Senate ABM Examiner," New York Times ,
22 March 1969, p. 17:7. See also Anthony Austin, The
President' s War (New York: Lippincott, 1971)
.
John W. Finney, "Senate Study Questions U.a. Arms
Sales Abroad," New York Times, 30 January 1967, p. 12:4.
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Dr. Bader ' s study raised a number of issues
which were to directly affect policy toward Latin
America. Included was a description of how arms sales
were financed to lesser developed countries through a
"revolving fund" administered by the Department of
Defense and Country X loans by the Export-Import
4 . .Bank. Although originally authorized by acts of
Congress, the Congress did not appear aware of the
magnitude of the arms sales program which did not
come under the review of Congress.
Country X Loans and the Revolving Fund
In the Mutual Security Act of 1957, Congress
authorized $15 million for the Defense Department to
use in arranging loans for arms sales. In 1961, the
Foreign Assistance Act specified that any repayments
for military assistance could be placed in this
5
account and used to finance further sales. Receipts
from sales plus additional annual authorizations
swelled the account to more than $300 million. The
4
U.S., Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign
Policy
, pp. 5-7.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Statutes at
Large
, vol. 75, sec. 508 (1961), p. 437.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign
Policy
,
p. 6. The actual amount was $384 million as of
30 June 1967. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 , S.
Report 499, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 9.
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 permitted the Defense
Department to completely guarantee loans for arms
purchases, made by private banks to lesser developed
7countries, while maintaining only 25% as a reserve.
Theoretically, more than $1.2 billion in loans could be
made for the sales of arms for which Congress had no
oversight authority. Additionally, the staff study
mentioned Country X loans by the Export-Import Bank,
which were for arms purchases by lesser developed coun-
tries. The study said, "The Eximbank does not know or
o
want to know where this money goes."
Congress was aroused by the sinister overtones
of this arrangement and was concerned that: first, the
loans could be extended without any congressional
review, and second, the Administration seemed to
have camouflaged the existence of such an arrangement.
It was a similar situation between the two branches
of government that caused one author to later
comment that it would be "prudent for the
executive to keep in close touch with Congress,
7Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Statues at
Large
,
vol. 78, sec. 201(d)(3) (1965), p. 1011.
o
U.S., Congress, Senate, Arms Sales and Foreign




which feels about the fait accompli much as nature
9does about vacuums."
Beginning February 7th, at the instigation of
the committee staff, the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee on Disarmament held hearings which included
the subject of arms sales. Senator Albert Gore
(D-TN) served as the Subcommittee Chairman. Assistant
Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton was asked to
testify, but he mentioned the Country X loans only in
passing. Later in the hearings the subject of Country
X loans was broached again by Senator Gore, who
concluded
,
I do not like this Country X account, and these
kinds of devices which really go around any
participation by the Congress or any of its
committees. Things grow like topsy . . . and
this program has grown without the adequate
participation of the Congress.
H
On March 20, Mr. Harold F. Linder, President
and Chairman of the Board of the Export-Import Bank,
testified before Congressman Otto Passman's Foreign
9William Diebold, Jr., "U.S. Trade Policy: The




Bader interview, 30 May 1978. Dr. Bader , in
addition to serving on the staff of the full committee,
also served as a consultant to the Subcommittee on
Disarmament.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Armament and Disarmament
Problems, Hearings , before the Subcommittee on Dis-
armament, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 150.
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Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee. During the hearings, Mr. Passman asked a
question to ascertain whether or not Congress had
authorized the bank to make loans to finance sales
of military equipment. Mr. Linder replied, "I do
not know that there was a specific authorization by
12the Congress." A few minutes later, Mr. Linder gave
the first public explanation of how the loans were
arranged
.
MR. PASSMAN. Do I understand the committee is
not going to be able to ascertain the number of
countries for which you are financing the sale
of military equipment?
MR. LINDER. The committee can ascertain all of
those countries where we at Eximbank can identify
the country. But if the Defense Department came
to us tomorrow morning and said, "Country X is
buying $5 million worth of military equipment.
We have a 5 year note from country X which we
are prepared to guarantee to you. Country X has
paid down 10 percent or 15 or 20 percent in cash.
It will repay the balance over a period of 5
years in equal semiannual installments. Will
you discount a note guaranteed by the Defense
Department or buy an account receivable which
the Defense Department has against country X's
obligation which we tell you we hold and which
we guarantee you repayment on?" I would
12
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropria-
tions. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appro -
priations for 1968
,
Hearings , before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, 90th Cong.
1st sess., 1967, pt. 1, p. 17. This is a notable
answer because in later hearings Mr. Linder made an
elaborate case for the basis of the congressional




provide them with the money. I do not know
which country is denominated "X."13
The question of whether or not Congress had been
properly informed or had even actually authorized
such use of the revolving fund in the Country X loans
became more and more a controversial issue. During
hearings in April, Secretary of Defense McNamara made
a comment that was to be quoted many times during the
next few months concerning this controversy:
MR. MORSE. Have you ever sought congressional
sanction for utilization of the Export-Import
Bank for this purpose?
MR. MCNAMARA. No, I think this is a matter
for the Export-Import Bank to settle. 14
In effect, the Secretary of Defense was saying that
any question of authorization was not a problem for the
Defense Department to worry about. If there was to be
any concern about authorization, that was the purview
of the bank. The Secretary's haughty and even dis-
dainful attitude only added to the impression that
13 Ibid., p. 19. Assistant Secretary of Defense
John McNaughton had mentioned the subject of the
Export-Import Bank's financing of military sales to
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarma-
ment on February 7, but these hearings were held in
executive session and were not released to the public
until May 2.
14 U.S., Congress, House, Foreign Assistance Act
of 1967 , Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 144.
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the Defense Department was going to utilize absolutely
every possible means to finance arms sales to customers
of its own choosing. The Secretary gave the impres-
sion that arms would be sold one way or the other,
preferably without the knowledge and interference of
the Congress. This cavalier response was to sit less
well as the summer progressed and the subject of arms
transfers heated up along with the weather in Washing-
ton.
Both of the Senate and House Committees on Bank-
ing and Currency held hearings in April and May on a
bill concerning routine matters of the Export-Import
Bank. Mr. Linder provided testimony before both com-
mittees, but he made no mention of the bank's provision
of loans for arms sales to lesser developed countries,
nor did either committee quiz him on the subject. Both
committees approved the measure and issued reports in
favor of the Export-Import Bank bill recommending ap-
15proval by their parent bodies of the legislature.
By July, Congressman William B. Widnall (R-NJ)
was concerned enough by the Export-Import Bank's in-
volvement in arms sales that he wrote a letter to
Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee,
15
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Banking and
Currency, Export-Import Bank Act Extension , H. Rept.




. Mr. Widnall recommended the
unusual action of reconvening the Committee after it
had completed its work and had issued its report.
Mr. Patman agreed and the new hearings began on
July 17.
Mr. Linder was summoned to return to the House
Committee on July 17, this time accompanied by several
of the Administration's more able spokesmen: Mr. Paul
H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Mr. Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs; Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the
Treasury; and John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs. Despite
their articulate statements, they were not able to
remove the existing impression that the Congress had
been deliberately left uninformed and in the dark about
the magnitude of the sales program and the operation
of the Defense Department revolving fund. Also to
many members, the Country X loan system was a deliber-
ate subterfuge to preclude congressional involvement
in this important area of foreign policy. In spite of
the assertions of the Administration spokesmen as to
U.S., Congress, House, Export-Import Bank and
Credit Sales of Defense Articles, Hearings , before the








their efforts to keep the Congress informed, the
members of the House Banking and Currency Committee
denied having any knowledge of such an arrangement.
Congressman Henry Reuss (D-WI), a member of the bank-
ing committee, was indignant upon learning of these
arrangements to finance arms purchases and stated:
"Until last week I was totally unaware of these arms
sales, and I have sat on this committee for 14
years
.
During the discussions of the Foreign Assistance
Act by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Frank Church (D-ID) offered an amendment to
abolish the revolving fund and to prevent future
Country X loans by the Export-Import Bank. The com-
mittee upheld Senator Church's amendment and by a vote
of 12 to 6 passed the bill to the full Senate. Senator
Fulbright said the committee's proposed bill would
"help restore the Senate's proper role in the formu-
1
8
lation of foreign policy." He also stated:
The members of the committee considered this
matter most seriously, and arrived at the con-
clusion that this sales program, particularly
sales under the so-called Country X program--
which had been very successfully concealed from
Congress—constituted a policy which went much
too far in encouraging arms races, and in
17
Ibid., pp. 10, 21.
1 o
U.S., Congress, Senate, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
14 August 1967, Congressional Record, vol. 113, p. 22549
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imposing on poor and small countries burdens
which they could ill afford. 19
Senator Wayne Morse was also an outspoken critic
of the arms sales program and said, "We were aghast
when we discovered for the first time how far they
have gone with this revolving fund." He went on to
assert that "American military aid in the underdeveloped
nations of the world is the greatest cause of the
i. 2
spread of communism in these areas of the world.
To counter Senator Church's amendment, Senators
Henry Jackson (D-WA) and John Tower (R-TX) offered a
new amendment to continue the credit sales mechanisms.
In introducing the measure, Senator Jackson said:
. . . it is sound sense, in the matter of
military sales and grant aid, not to unduly
tie the hands of the President. I believe that
the pending bill, proposed by the Foreign
Relations Committee, is too restrictive and
that it would dangerously impede the President
in the conduct of our foreign and defense
policy. 21
The amendment was defeated by a vote of 4 3 to 50.
19 U.S., Congress, Senate, 90th Cong., 1st. sess.,
15 August 1967, Congressional Record, vol. 113,
p. 22639. —
20
Ibid., p. 22632. Senator Morse, in addition to
being a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin
American Affairs.




Senator Tower proposed a similar amendment, but it
22
was defeated 45 to 46.
After presentation of the reports from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, the Conference Committee
locked into a six-week struggle from September 14
to November 1, to resolve the differences between the
House and Senate versions of the bill. On Novem-
ber 7th, the Conference Committee presented its
report. It was approved by the House on
23November 8th by a vote of 205 to 187. The Senate
passed the bill on the same day by a voice vote.
Congressman Thomas E. Morgan (D-PA) was the manager
of the House members assigned to the Conference
Committee. In his report to the House, he noted that
there were "89 points of differences" between the
22Congressional Record
,
15 August 1967, pp.
22650, 22660. In light of later political orienta-
tions, it is interesting to note that in both of
these votes on the revolving fund question, Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) voted to maintain the fund,
while Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY) voted to abolish
it. Also, of the little things of which politics is
made, Senators Everett Dirksen and Charles Percy of
Illinois had to leave between the first and second
votes to fly to the Illinois State Fair. Both had
supported the measure in the first vote.
23U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Legislative History of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, 88th, 89th, 90th Congress . 93rd
Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 144.
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House and Senate versions when they started, but the
"most difficult and time-consuming issue which the
conference had to deal with involved sales of military
equipment on credit terms and the authority for the
Defense Department to guarantee such credits."
In its final form, the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1967 specified termination of the revolving fund
as of June 30, 1968. It also specified a limit of
$190 million in loans that could be guaranteed by the
25Defense Department in fiscal year 1968. But that
was not the end of the renovation to the former system
of financing arms sales to lesser developed nations.
One more restriction was yet to be formed.
Congressman Widnall's letter to Congressman
Pattman in July had caused a reconvening of hearings
by the House Committee on Banking and Currency on the
Export-Import Bank bill. Further action on the bill
was then blocked by a controversial plan for the
Export-Import Bank to finance loans to Italy for the
Fiat automobile company to build an $800 million plant
24
U.S., Congress, House, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
8 November 1967, Congressional Record , vol. 113,
p. 31742.
25Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Statutes at
Large, vol. 81, sec. 201 (1968), pp. 456-457.
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2 f>in the Soviet Union. In February 1968, Mr. Pattman
offered an amendment, which was adopted, designed to
prevent the Export-Import Bank from making loans to
lesser developed countries for the purpose of arms
purchases. Mr. Pattman 's amendment read:
The Bank shall not guarantee, insure, or extend
credit or participate in an extension of credit
in connection with any credit sale of defense
articles and defense services to any country
designated . . . as an economically less
developed country. . . . The prohibitions set
forth in this paragraph shall not apply with
respect to any transaction the consumation of
which the President determines would be in the
national interest and reports such determination
(within thirty days after making the same) to
the Senate and the House of Representatives. In
making any such determination the President shall
take into account, among other considerations,
the national interest in avoiding arms races
among countries not directly menaced by the
Soviet Union or by Communist China; in avoiding
arming military dictators who are denying social-
progress to their own peoples; and in avoiding
expenditures to developing countries of scarce
foreign exchange needed for peaceful economic
progress . 27
After being approved by both House and Senate, the
2 8
bill was signed by the President on March 13, 1968.
2 ft
"Fiat Deal Sparked East-West Trade Contro-
versy," Congress and the Nation, 1965-1968 , vol. 2




U.S., Congress, House, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.,
7 February 1968, Congressional Record , vol. 114,
p. 2433.
8
To Amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 ,
Statutes at Large, vol. 82, sec. 1(c) (1969), p. 48.
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At the end of a long series of events, Dr.
Bader ' s staff study yielded several results. The
revolving fund of the Defense Department was abolished;
the Country X loan arrangement between the Export-
Import Bank and the Defense Department was terminated;
and the Export-Import Bank was prohibited from making
loans to lesser developed countries for arms purchases.
Another result of the controversy, which was created
by these actions, was an increased awareness, inter-
est and sensitivity on the part of Congress toward the
subject of arms transfers.
As significant as these new restrictions were on
the financing of arms transfers, they were only a por-
tion of the developments during 1967. A second major
development in the line of restrictions centered on
Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO)
.
The Symington Amendment
An event, which at first seemed unrelated to U.S.
arms transfer policy toward Latin America, was the
revelation that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had
recently sold arms to Iran. This event led to the
second major restriction on U.S. arms transfer policy
and had a primary application in Latin America.
This revelation of U.S. and Soviet arms transfers
to Iran was highlighted by Senate hearings early in
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1967. Senator Stuart Symington played a sig-
nificant role in these hearings. He served as a member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a
member of the Subcommittee on Disarmament. He also
served as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern
29
and South Asian Affairs. After participating in the
hearings held by the Subcommittee on Disarmament in
February and early March, Senator Symington convened
his own subcommittee on March 14, 1967. In his opening
statement he said that one of the purposes of the
hearings was to inquire into the recent disclosures
through the newspapers that the Soviet Union had sold
$110 million in military equipment to Iran, while at
the same time the U.S. had sold its most sophisticated
jet fighter, the F-4 Phantom, to Iran. He went on to
stress that the question to be explored was "not
whether the United States should or should not be
selling this military equipment; rather whether the
governmental machinery is coordinated adequately; and
also whether the Congress is properly informed and
consulted before such decisions are made."
29
Dr. William B. Bader served as consultant to
the subcommittee.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Arms Sales to Near East and South Asian
Countries, Hearings , before the Subcommittee on Near









One of the witnesses was Mr. Henry Kuss, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Logistics Negotiations, who was responsible for U.S.
military sales negotiations worldwide. During his
testimony, Mr. Kuss stated that in 1966 the Administra-
tion knew of the Soviet sale of military equipment to
Iran prior to making the decision to sell F-4 jet
fighters to Iran. He also admitted that Congress would
have found out six to nine months later during the
31
next annual budget review cycle.
Another aspect of the F-4 sale to Iran was
brought to light by Dr. Bader
:
DR. BADER. The recent sales of F-4's represents
the first time that a member of a Western alli-
ance has purchased Soviet military equipment.
That is correct, is it not?
MR. KUSS. In a formal sense of alliances, I
believe that to be correct. 32
This was enough to concern Senator Symington about join-
ing Communist countries in the supply of arms to third
nations. Later in the hearings, Townsend Hoopes,
31 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
32
Ibid., p. 62. The alliance referred to was the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) , consisting of
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. The U.S. was asso-
ciated through Executive Agreements. CENTO was
announced on August 19, 1959 in order to change its
name from the Baghdad Pact after Iraq withdrew its
membership following a revolution in July 1958. "Pact
Minus Baghdad Adopts a New Name," New York Times ,
19 August, 1959, p. 3:3.
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs was questioned on the same subject:
SENATOR SYMINGTON: Have we now put ourselves
in the position of being a cosupplier of mili-
tary equipment to a country receiving Communist
military aid?
MR. HOOPES. In the case of India that is true,
sir. That has been true for some years.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. Pakistan also?
MR. HOOPES. Yes.
SENATOR SYMINGTON. So in the case of Iran,
Pakistan, and India, we are supplying arms,
and the Communists are supplying arms.
MR. HOOPES. Yes, sir; that is true. 33
Concerning the transfer of F-4's, tanks, and
other equipment by various means, the Senator observed
"There has been practically no knowledge about these
34programs." He went on to say that the Senate's
knowledge of such things came from the newspapers, not
from any source in the Administration.
Still another facet of arms sales was brought
out by Senator Symington's subcommittee hearings.
This added fuel to the entire controversy and involved
F-86 jet fighters. Through questioning, it was
established that 90 F-86 Sabrejets of the Korean War
33U.S., Congress, Senate, Arms Sales to Near
East and South Asian Countries
, p. 62.
34 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
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era had been manufactured in Canada under U.S. license
and transferred to West Germany. From West Germany,
the planes were supposedly sold to Iran with U.S.
approval but, in the actual event, ended up in Pakistan
where the U.S. had an embargo applied on all lethal
equipment as a result of the 1965 India-Pakistan
35
war. Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) pressed
Townsend Hoopes with repeated questions as to whether
or not the Administration knew that the F-86's were
destined for Pakistan, but he could not receive a yes
or no answer. Despite the testimony of Administration
witnesses to the contrary, at best it seemed that the
Administration's monitoring and enforcement capabili-
ties were inadequate to prevent improper re-transfer
of U.S. weapons, and at worst the suspicion remained
that the Administration had knowingly permitted the
transfer to occur in a deliberate circumvention of
congressional policy and U.S. law.
At the end of Mr. Hoopes' appearance at the











What worries me is the extent to which this
whole arms program has been under the rug,
so far as the Congress is concerned. I do
not mean to be redundant, but I mentioned that
the first knowledge we had on the Foreign
Relations Committee or the Armed Services
Committee, of the sale of sophisticated planes
to Iran, was when we read about it in the
press. This, in effect, such sales, formulate
foreign policy . In such cases, if there is
no "advice and consent," what is the use of
having us here? . . . This is either going
to stop or there is going to be a lot more
said about it. We want to know. When you set
foreign policy through the sale or grant of
arms, we believe the appropriate Senate com-
mittees have the right to know the details
before it is detailed to the public press,
and the reasons for each major decision. 37
During July, a New York Times article stated
that Senator Symington was reported to be convinced
that the Administration was bypassing Congress and
existing law by the financing of arms sales to
lesser developed countries. His particular case in
point was his belief that through the "back door
financing" of the Country-X loan system, the Adminis-
tration was circumventing the legal limit on arms
sales to Latin America. He was quoted as saying:
"We were assured that Central and South American de-
velopment was economic—not an arms race. Then we
find there's this trick of back door financing through
the ex-im bank. All I can say is that we (Congress)
37 Ibid., p. 79. [emphasis added.

158
3 8have been taken." Even though his amendment was
couched in terms of all lesser developed countries,
the primary region intended for application of his
amendment was Latin America. That Latin America
was the intended target has been confirmed by Mr. Pat
Holt who, as a staff member, helped draft the Symington
amendment. In a personal interview with the author,
he stated: "Our concern over Latin America was the
prime mover" for the amendment.
Through his participation in the hearings by
the Subcommittee on Disarmament and the Subcommittee
on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senator
Symington was fully briefed on the subject of arms
transfers when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
started hearings on June 12 on the proposed Foreign
Assistance Act of 1967. As a result of Symington's
dissatisfaction with the arms transfer program, he
proposed an amendment commonly associated with his
name. In its final form, as passed by Congress, the
O Q
Stuart Symington, quoted in Neil Sheehan,
"Leader in House Acts to Compel Arms Sale Study,"
New York Times , 25 July 1967, pp. 1:1, 2:2.
39 Interview with Pat M. Holt, former staff
member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington,
D.C., 18 April 1978. Mr. Holt was a staff member for
the committee from 1950 to 1977. After 1958, he was




Symington amendment became section 620 (s) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended:
In furnishing development assistance under this
Act, and in making sales under the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
as amended, the President shall take into
account (1) the percentage of the recipient
or purchasing country's budget which is devoted
to military purposes, and (2) the degree to which
the recipient or purchasing country is using its
foreign exchange resources to acquire military
equipment. When the President finds that devel-
opment assistance under this Act, or sales under
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended, are being diverted to
military expenditures, or a recipient or pur-
chasing country is diverting its own rescources
to unnecessary military expenditures, to a
degree which materially interferes with its
development, the President shall terminate such
assistance and sales until he is assured that
such diversion will no longer take place. No
other provisions of this Act shall be construed
to authorize the President to waive the provi-
sions of this subsection.
After his amendment had become law, Senator
Symington was paid a visit by Under Secretary of State
Nicholas Katzenbach who consulted with Symington con-
cerning the effects and implementation of the amend-
ment. Mr. Katzenbach reported: "The Senator said that
he would never have introduced his amendment in the
first place if he had not been misled about the F-4
41
sales to Iran."
40Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Statutes at
Large , vol. 81, sec. 301(f)(4) (1968), p. 459.
Nicholas deB Katzenbach, Under Secretary of
State, "Memorandum for the President. Report of Our
Hill Consultations on the Conte-Long and Symington
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In the events leading to the Symington amend-
ment, it can be seen that as Senator Symington and
his congressional colleagues became more acquainted
with the area of arms transfers, they become more
appalled at what they perceived to be willful and
express disregard for the Senate's opinion in the
orientation and execution of foreign policy. Because
of the catalytic effect of Dr. Bader's staff study,
the outlines of the primary questions were well drawn
early in the year, and the targets for later question-
ing were clearly defined. In the subcommittee hearings
prior to convening the Foreign Relations Committee
hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act, most members
had become well acquainted with the issues and the
major players in the administration's line-up.
Because of the warm-up, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was better equipped than usual to enter the
annual discussions with the Administration on the
subject of the Foreign Assistance Act.
The Administration might have been perceptive
enough to realize that keeping the information from
the Congress on the sale of F-4's to Iran would be
unsatisfactory on several grounds. First, any senator
Amendments," Washington, D.C., 13 February 1968, Tab
A., p. 6. On file at the Department of State.
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from Missouri would have a desire to know of major
F-4 sales since the prime contractor for the F-4,
the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, was located in
St. Louis. A sensitive Administration might have
notified the senators and representatives from
Missouri so they could have informed the public and
reaped the political benefits of spreading the good
news of F-4 sales which would increase employment
in the St. Louis area rather than allow this preroga-
tive to pass to the press. Second, as congress-
men, they could hardly approve the executive's in-
dependent pursuit of such an arms sales program with
such international political ramifications or tolerate the
fact that Congress was to learn about it after the
fact. Third, they would have had to question the
judgment of an executive branch which would sell
the country's most advanced fighter planes to a nation
which at the time was involved in arms purchases from
the avowed enemy. If the bed-rock reason for a
program of arms transfers to allies was anti-communism,
that foundation was certainly shaken by the disclosure
of hearings early in 1967.
Senator Symington and his fellow members were
dismayed to learn that the U.S. had joined the two
primary Communist antagonists—China and the Soviet
Union--in being co-suppliers of weapons to at least
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three other nations. Such revelations had to bring
into question the rationale of the underpinnings of
the entire arms transfers program. As a senator,
he would have to take affront at any administration
whose policies deliberately precluded the Senate
from serving his concept of its proper role in the
formulation and direction of foreign policy. The
exposure of the Administration's performance in
intentionally not informing the Congress on decisions
such as to sell F-4's to Iran could only bring into
mind serious questions of executive motives. Gradually
becoming aware of how arms transfers or their denial
actually made foreign policy, Senator Symington was
determined to assert the Senate's obligation to
exercise "advice and consent" to this mechanism.
Because of the assertions by Dr. Bader, which
were confirmed in the hearings, plus the additional
information brought to light in the hearings, Senator
Symington became angered by the purposeful circum-
vention of Congress by the executive. As a result,
Senator Symington offered an amendment which served
to limit the flexibility of the executive in this
area. The primary objective of the Symington amend-
ment was to make economic assistance of the purchase
of arms more effective by preventing the waste of
natural resources. A second objective was an

16 2
attempt to ensure the executive did not circumvent
the regional dollar ceiling on arrrs transfers to
lesser developed countries, especially to Latin
America.
The Conte-Long Amendment
The third major restriction, which developed
during 19 6 7, was primarily the result of the views
of Congressman Silvio 0. Conte (R-MA) . This restric-
tion dictated against the transfer of sophisticated
weapons and had particular relevance to Latin America.
Mr. Conte was first elected to Congress in 19 5 8
and became a member of the Appropriations Committee.
It was the responsibility of this committee to appro-
priate funds approved by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to support programs such as the foreign
assistance legislation.
During the hearings held in 19 6 7 by the Appro-
priations Committee and its subcommittees, Mr. Conte
gave an early synopsis of his views on arms transfers to
Latin America when he stated: "I have been very
unhappy with our programs of providing military aid
to Latin America on an individual country rather than on
a regional program basis." This section will display
how Mr. Conte' s unhappiness resulted in a separate
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new congressional restriction on the executive's
policy on conventional arms transfers, with particu-
lar application toward Latin America.
During hearings by the House Appropriations
Foreign Operations Subcommittee on the Foreign Assist-
ance Act, Mr. Conte engaged Henry Kuss in a discussion
of Chile's purchase of British Hawker Hunter jet
fighters. Mr. Kuss, Director of the International
Logistics Negotiations Office of the Defense Depart-
ment, argued that the Administration had tried to
exercise restraint and had attempted to dissuade
Chile from buying costly and elaborate jets. He
explained that when faced with the Administration's
reluctance to sell planes, Chile bought planes from
Britain. Mr. Conte observed:
It is discouraging to see that they are able
to get around us. We can turn them down and
they go to some of our allies that we are help-
ing out. I think the chairman really hit on
this where we are giving grant aid to some of
these countries and then they turn around and
use their own resources to buy this military
equipment. ... It [Chile] should be plowing
that money into education and doing away with
some of the misery and hunger that they are
faced with down there. ... We are giving them
grant aid. . . . then they divert that grant aid
for these Hawkers. 43
42
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropri-
ations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appro -
priations for 1968 , Hearings , before the Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, 90th





Mr. Conte's viewpoint was to gain support from his
fellow congressmen throughout the session. This same
conviction was evidenced also in a later episode when
Peru bought Mirage jets from France. It seemed incon-
sistent for the U.S. to provide economic assistance
to a nation which in turn used other equivalent assets
for the purchase of unneeded military equipment. After
the hearings and during the subcommittee's preparation
of the report, Mr. Conte offered two similar amend-
44
ments to the appropriations act. They were co-
sponsored by Congressman Clarence D. Long (D-MD) and
were called the Conte-Long Amendments.
In their final form, the Conte-Long Amendments
to the Foreign Assistance Act read:
Military Assistance paragraph:
Provided further , That none of the fund contained
in this paragraph and none of the funds contained
in the military assistance credit sales revolv-
ing fund shall be used to finance directly or
indirectly the purchase or acquisition of sophis-
ticated weapons systems, such as missile systems
and jet aircraft for military purposes, by or
for any underdeveloped country other than Greece,
Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China,
the Philippines, and Korea unless the President
determines that such purchase or acquisition of
44 This was somewhat unusual in that such
"legislative" amendments were the normal responsibil-
ity of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The standard
function of the Appropriations Committee was to merely
review the legislative programs and officially appro-
priate the funds to support these programs.
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weapons systems are vital to the national secur-
ity of the United States and reports within 30
days each such determination to the Congress.
The President is directed to withhold economic
assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount
spent by any underdeveloped country other than
Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of
China, the Philippines, and Korea for the pur-
chase of sophisticated weapons system, such as
missile systems and jet aircraft for military
purposes from any country, unless the President
determines that such purchase or acquisition of
weapons systems are vital to the national secur-
ity of the United States and reports within
thirty days each such determination to the
Congress .45
If the executive was weary of the assault on its
flexibility in carrying foreign policy, there was no
time to rest. The day after the signing of the Foreign
Assistance Act, the Secretary of Defense appeared
before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. His
mission was to restore the $225 million in funds tar-
geted for cutting from the Appropriation Bill for
foreign assistance. Mr. McNamara stated, "It is
just impossible to take it out without disastrously
affecting our security." When it was pointed out to
him that some reduction was inevitable, he described
it as disastrous.
45Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appro -
priations Act, 1968, Statutes at Large , vol . 81
(1968)
, pp. 937, 940-941.
46
U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance and
Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968 ,
Hearings
, before the Committee on Appropriations, 90th
Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 336-337.
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In a response to a question by Senator Margaret
Chase Smith, the Secretary focused on Latin America:
The total amount of military assistance we
propose to give to Latin America--with 21
nations and a population of 240 million is $45
million. Far from being the foundation for dic-
tatorships or the catalyst that supports move-
ment toward dictatorships, this $45 million is,
in my opinion, a restraining influence, an in-
fluence toward democracy. Perhaps even more
importantly, because it is a more powerful in-
fluence in this other area, it is an influence
toward restraint on military expenditures .
^
Later Mr. McNamara was asked for his views on
the proposed Conte-Long Amendment and he provided these
in a memo
:
1. The apparent intent of the amendment is to
prevent the U.S. military aid programs from
contributing to arms races or the diversion of
development resources to unnecessary military
expenditures. Avoidance of such results is
and has been Executive Branch policy--one which
the President has used persuasion and the influ-
ence of the U.S. military and economic aid to
further. No additional legislation is needed
to state or enforce this policy.
2. The amendment would be harmful. The
effects go far beyond its apparent intent. It
sets up a rigid and arbitrary standard which
simply ignores less developed countries' needs
and politcal realities. . . . The proposed
amendment . . . fails to distinguish the legi-
timate from the excessive.
3. ... the proposed amendment is almost
impossible from a technical standpoint. There
is no effective standard for definition of
"sophisticated weapons systems". . . . The
technical deficiencies are not simply a question
of definitions. Rather they reflect the basic
47 Ibid., pp. 344-346
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difficulty of any prohibition which seeks to
apply a single arbitrary standard to widely
and constantly varying situations.
4. The Executive Branch opposes the amendment
because its inflexibility and excessive scope
would be harmful in many situations. . . . The
proposed amendment recognizes neither the
legitimate defense needs of less developed
countries . . . nor the importance of providing
economic assistance to achieve important U.S.
foreign policy objectives. . . . The proposed
amendment puts achievement of U.S. policy ob-
jectives at the mercy of sales efforts of other
nations, whether western European or Communist.
The proposed amendment discriminates
against countries which do not or cannot manu-
facture sophisticated weapons themselves, but
must obtain them from other countries. In
effect, it puts a premium on the diversion of
LDC productive capacity from development-
oriented industries into the production of
armaments . 4 8
At the conclusion of the hearings, Senator John
Pastore (D-RI) asked Mr. McNamara if he had any more
remarks. He replied:
The legislation this year is particularly re-
strictive . . . the first problem we have is
with the monetary amount. I plead with you to
raise it back to the authorized level.
The second problem we have is with the so-called
Conte-Long Amendment which restricts the grant
or sale of so-called sophisticated equipment to
certain countries. That is a very serious
restriction. 49
The appropriations bill passed both House and




Ibid., p. 363. Secretary McNamara' s pleading
is in marked contrast with his performance in April when
he answered Congressional questions with such disdain.
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by President Johnson. The objectives set for the
Conte-Long amendments are quite readily determined.
Mr. Conte felt strongly that his amendments were
essential and he attached his personal views in a
supplement to the report on the Foreign Assistance
Act prepared by the Appropriations Committee. Because
of the extraordinary costs of the Vietnam war, the
budget deficit and looming financial crisis, Mr.
Conte said, in part:
Last year I quoted the following statement
from the report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee
:
It is important that less developed countries
not be encouraged to divert their limited
resources from programs to economic and
social development to building military
establishments larger than are necessary
to maintain internal security and defend
against border incursions.
Last year I quoted that statement favorably and
with hope. This year I cannot.
Today, it is not sufficient "not to encour-
age." Positive steps are now required. We
must neither assist nor support these highly
dangerous self-defeating actions.
It is illusion to answer this by stating--
Who are we, the United States, to decide what
are highly dangerous and self-defeating actions
for others to take.
It is absolutely true that we do not have
the right to decide that question for others.
This is not what is being advocated. . . .
I am deeply concerned with and disturbed
by the development of an arms race in Latin
America. As I stated earlier, I have held this
concern since I first came to Congress. . . .
And we are dealing with countries who simply
cannot afford to and do not have any need to
invest their precious limited resources in the





The greatest threat to security in Latin
America today comes from within, not from
without. Any dangers there to national
soverignty are from internal unrest and dis-
satisfaction, not from external attack and
aggression. . . .
For as all of the countries of Latin America
find themselves more and more heavily armed,
there is more and more a chance that one country
is going to use this armament against
another. . . .
No country can afford to be wasteful and
these countries least of all.
The purchase of sophisticated weapons of
war by these countries can be classified in no
other category than that of being wasteful.
We should take no part in assisting or encourag-
ing this unfortunate misuse of limited resources
We are on the one hand trying to supplement
limited resources in order to assist these
countries in developing to their fullest capa-
city as quickly as possible. If, on the other
hand, we turn around and sell them weapons that
they cannot afford and do not need, we are de-
feating our own programs. Similarly, if we
provide assistance to any underdeveloped country
which, in turn, uses its own resources to pur-
chase sophisticated weapons, it is as if our
economic assistance was being diverted to the
purchase of these sophisticated weapons, a
result which cannot be justified. . . .
By no stretch of anyone's imagination can
the purchase of sophisticated weapons by under-
developed countries be considered an efficient
mobilization of resources. It is just the
opposite. By diverting the country's own
resources from being used in an effective
manner, it completely dilutes the effectiveness
of our assistance.
In his lengthy summary, Mr. Conte stressed his
views, fears, and objectives. The goals for his
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropria-
tions, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appro -




amendments in lesser developed countries were:
(a) to stop arms races, particularly in Latin America,
(b) to prevent diversion of local resources from
social and economic development to unnecessary pur-
chase of weapons, (c) to prevent this diversion by
prohibiting the procurement of sophisticated weapons,
and (d) to make U.S. economic aid more effective in
assisting the development of the recipient nations.
By inference in some cases and explicitly in
others, Mr. Conte stressed that the primary location
for the application of his amendments was Latin
America. This was also brought out by Mr.
Katzenbach. During consultations with congressional
leaders on Capitol Hill, the Under Secretary of State
visited with Mr. Conte and discussed the subject
of the restrictions the Congressman had sponsored.
Mr. Katzenbach reported in his summary to the
President that "Conte said that when he proposed his
amendments he was interested primarily in Latin
America and sub-Sahara Africa." Mr. Katzenbach also
called on Mr. Long and reported, "He [Mr. Long] was
adamantly against arms sales to Latin America. He
said that his Amendment had been principally aimed
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at the Latins and sub-Sahara Africa." 51 Several
months later, William S. Gaud, the Administrator of
the Agency for International Development (AID)
,
paid
a similar call on Mr. Long. Mr. Long was reported
to be of the opinion that "all military assistance
5 2to Latin America should be eliminated." There can
be little doubt that both Mr. Conte and Mr. Long were
concerned about the procurements of arms by Latin
American countries. Since in their view, the economic
development and the judgment displayed in arms pur-
chases were unsatisfactory in Latin America, the two
congressmen proposed to help correct both conditions
with their amendments.
When Under Secretary of State Katzenbach made
his visit to Capitol Hill to talk with the leaders
after the new restrictions had become law, he also
visited House Majority Leader Carl Albert. In the
resume of the conversations, Mr. Albert was reported
to be of the view that there was not widespread
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "Memorandum for the
President. Report of Our Hill Consultations on the
Conte-Long and Symington Amendments," Tab A., p. 2.
52 . .William S. Gaud, Memorandum from the Adminis-
trator of the Agency for International Development for
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, "Meeting with
Congressman Long," Washington, D.C., 13 May 1968, p. 1
On file at Agency for International Development.
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support for the restrictions and that modifications
in the future were a reality. He did not think the
limitations were based on any deep belief but that
the "legislative action was more of a mood than a
53
conviction." If the actions of Congress were only
a mood, it was fed by the frustrations and uncertain-
ties of Vietnam, fear that the U.S. was overextended
in its commitments, and apprehension that arms
transfers was one element which fostered such gradual
assumption of commitments. It was only a mood, but
it would continue for a long time to come.
A reflection of this mood can be seen in a
report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after
considering additional restrictions on arms transfers.
Some of the advantages to the restrictions as seen by
the Committee would be a "reassertion of the Congress 1
proper role in the formulation of foreign policy,"
and they would "force the executive branch to practice
what it preaches about preventing arms races and
discouraging wasteful military expenditures by poor
nations." In the eyes of the Committee, the restric-
tions would provide "additional leverage" on nations
diverting their resources and would also "restrain
53Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "Memorandum for the
President. Report of Our Hill Consultations on the




some of our own officials." It became plain in this
Senate report that the target for the restrictions
was not only the actions of foreign nations but also
the behavior of the Executive Branch of the U.S.
government! Not only was the Congress concerned about
such rationale as poor nations diverting resources,
but was perhaps even more concerned about "reassertion"
of its proper role in the creation of foreign policy
for the United States.
The three major legislative restrictions on arms
transfers did not grow in isolation. There were major
world events which occurred in 1967, and had a measure
of influence on the considerations of individuals in
the U.S. Congress, not just in 1967 but beyond.
There was, of course, the Vietnam War which was an
omnipresent and increasing factor. Additionally in
1967, the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arabs
occurred, and Peru decided to buy new military jet
aircraft
.
In the midst of hearings on Capitol Hill on the
costs and benefits of arms transfers and foreign aid,
the Six-Day War broke out. Because Israel feared an
attack by its neighbors, it launched a pre-emptive
54 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 , S. Rept.
499, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 8, 12, 13.
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attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria on June 5, 1967.
The brief but fierce conflict fanned the fires of
criticism by congressional opponents of arms transfers,
The critics pointed out that U.S. arms had been trans-
ferred to both sides and asserted that U.S. actions
had helped lead to the war. In other words, the
occurrence of the Six-Day War supported the critics'
conclusion that the procurement of arms led to their
use. To the critics it was clear that arms transfers
caused arms races, and arms races led to wars.
In the particular case of the Six-Day War, the arms
transfers confirmed the example of the Indian-Pakistan
War of 1965 when the U.S. again had been providing
military support to both governments. The desire
for the U.S. to remain clear of such conflicts would
also be reenforced by C. L. Sulzberger's fourth car-
55dmal rule of diplomacy.
In 1967, an additional factor which added to
the controversy of the overall issue of arms transfers
was Peru's decision to obtain modern military jet
planes. During that summer, it became known through
3
"There are, in diplomacy, four cardinal rules
Rule one is always keep the initiative. Rule two is
always exploit the inevitable. Rule three is always
keep in with the outs. And rule four is never stand
between a dog and a lamppost." C. L. Sulzberger,
"The Middle East—A New Initiative," New York Times ,
27 May 1957, p. 30:3.
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the press that Peru wanted to purchase the U.S. F-5
jet fighter for its air force to replace the aging
F-80 Shooting Stars. President Belaunde Terry told
the author in a personal interview that by 1967 the
Peruvian air force had a 35 different types of air-
craft and wanted to reduce this inventory to 7. For
reasons of improved economy of maintenance and logis-
tics, President Belaunde Terry approved of this con-
solidation. The U.S. F-5 was initially selected for
price, performance and ease of logistic support.
Because of an excessive delay in receipt of a U.S.
response, he started to consider other aircraft from
Britain, Sweden and France. It may be recalled that
President de Gaulle of France had offered "anything
reasonable" in way of arms during his state visit in
1966.
Partly as a result of previous U.S. policy to
hold down costs of arms purchases by lesser developed
countries and partly as a reluctance to introduce
supersonic aircraft to Latin America, the executive
branch refused permission for the F-5 sale. The deci-
sion not to sell F-5's had to have been influenced also
by a separate expropriation controversy between the
U.S. and Peru.
Interview with Fernando Belaunde Terry, President
of Peru, 1963-1968. Washington, D.C., 18 April 1978.
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The case at issue was a dispute over the La
Brea y Parifias oil fields owned by the International
Petroleum Company (IPC) . After a long controversy,
in July 1967 the Peruvian Congress declared the oil
fields were national property. Peru then charged IPC
$690 million for back taxes and the value of oil
extracted. The State Department became involved by
trying to apply the specifications of the Hickenlooper
amendment which set out punitive actions in the event
57
of expropriation of U.S. property.
After the U.S. refused to sell F-5's, it became
known that Peru was seriously considering the purchase
of a dozen French Mirage jets for more than $30
c o
million. After the possibility of a Mirage purchase
became known, the State Department began to reconsider
the decision about F-5's. As the controversy grew
over arms sales in general and Peru in particular,
the subject of F-5's came to threaten the passage of
the entire foreign aid bill.
On October 25th, Congressman Henry S. Reuss
(D-WI) and 20 of his colleagues wrote to Secretary
57U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Relations
with Peru, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 98-99.
5 8
Paul L. Montgomery, "Peru's President Faces
Major Decisions as 4th Year Begins," New York Times ,
28 July 1967, p. 8:4.
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of State Rusk warning him that if the Administration
did consumate the sale of F-5's to Peru, they would
have to withdraw their support of the foreign aid
- . , . . 59legislation.
It may be recalled that at this point, the
foreign aid bill was still in the Senate/House Con-
ference Committee, deadlocked over the issue of the
revolving fund. The Secretary replied on November
4th that for a number of reasons, it was in the best
interests of the U.S. that the sale be completed.
On November 7th in a turn-about, Secretary Rusk wrote
that he would "take very seriously" the expressed
desires of the Congress in any amendment to limit
U 4- * 61such transfers.
In the midst of the arms sales controversy, the
Administration found itself in a quandary. On the
one hand it desired to sell F-5's to Peru to forestall
the purchase of Mirages from France. On the other
59Neil Sheehan, "Latin Jet Sales Vexing to
Congress," New York Times , 27 October 1967, p. 15:1.
fi n
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, letter, to Repre-
sentative Henry S. Reuss, dated 4 November 1967, Wash-
ington, D.C. Reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, 90th
Cong., 1st sess., 6 November 1967, Congressional Record ,
vol. 113, pp. 31383-31384.
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, letter to Repre-
sentative Thomas E. Morgan, dated 7 November 1967,
Washington, D.C. Reprinted in U.S., Congress, House,
90th Cong., 1st sess., 8 November 1967, Congressional
Record, vol. 113, pp. 31745-31746.
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hand, there was the threat that any such sale of
F-5's might very well block the passage of the entire
foreign aid bill. In effect, was the prevention of
supersonic European jets from entering Latin America
worth the sacrifice of the entire foreign aid bill?
The Administration chose not to make that decision.
The year 1967 had seen three major restraints
placed on arms transfers, and they significantly
affected Latin America. Also, separate events and
revelations of previous Administration policies fed
the controvery which carried into 1967 and resulted in
new restrictions.
1968
In 1968, the sale of arms was separated from
the Foreign Assistance Act and was the subject of
distinct legislation. This new authority became known
as the Foreign Military Sales Act. In 1968 during the
development of both acts, a number of restrictions--
both old and new—were incorporated. This section will
describe the expansion of congressional restrictions on
arms transfers during the year 1968 and define their
objectives
.
Because the foreign aid bill of 1967 had received
such a mauling by the Congress, in 1968 the executive
branch proposed separating the sale and grant of arms
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Even though the Foreign Military Sales Act was
introduced as brand new legislation, by the time it
reached its final version it was a veteran with a
number of amendments with particular application to
Latin America. Two were proposed by Mr. Reuss, one
by Mr. Conte, and one by Congressman Thomas M. Pelly
(R-WA)
.
The language and intent of Senator Symington's
amendment of the previous year was proposed by
Mr. Reuss to be included in the New Foreign Military
Sales Act, and this amendment became known as Reuss
One. The act as originally drafted applied the
Symington provisions only to sales for credit.
Mr. Reuss stated the objective for his amendment was
to broaden its application to include sales for cash.
As proposed and as finally passed, the amendment read:
When the President finds that any economically
less developed country is diverting development
assistance furnished pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or sales
under the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, to military
expenditures, or is diverting its own resources
to unnecessary military expenditures, to a
degree which materially interferes with its
development, such country shall be immediately
ineligible for further sales and
U.S., Congress, House, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.,




into two separate legislative acts. This separation
was proposed for at least three reasons. First, the
controversy over the sale of F-5 jet fighters threat-
ened to wreck the entire foreign aid program developed
in the previous year. In order to avoid such a dis-
pute from creating havoc with a separate program in
the future, the executive branch wanted the separation
so that each could be debated on its own merits.
Second, since the arms sales program had grown to such
proportions in relation to grants, both branches de-
sired to collect all of the applicable rules for sales
in one document. This would ease the understanding,
application and execution of the specifications. A
third consideration was that the grant of arms, like
other items in foreign aid, was a drain on U.S. tax
dollars to be appropriated. Sales, on the other hand,
were conducted at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer but
were paid for by the foreign purchaser. Both branches
agreed that considerations for the granting of both
economic and military assistance should be concentrated
in one article of authority. Likewise, both bodies
wanted the specifications for sales to be assembled
in one place. Thereafter, the authority for the grant
of arms was contained in the Foreign Assistance Act
and the authority for sales was contained in the




. . . until the President is assured
that such diversion will no longer take place. 63
Mr. Reuss also proposed a second amendment, known
as Reuss Two, aimed at the protection of foreign popu-
lations from oppression by military dictators. He
said his aim was to include the same provision in the
Sales Act as was contained in the Export-Import Bank
64
Act. As to his real objectives, it will be recalled
that Mr. Reuss was the leader of some 20 House members
who threatened to overturn the 1967 foreign aid program
if F-5 fighters were sold to Peru.
The next major restrictive amendment was offered
by Congressman Thomas M. Pelly (R-WA) and involved
fishing vessels. The seizure of U.S. fishing boats
operating inside the territorial or economic zones
claimed by foreign nations had been an issue for years.
By 1968, the problem's proposed punitive solution was
to involve the transfer of arms. Mr. Pelly' s answer
would be to prohibit arms sales to any offending
nation. As finally approved, the amendment read:
No defense article or defense service shall be
sold by the United States Government under
this Act to any country which, after the date
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Statutes
at Large , vol. 82, sec. 35 (1969), p. 1325.
64
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of enactment of this Act, seizes or takes into
custody or fines an American fishing vessel
engaged in fishing more than twelve miles from
the coast of that country. The President may
waive the provisions of this subsection when
he determines it to be important to the
security of the United States, and promptly
so reports to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate. 65
During the discussion of his amendment, Mr. Pelly
made clear his target: "The importance of such an
amendment is evidenced by the criminal activities of
some Latin American countries, which, at gunpoint,
have been seizing American fishing vessels on the high
seas." There is no doubt that the seizure of fish-
ing boats was a significant problem. The New York
Times reported that since 1961, 28 U.S. ships had been
seized by Peru, and an additional 47 others had been
seized by other Latin American governments. One im-
mediate problem with the Pelly amendment, however,
was the question of the length of term of applicabil-
ity. In other words, if the sanctions of a cutoff
of defense sales was made, what would be the dura-
tion of the prohibition? As written, the duration
was open-ended and could be seen as an extremely
65
Ibid.





"Peruvians Attack U.S. Fishing Boats and Cap-
ture One," New York Times, 15 February 1969, p. 2:2.
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harsh measure in retribution for the seizure of one
fishing boat. Since the majority of the previous
incidents involved primarily Ecuador, Peru and Chile,
Latin America was the region most likely to be
6 8
affected. The U.S. vessels engaged in fishing in
the South American waters would logically come from
California, Oregon and Washington, the latter being
the state represented by Mr. Pelly.
A separate but related act of legislation was
offered by Senator Thomas H. Kuchel (R-CA) . It was
not part of the Foreign Assistance Act but included a
penalty for acts similar to those specified by the
Pelly amendment. In order to safeguard the fishermen
from his state of California who fished in the contro-
versial waters of Latin America, Senator Kuchel 's
amendment was added to the Fisherman's Protective Act
of 1954. The Secretary of State was directed to make
a claim against any government which seized a U.S.
vessel. If after 120 days the claim was not satis-
fied, he was to initiate the punitive clause. The
clause stated: "The Secretary of State shall
6 8
For a more complete discussion of the fishing
rights controversy, see Virginia M. Hagen, The Latin
American-United States Fishing Rights Controversy , with
Specific Reference to Chile, Ecuador and Peru .
Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1969).
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withhold ... an amount equal to such unpaid claim
from any funds programmed for the current fiscal
year for assistance to the government of such
,.69country
.
There was an existing section of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 which had been added in 1965,
but it obviously was not specific enough for Mr.
Pelly or Senator Kuchel. It read:
In determining whether or not to furnish
assistance under this Act, consideration shall
be given to excluding from such assistance any
country which hereafter seizes, or imposes any
penalty or sanction against, any United States
fishing vessel on account of its fishing
activities in international waters. The pro-
visions of this subsection shall not be appli-
cable in any case governed by international
agreement to which the United States is a
party. 70
The last major amendment made to the Foreign
Military Sales Act that year was offered by Congressman
Silvio Conte (R-MA) . As he explained, his purpose
was to include in the act the same provision against
sophisticated weapons as contained in the foreign
aid appropriations act of the previous year. An
annual appropriations act is effective only during the
applicable fiscal year. As a result, his amendment in
69Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, Statutes
at Large
,
vol. 82, sec. 3 (1969), p. 730.
70Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Statutes
at Large, vol. 79, sec. 301 (d) (4 ) ( 1966 ) , p. 660.
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1967 expired on June 30, 1968, which was at the end
of fiscal year 1968. In order to make the same re-
striction effective for all following years, he
proposed it in the authorization bill for arms sales.




that none of the funds contained in
this authorization shall be used to guarantee,
or extend credit, or participate in an exten-
sion of credit in connection with any sale of
sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile
systems and jet aircraft for military purposes,
to any underdeveloped country other than Greece,
Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China,
the Philippines and Korea unless the President
determines that such financing is important
to the national security of the United States
and reports within thirty days each such
determination to the Congress. 71
In defining his objectives for his amendment,
Mr. Conte explained:
In my original amendment last year I was driving
at Latin America and Africa. I was attempting
to prevent the sale of sophisticated weapons of
war, such as jet fighters, especially to Latin
America and Africa. . . . the main thrust of the
amendment, both here and in the foreign aid bill,
was to put a stop to the arms race that was
building up in South America and Africa. 72
One difference should be noted between the 1967
and 1968 versions of his amendments. In 1967, it read
71
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that the prohibition would be in effect unless the
President determines such sales to be "vital" to the
national security of the United States. The 1968
version changed the criteria to "important."
Congressman Long thought the word "vital" made the
rule "tighter" and proposed two separate amendments
to have this one word changed, but both attempts were
73
rejected by the House. In 1967, Mr. Long was a
co-sponsor of the legislation, but in 1968, he
declined to co-sponsor the legislation again.
The regional ceiling on military assistance to
Latin America, including arms sales, was continued at
$75 million. This ceiling was applied to cash sales,
credits, guarantees, grants, and loans. A proviso was
included to permit the President to waiver the ceiling
if he determined it to be "important to the security of
the United States." 7
Under the legislation of 1968, authority for the
granting of arms was contained in the Foreign Assistance
Act. Mr. Conte again offered an amendment; this one
was to ensure that the restrictions contained in the
1967 amendment were permanently applied in the future











As approved by the President, it read:
The President is directed to withhold economic
assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount
spent by an underdeveloped country for the pur-
chase of sophisticated weapons systems, such as
missile systems and jet aircraft for military
purposes from any country unless the President
determines that such purchase or acquisition of
weapons systems is important to the national
security of the United States and reports within
thirty days each such determination to the
Congress . 75
As a result of authority for grant and sales of
arms being split into two different acts, the article
containing the regional ceiling had to be changed.
It was altered to set a limit of $25 million in arms
that could be given to Latin America. Another specifi-
cation provided $10 million that could be granted
only for use in patrolling coastal waters to prevent
Communist infiltration. Therefore, if $10 million were
expended for coastal patrol and if $25 million were
used in other grant aid, then $40 million would remain
authorized for sales through the Foreign Military
Sales Act which set an overall limit of $75 million.
So the mood of Congress continued. As a result
of its hearings and deliberations on the foreign aid
bill, on June 26, 1968 the House Foreign Affairs
Committee made its report and approved the measure
Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Statutes at
Large, vol. 82, sec. 301(c) (1969), pp. 963-964.
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with a vote of 24 to 9. An addendum for minority
views said:
We strongly oppose the efforts of underdeveloped
countries to spend money that is urgently needed
for economic development on the purchase of
sophisticated weapons such as Mirage supersonic
jet fighters from France, at a time when the
United States is being asked to support the
country's economic development. The plight
in which the United States finds itself repre-
sents another tragic inconsistency in the
foreign aid program. Expensive, supersonic
jets are not needed for the external defense of
any Latin American country. 76
Part of the mood of Congress was certainly directed at
Latin America.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee made its
report on July 26, 1968 and supported the amendment
with a vote of 14 to 4. In its dour report, the
committee said that "the United States is beset by
more demands, both home and abroad, than it can
meet," but seemingly had an "inability or unwilling-
ness ... to reduce its international commitments."
Concerning the Conte amendment, the committee was
77
hopeful that it would "serve to deter an arms race."
Elaborating on the Conte amendment, the report said:
"7 £\
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 , H. Rept.
1587, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p. 56.
77 .
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 , S. Rept.
1479, 90th Cong., 2nd sess, 1968, pp. 3, 12.
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It passes no judgment on the determinations
which other sovereign countries may make of
their own defense needs. It is simply a state-
ment that the United States, as a sovereign
country itself, is not going to use its economic
assistance to offset the cost of sophisticated
weapons systems acquired by countries receiving
assistance from the United States. (p. 12)
Such a disclaimer on making judgments for other actions
did not prevent such nations from perceiving that such
judgments were consistently being made by the U.S. on
their behalf.
The Foreign Military Sales Act also provided an
occasion for congressional attitudes to be expressed.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that
the act was in response to "Congressional concern that
a large military sales program, unless it is carefully
managed, may contribute to the development of regional
arms races, thereby diverting scarce economic resources
7 8
and contributing to regional tensions."
The House Foreign Affairs Committee asserted:
The basic purpose of foreign assistance has been
to enhance the security of the United States
through the development of economic and military
strength in the non-Communist world.
For more than two decades the military
assistance program has been a vital part of
the U.S. foreign policy. 7 ^
78
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Military Sales Act , S. Rept. 1632,
90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p. 1.
79 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The Foreign Military Sales Act , H. Rept. 1641,
90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p. 2.
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The report described the gradual shift from arms sales
as nations became more self-sufficient after World War
II. It stated that this continuing shift was in the
national interest because such sales reduced the cost
to the U.S. of maintaining essential U.S. or allied
forces and also helped offset the balance of payments
8effects of maintaining U.S. forces overseas.
In a lengthy justification for sales, the
report went on:
It has been suggested that the United States,
as a great power, should take the initiative
in discouraging arms purchases by refusing to
make defense equipment and services available
to would-be purchasers, particularly underde-
veloped countries.
This is neither feasible nor wise. The
United States is not the only arms supplier in
the world. Indeed, the major sources of arms to
the underdeveloped countries is the Soviet bloc,
principally the Soviet Union. Soviet military
sales, integrated with grant programs, play a
major role in Soviet foreign policy in the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, the subcontinent, and the
Western Hemisphere through Cuba.
There is also a great deal of evidence that
some of the larger non-Communist countries are
also expanding their arms sales programs.
U.S. arms sales policy cannot operate in a
vacuum, taking no notice of the arm sales poli-
cies of other countries.
It is in our own national interest to make
carefully controlled and selective arms sales
to some undeveloped countries to assist them to
maintain the internal security which is so vital
to orderly development of democratic, social,
economic, and political institutions. And that
it should continue to be U.S. policy to limit
Ibid




rather than to promote military sales to such
countries in order to insure that scarce re-
sources are not diverted to unnecessary
military expenditures.
It makes no sense to have a grant military
assistance program and not be able to make
sales to those countries that are capable of
assuming a larger burden in their own
defense . 81
The committee's report seemed to favor judi-
cious use of arms sales to allied countries in order
to ease the defense burden on the United States.
Nevertheless, before the act was finally passed,
Latin America seemed to be the focus of restrictions
written into the bill.
As evidence of the congressional dissatisfaction
with foreign aid, the final amount authorized in
1968--for fiscal year 1969--was the lowest amount
in the history of the program, which stretched over
two decades. In recognition of such congressional dis-
pleasure, President Johnson's proposed bill had asked
for $2,920,000,000, the lowest ever proposed. Despite
the lowered figure, Congress was in the mood to assert
its budget authority over the executive as well as
express its general discontent with the foreign aid
program. As a result, the foreign aid authorization,
which included both economic and military assistance,
81
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was cut to $1,974, 050,000. 82 As a measure of com-
parison, the amounts requested for military assistance
by the executive and the amounts authorized by Congress
were as follows:
Fiscal Executive Branch Congressional Percent of
Year Request Authorization Reduction
1964 $1,405,000,000 $1,000,000,000 28.8%
1965 1,055,000,000 1,055,000,000
1966 1,170,000,000 1,170,000,000
1967 917,000,000 875,000,000 4.5
1968 620,000,000 510,000,000 17.7
1969 420,000,000 375,000,000 10.7
1970 425,000,000 350,000,000 17.6
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Defense, Congressional
Presentation, Security Assistance Program, FY 1977
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977),
p. 2 .
In summary, because of the controversy over arms
transfers in 1967, in 1968 the executive proposed and
the Congress concurred that the grant and sale of arms
should be separated for better review and management.
The Foreign Military Sales Act became the locus of the
authority and the rules covering arms sales, while
grants remained contained in the Foreign Assistance
82
"Congress Clears Smallest Foreign Aid Bill in
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Act. Several new restrictions or punitive amendments
became law. These were offered by Congressmen Pelly,
Reuss and Conte, and Senator Kuchel. The objectives
of the restrictions were to curtail fishing boat
seizures, prevent arming military dictators, and
prohibit the transfer of sophisticated weapons. The
punitive clause in each case was to be a denial of the
grant or sale of conventional arms. Although written
in terms of universal application, the region largely
affected was Latin America. The discontent of Congress
with the policies of the executive can be seen in the
assertion of congressional budget power by authorizing
the lowest amount in history for the support of the
foreign aid program and for military assistance.
Congress had continued to assert itself in 1968
and had disapproved of executive policies. Fears of
more Vietnams and too many overseas commitments led to
cutbacks and restrictive policies. Apprehensions of
an arms race in Latin America coupled with the dis-
approval of underdeveloped nations buying unnecessary
weapons brought more limitations at the beginning of
1969.
1969
During 1969, even though U.S. -Latin American re-
lations were eclipsed by the war in Vietnam and
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overshadowed by U.S. domestic problems, several events
highlighted Latin America in the eyes of Congress.
These included unique congressional hearings specif-
ically on Latin America, the first Latin American war
since 1942, and a fact-finding tour of the region by
Nelson Rockefeller. A new president was inaugurated
who would also have new policies to apply toward Latin
America
.
This section will examine the development of
congressional restrictions on arms transfers to Latin
America during 1969. It will also review the effects
of significant events during the year which were
related to the question of arms procurement in Latin
America
A new development in the congressional restric-
tions was the combination of the previous Symington
and Conte-Long amendments and the repeal of the Conte-
Long amendment itself. In the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended by the Act of 1968, the Symington
amendment was contained in section 620 (s). The
Conte-Long amendment was section 620 (v) . In the new
legislation, section 620 (v) was repealed and combined
into the existing section 620 (s).
The combined version read:
(1) In order to restrain arms races and proli-
feration of sophisticated weapons, and to
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ensure that resources intended for economic
development are not diverted to military pur-
poses, the President shall take into account
before furnishing development loans, Alliance
loans or supporting assistance to any country
under this Act, and before making sales under
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended:
(A) the precentage of the recipient or
purchasing country's budget which is devoted to
military purposes;
(B) the degree to which the recipient or
purchasing country is using its foreign exchange
resources to acquire military equipment; and
(C) the amount spent by the recipient or
purchasing country for the purchase of sophis-
ticated weapons systems, such as missile systems
and jet aircraft for military purposes, from
any country.
(2) The President shall report annually to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
his actions in carrying out this provision. 83
Such a combined version of the Symington and
Conte-Long amendments had been contemplated by the
executive branch. The modification of the Conte-Long
amendments had been desired by the executive and at
least part of the legislative branch.
In April 1969 during the congressional delibera-
tions, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) met to
discuss alternatives for changing the amendments.
Proposals prepared for discussion at the meeting
ranged from attempting an outright repeal, to waivers
under certain conditions, to exemptions of certain
8 3Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Statutes at
Large, vol. 83, sec. 303 (1970), pp. 820-821.
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84types of equipment. In a separate memorandum, Mr.
Arthur A. Hartman from the Department of State, pro-
posed a combination of amendments which would provide
"considerable discretion to the Executive." The
essential elements of a proposal contained in this
memorandum, but proposed by Mr. Robert Klein from the
Military Assistance Staff, eventually constituted the
revised restrictive section as passed by Congress
8 5
and approved by the President.
The executive branch was obviously interested
in having the Conte-Long amendments modified in order
to permit the executive more flexibility. It now
became evident that at least part of the legislative
branch had second thoughts about the rigidity of the
amendments. A special subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee conducted a series of hearings
84Arthur A. Hartman, U.S., Department of State,
NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Memorandum, NSC-U/SM
9, "Discussion Memorandum for Meeting of Under Secre-
taries Committee on Conte Amendments," dated 4 April
1969. On file at Department of State, Washington, D.C.
Originally classified "Confidential." Received through
Freedom of Information Act request, 2 May 1978.
8 5
Robert M. Klein, Military Assistance Staff,
Agency for International Development. Memorandum, dated
16 April 1969. Contained in a memorandum from Arthur A.
Hartman, U.S., Department of State, NSC-U/SM 11, dated
16 April 1969. On file at Department of State. Orig-
inally classified "Confidential." Received through
Freedom of Information Act request, 2 May 1978.
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and studies on various factors affecting the national
defense of the U.S. One of the subcommittee's conclu-
sions was:
The Subcommittee has no quarrel with the Conte-
Long Amendment as it applies to foreign aid.
The purpose of the Amendment has a great deal
of merit. However, while we applaud its intent
to impose restraints on purchases of sophisti-
cated weapons systems by underdeveloped nations,
third countries are motivated by other consider-
ations. Consequently, rather than preventing
an arms race among our Latin American neighbors,
we may have given impetus to one that could
grow to unparalleled proportions. For if we
remove the United States from the strong com-
petitive position that it formerly held in the
sales of major items of military equipment, we
will also diminish U.S. moderating influence.
The United States would be replaced by vendors
to whom an arms race would have great economic
appeal and who, therefore, might make every
effort to bring about such a condition. 86
Another new amendment with significant applica-
tion to Latin America and little application to foreign
policy was offered by Senator Fulbright. It involved
limiting the numbers of foreign military students. As
originally proposed, the amendment was to limit the
number of foreign military students that could be
trained in the U.S. to one-half the number of foreign
civilians brought to this country under the Fulbright
O
f.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed
Services, Review of U.S. Military Commitments Abroad
,
Phase III— Rio and ANZUS Pacts . Report of the
Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture,




scholarship program. in the Conference Committee
discussions, this was altered to have the numbers be
equal. Its final version read:
The number of foreign military students to be
trained in the United States in any fiscal year,
out of funds appropriated pursuant to this part,
may not exceed a number equal to the number of
foreign civilians brought to the United States
under the Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange
Act of 1961 in the immediately preceding fiscal
year . 88
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported
that since 1949, there were 202,611 foreign military
students trained in the U.S., while only 89,754
civilians were brought to this country under the
Fulbright program. The number scheduled for fiscal
year 1970 was 5,834; whereas only 5,026 civilians
89
came in 1968. The result, obviously, had to be a
cut in the number of foreign military students. The
Department of Defense reported that between 1950 and
1969, there were 22,494 Latin American military stu-
dents trained in this country, and 28,087 were
O ~]
U.S., Congress, House, Conference Report on
Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 , H. Rept. 91-767,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 17.
8 8Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Statutes at
Large , vol. 83, sec. 203 (1970), p. 820.
89 .
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 , S. Rept.
91-603, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 27-28.
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trained in Panama or in their own country. 90 Although
a majority of those students had not been trained in
the U.S., the new restriction was to have a signifi-
cant effect on Latin America.
Since no time duration for either type of school-
ing was specified, this restriction was keenly felt in
Latin America. As applied, one military student in a
two-week truck maintenance course was equivalent to
an aviator undergoing eighteen months of pilot training.
The two-week maintenance course was not differentiated
from a foreign civilian Fulbright scholar attending
a college for one or two years.
In a personal interview with Senator Fulbright,
he said he proposed the amendment in an attempt to
increase the support for the scholarship exchange pro-
gram. He was not interested in cutting down the number
of military students. He explained that in 1966, the
Senate Appropriations Committee had cut in half the
funds which supported the program because of concern
over Vietnam war expenses. He thought the committee
would be more interested in having the number of mili-
tary students expanded with the result that funding
for Fulbright scholars would be increased. Actually
90
U.S., Department of Defense, Military Assistance
and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 17.
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the reverse occurred. The number of military students
91
was cut to that of the civilians.
In previous foreign aid acts, the costs of train-
ing foreign military students on a grant basis had
been exempted from the regional ceiling for either
the grant or sale of arms. The Fulbright amendment
served to limit the number that could be trained even
if the grant funds were available.
The provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act
and the Foreign Military Sales Act remained unchanged
with regard to the Latin American regional ceiling.
The overall total of sales, credits and grants was
$75 million. The limit on grants was $25 million.
The cost of training was not counted against the
overall total, although the Fulbright amendment did
affect the numbers which could be trained.
In reviewing the restrictions of 1969, it can
be seen that the executive wanted to ease the restric-
tions of the Conte-Long amendments. This desire
found some sympathy in the Congress and resulted in a
more flexible combination of the Symington and Conte-
Long amendments. This indication of sympathy in the
91 Interview with former Senator J. William
Fulbright, Washington, D.C., 5 June 1978. Senator
Fulbright was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from 1949 to 1975. He served as Chairman
of the Committee after 1959.
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legislature is also reflected in the statement by the
House Armed Services Committee which displayed the
apprehension that the effects of the Conte-Long
amendments would be exactly opposite to those desired.
Additionally, an attempt to increase the number of
foreign Fulbright scholars backfired and inadvertently
resulted in another restriction on Latin America.
There were several events during 1969 which
were relevant to the question of restrictions on arms
transfers to Latin America. There were two congres-
sional hearings which specifically focused on Latin
America. In July, El Salvador and Honduras engaged in
their "football war," and in the fall, Nelson
Rockefeller gave a report of his fact-finding mission
to Latin America. Richard Nixon was inaugurated
president in January and in a speech on October 31st,
gave a summary of his Latin American policy. A few
days later he announced the Nixon Doctrine, which was
to affect Administration policy toward arms transfers.
Because of a general dissatisfaction with the
accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress, the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs
92held hearings from March to May. One of the
92
U.S., Congress, House, New Directions for the
1970' s: Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Develop -
ment, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st sess. , 1969.
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subjects was military assistance. In June and July,
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs conducted hearings specifically
9 3on the subject of arms transfers.
During July, Honduras and El Salvador became
embroiled in a brief war. Although the real reason
for the war was a long standing border dispute, it
is often referred to as the Football War because of
the disagreement which precipitated the war. As a
result, Senator Fulbright suggested a complete embargo
94on grant arms to all of Latin America. The Organiza^
tion of American States quickly called for a cease
fire and submission of the dispute to mediation.
Because of the unanimity of the remaining members of
the OAS , the war was ended after only several weeks.
Also in 1969, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of
New York was sent by President Nixon on a fact-finding
mission to Latin America. His report was to be the
basis for the President's new policy statement on
the region. The Governor's report was presented at
93
U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Military
Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings
,
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st
Cong., 1st sess., 1969.
94
Peter Grose, "O.A.S. Peace Move is Backed
by the U.S." New York Times, 16 July 1969, p. 12:3.
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the end of August, and the President made his Latin
American policy speech at the end of October. 95 At
first glance this might appear as an indication of
interest and concern in the area. The reverse was
feared to be the case. Nixon was the first post-war
U.S. president not to mention Latin America or its
problems in his inaugural address. He did not get
around to naming an Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs until he was several months
into his term. His policy address on the region did
not come until nine months after he was sworn in.
It was clear that Latin America was far removed from
the top of the list of priorities with the new
president. The Secretary General of the Organization
of American States, Galo Plaza, commented on the Latin
American discontent with the U.S. sense of priorities.
He said it stemmed from a resentment that the goals
of the Alliance for Progress had not been met in
housing, land reform and economic growth. The former
Ecuadorian president said the dissatisfaction also
was derived from the perception that Latin
95Nelson A. Rockefeller, Quality of Life in
the Americas. Report of a U.S. Presidential Mission
for the Western Hemisphere . Reprint by Agency for
International Development (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1979) .
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America had become a "backwater" in the foreign
policy of the U.S. 96
For several years the Congress had become in-
creasingly concerned by U.S. commitments abroad and
the extent of the involvements these obligations might
lead to. On February 5, Senator Fulbright introduced
a bill in the Senate which became known as the
"national commitments" resolution. It was an attempt
to reassert the congressional role in foreign policy
and to clearly inform the President of the congressional
displeasure at the current perceived increase in over-
seas commitments. The resolution passed the Senate
97
with a vote of 70 to 16 on June 25th.
In response to such criticism and after review-
ing Governor Rockefeller's report, the President gave
his Latin American policy speech on October 31st to
the Inter-American Press Association. He listed his
objectives as a "more mature partnership in which all
voices are heard and none is predominant." He
promised changes in U.S. policies and procedures
Galo Plaza, as quoted in Juan de Onis, "O.A.S.
Chief Cites Rancor Over U.S.," New York Times ,
3 June 196 9, p. 2:4.
U.S., Congress, Senate, 91st Cong., 1st sess.,




which would "center on economic development and
especially on the policies by which aid is admin-
Q O
istered and by which trade is regulated."
A few days later, President Nixon made a major
pronouncement for a new direction in U.S. foreign
policy, and this became known as the Nixon Doctrine.
The doctrine was announced in a radio and television
address on November 3rd. The principal portion which
was to affect military assistance read:
In cases involving other types of aggression
[by a nuclear power] , we shall furnish military
and economic assistance when requested in
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we
shall look to the nation directly threatened
to assume the primary responsibility of pro-
viding the manpower for its defense. 99
In other words, the President was pledging increased
hardware to allies in need but fewer men to defend
mutual interests. Areas of tension and conflict would
receive more material support but less in the way of
U.S. troops.
9 8 Richard M. Nixon, "Action for Progress for
the Americas," Department of State Bulletin , vol. 61
(17 November 1969), pp. 409-410.
99 .
Richard M. Nixon, "The Pursuit of Peace in
Viet Nam," Department of State Bulletin , vol. 61
(24 November 1969), p. 440. The President had men-
tioned his new doctrine to newsmen on Guam on 25 July
but it was not officially announced until his broad-
cast on 3 November.
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The public and Congress had sent clear signals
to the President. Both bodies were becoming increas-
ingly weary of the war in Vietnam and skeptical of U.S.
military obligations overseas. With the rising dis-
satisfaction evidenced in the public press, coupled
with the national commitments resolution of Congress,
it was made plain to the President what his policy
should be. Originally intended to apply to South East
Asia, the doctrine was soon made the worldwide pre-
scription for U.S. foreign policy. It was the basic
formula for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam
but also presented congressional leaders with a new
factor to contemplate in arms transfer to Latin America
If Rio Treaty allies were to provide any support for
common interests, sales credits, grants, and sales
of arms would have to be more forthcoming.
From the relatively small number of restrictions
created in 1969, the impression might be gained that
Congress was satisfied with its accomplishments in
setting parameters for military assistance and foreign
aid. The opposite is the case. Congressional dis-
pleasure with foreign assistance continued to increase
in 1969. The Congress did not alter the Foreign
Assistance Act with a flurry of amendments because it
had intended to completely rewrite and restructure the
act during the next session. Indications of this

208
intent can be seen in the somewhat unusual step of
making foreign aid authorizations for two years
rather than the normal one year. The final authoriza-
tion was for $1,972,525,000 for fiscal year 1970,
and $1,936,525,000 for fiscal year 1971. 10 ° These
amounts were successively the lowest authorized in
the history of the program. The foreign aid appro-
priations bill then became locked in controversy over
funds for Taiwan and South Korea. As a result, the
appropriation of funds to support the specifics of the
economic and military aspects of the foreign aid
program for fiscal year 1970 was not completed in
1969.
In summary, the new strictions of 1969 were the
combination of the provisions of the Symington and
Conte-Long amendments and were put into one section of
the Foreign Assistance Act. The new section permitted
more flexibility by the executive. Senator Fulbright's
amendment to obtain more funds for the Fulbright
scholarship program resulted instead in a cut in the
number of military students that could be trained.
Since the majority of those trained in the past had





come from Latin America, the inadvertent effect of
the amendment was to fall primarily on Latin America.
Events which affected decisions on restrictions
on arms aid to Latin America were the continuing and
heightened dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam
and a feeling that the U.S. was overcommitted abroad.
This feeling was evidenced in the Senate's national
commitments resolution and the commencement of a two-
year study of those commitments. The House and Senate
held hearings specifically on the problems of Latin
America and focused wholly or in part on the subject
of arms transfers. In July, the first Latin American
war in 27 years broke out between Honduras and El
Salvador. This brief war drew attention and criticism
to U.S. arms transfers to Latin America because both
sides had been supplied by the U.S. Governor
Rockefeller presented his report on Latin America in
August with many recommendations on how to improve
U.S. -Latin American relations. In November, the
President announced his new doctrine for U.S. foreign
policy guidance. It contained the principle that in
the future, the U.S. would provide more equipment
but less manpower in defense of mutual allied inter-
ests overseas. The doctrine was intended originally






The congressional restrictions on arms transfers
beginning with 1967 were not created in isolation. As
already described, outside events and considerations
also had effect on the development of the limitations.
One primary tempering effect on the growth and direc-
tion of the restrictions was the reaction of the
executive, although this was not always contrary. In
order to place the expansion of the restrictions in
proper perspective, this initial executive reaction
will be outlined in order to show how the executive
shifted to accommodate the new restrictions and their
requirements. This will be followed by a review of the
contemporary response to the congressional initiatives
from sources in and out of government, both in support
of and in opposition to these initiatives.
Initial Executive Reaction
In order to review the reaction by the executive
to the restrictions of 1967, it is necessary to turn
back to the summer after the Church and Symington
amendments had been proposed. It is recalled that
the Church amendment was to abolish the Department of
Defense revolving fund which had been used to make
loans to lesser developed countries, thus enabling
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them to purchase arms and defense services. The
Symington amendment specified the termination of
assistance to a lesser developed country if the reci-
pient nation diverted resources from economic
development to unnecessary military expenditures.
As the foreign aid bill proceeded through its
hurdles, the Senate version passed on August 17th.
The House passed its version on August 24th. By
September 13th, both houses had agreed on a procedure
for a conference, and 11 senators and 7 representa-
tives were designated to the conference committee.
The conference committee met for the first time on
September 14th and was to remain deadlocked on the
issue of the disposition of the revolving fund until
November 7th.
In an attempt to have its views known and to
influence the outcome of the conference committee's
deliberations, the executive branch provided to the
conference committee position papers pertaining to
a number of items contained in the proposed legisla-
tion. The executive branch position paper stated
that the elimination of the revolving fund would
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Legislative History of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, 88th, 89th, and 90th Congresses
,
93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, p. 144.
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eliminate loans for military purposes to any Middle
Eastern or Latin American country and to many other
102countries around the world. This was true because
the lesser developed countries were unable to qualify
for loans from the Export-Import Bank or from private
banks. Without the revolving fund, the lesser devel-
oped countries would be reduced to outright grants or
strictly cash purchases. Another factor mentioned by
the executive to try to sway the conference committee
was the fact that outstanding obligations of the fund
were more than $700 million. If the fund was termin-
ated, the alternatives would be to default on the
obligations or for Congress to appropriate the funds.
The position paper concluded that it was "absolutely
essential" for the fund to be retained.
As far as the Symington amendment was concerned,
the reaction was somewhat different. In the position
paper, the executive branch said it supported the
"intent" of the amendment, which was "to make certain
that U.S. aid was properly used and to discourage
102
"Executive Branch Position Papers for House/
Senate Conference on FY 68 MAP Authorization," Con-
ference Paper F, "Revolving Fund," dated 8 September
1967, p. 2. Located in Record Group 51, Records of
the Bureau of the Budget, Legislative Reference Divi-
sion, 1965-1968, Series 65.2. File on Public Law




excessive military expenditures by the less developed
countries." But the executive opposed the amendment
in its original form. First, as originally written,
the provisions and penalties would have applied to all
types of assistance. The executive recommended the
amendment be limited to development assistance, which
would "properly limit the amendment to Development
Loans, Technical Assistance and Alliance for Progress
104Loans." Second, as first proposed, the amendment
was aimed at preventing diversion of sources to
military expenditures "to a degree which interferes
105
with economic development." The executive position
was that it could be argued that "any military ex-
penditures are, by definition, inconsistent with the
development of a country, because the military
expenditures were for goals other than development."
The executive's proposal was to prescribe "unnecessary
military expenditures" which would permit taking into
account the resources of a nation, its developmental
104Conference Paper 43, "Excessive Military
Expenditures," in "Executive Branch Position Papers
for House/Senate Conference on FY 68 MAP Authoriza-
tion," dated 8 September 1967. Located in the National
Archives, Record Group 51, Records of the Bureau of
the Budget, Legislative Reference Division, 1965-1968,
Series 65.2. File on Public Law 90-137.
U.S., Congress, Senate, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,




needs and its military requirements and, thereby,
make the amendment "more realistic and effective."
Third, the original amendment sought to restrain
military expenditures which were "likely to cause an
increase in the arms race." The executive branch
position said, "The provision ought to be limited to
the effect of a country's military expenditures on its
development, and exclude the effect on 'the arms race'




The fourth objection to the amendment by the
executive was that it provided for the President's
determination to terminate aid as a result of the
provisions, but it would take a concurrent resolution
of the entire Congress to recommence the aid. The
executive's view was that if the President could
turn off the aid, he should be permitted the flexibil-
109ity to turn it on again. The position paper then
recommended an altered version of the amendment which
incorporated the previously mentioned proposed changes.
1 fiConference Paper 43, "Excessive Military
Expenditures," pp. 2-3.
107Congressional Record , 11 August 1967, p. 22434





In the actual event, the Symington amendment as
actually approved by the Congress and signed by the
President was worded exactly as was recommended by
the executive branch in its position paper.
In addition to expressing an opinion on the two
major new restrictions, the executive branch responded
in its position papers to other aspects of the foreign
aid bill. One such item was the regional ceiling on
the grant and sale of arms to Latin America. The
position paper stated:
There has been talk of an "arms race" in Latin
America, but the facts do no bear this
out. ... In almost all countries in the
Region, pay and allowances and other fixed
operating costs consume 80-85% of the military
budget. After other costs are deducted, very
little remains available for new equipment.
In the whole area, during the five year
period FY 63-67, the United States sold only
70 light tanks, 72 howitzers, and 60 combat
aircraft--about one half of which were trainers
but are included in the total because they
mount machine guns and possibly could assume a
combat role in counterinsurgency . HI
These files on Public Law 90-137 in the Na-
tional Archives were not opened to the public until
June 1978. It was not previously known that the
Symington amendment, in the final form, was worded as
expressly desired by the executive branch.
Conference Paper N, "Latin American Ceiling,"
in "Executive Branch Position Papers for House/Senate
Conference on FY 68 MAP Authorization," dated 8
September 1967, p. 2. Located in the National Archives,
Record Group 51, Records of the Bureau of the Budget,
Legislative Reference Division, 1965-1968, Series
65.2. File on Public Law 90-137.
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In 1967, when a bill was passed by Congress and
sent to the President for signature, the Director of
the Bureau of the Budget would send copies to all
Cabinet officers interested in the particular subject
and would ask for their comments and recommendations
on what is referred to as enrolled legislation. The
comments returned from the departments often contained
proposed remarks for the President to use in any
public statement he might wish to make on the occa-
sion of the signing of the bill. These comments were
compiled and summarized by the director in a final
memorandum which accompanied the bill to the
President
.
In view of the opposition during the hearings to
the congressional restrictions, the Defense Depart-
ment's reply was surprisingly mild. The Defense
Department's reply said, in part:
Congress . . . imposed several new restrictions
on grant aid and sales operations. However,
these obstructions are not so severe as to
warrant veto of the Act. . . . The Act is
112This same procedure is still in effect, only
now performed by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) . 0MB superceded the Bureau of the Budget as a
result of the Federal Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1970, which took effect on 1 July 1970. See "Reor-
ganization Plan No. 2 of 1970," Code of Federal
Regulations, 1966-1970 Compilation (Washington, D.C.
:




. . . and will permit an adequate
level of operations . 113
The State Department appeared much more con-
cerned about the effects of the bill. Its reply stated
that the bill created "major problems" that would
affect foreign assistance and the conduct of foreign
policy but concluded that there was "no effective al-
ternative" to signature of the bill. The alterna-
tive was, of course, to have no foreign aid support
at all. The State Department's concern was mirrored
in the suggested signing statement enclosed in its
reply. The suggestion included:
The planned military assistance and sale program
was designed to help the countries . . . stand
firm against the pressures upon them; to let
those menaced by subversion and guerilla war—as
in our own hemisphere--maintain order and secur-
ity so their economies can grow. . . .
I am very concerned about arms competition
among less developed countries and about their
diversion of scarce resources to the procurement
of sophisticated weapons. We are taking these
problems very seriously. But crippling the
ability of the United States to meet legitimate
113Secretary of Defense, letter to Charles L.
Schultze, Director of the Budget, Washington, D.C.,
dated 14 November 1967, p. 1. Located in the National
Archives, Record Group 51, Records of the Bureau of
the Budget, Legislative Reference Division, 1965-1968,
Series 65.2. File on Public Law 90-137.
114William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Congressional Relations, letter, to
Charles L. Schultze, Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D.C., dated 13 November 1967, pp. 1-2.
Located in the National Archives, Record Group 51,
Records of the Bureau of the Budget, Legislative Refer-




needs of friendly countries for order and
security in no way prevents an arms race.
To respond to the real challenges of
development and security in a timely and
meaningful way, we need more money and more
authority than this bill affords.
I
15
Although the President did not use the State Depart-
ment's suggested words, the apprehension of the
department is evident.
In the final memorandum to the President from
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the director
described the provisions which eliminated the revolv-
ing fund and reported that the Defense Department
"informally advises that these provisions will not




It is to be noted that no mention of the
Conte-Long amendments is made in the executive branch
position papers or the comments to the President from
Cabinet departments on the Foreign Assistance Act.
This is because the Symington and Church amendments
were contained in the Foreign Assistance Act; whereas,
the Conte-Long amendments were later to be included
in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act. At the
time of the Presidential signing of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1967 on November 14, the appropria-
tions act was still in hearings.
Charles L. Schultze, Director, Bureau of
the Budget, Memorandum for the President, "Enrolled
Bill S. 1872--Foreign Assistance Act of 1967,"
Washington, D.C., 13 November 1967, p. 4. Located
in the National Archives, Record Group 51, Records
of the Bureau of the Budget, Legislative Reference




Even though State and Defense seemed to differ on the
evaluation of the effect of the restrictions, the
President took a dim view of the results. The Presi-
dent signed the bill on November 14th and said,
"l believe the restrictions in this Act will seriously
inhibit this Government's effort to assure and enlarge
the security of the free world. For 20 years we have
recognized the link between that security and our own.
We should not lose sight of it now."
As previously described, in November and December
1967, the appropriations act proceeded through hearings,
and conference committee deliberations, and was ap-
proved and sent to the President for signature. The
forwarding memo from the Bureau of the Budget high-
lighted the cuts--44 percent in the loans for countries
outside of Latin America, 27 percent in Alliance for
Progress loans, 35 percent in military assistance—and
pointed out that Congress had cut the program to "the
lowest level in the 20 years since the Marshall Plan
began." The memo went on to evaluate the Conte-Long
amendments
:
. . . these provisions present difficult policy
and administrative problems. Among these
117
"Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. Statement
by the President upon Signing the Bill. November 15,
1967." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents ,




the definition of "sophisticated"
weapons;
the extent of spending of the affected
country for "sophisticated" weapons
systems (we do not know this for all
countries)
;
the "base" aid level from which such
military expenditures are to be
withheld;
whether to deduct spending under prior
year contracts made before this
enactment.
They will certainly increase the number and
complexity of Presidential determinations as
to our vital national security interests,
especially for planned military credit and
commercial sales programs, for Latin American
(F-5 aircraft) and Arab countries.^ 8
As a continuation of the reaction of the execu-
tive branch, it can be established that an honest
effort was made to abide by the specifications of the
Symington and Conte-Long amendments, even if the
specifications were vague. In order to develop a
framework to handle the problem, the State Department
needed information on arms procurement by each lesser
developed country. On January 27, 1968, the State
Department sent a message to U.S. embassies in all
118Wilfred H. Rommel, Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference, Bureau of the budget, Memo-
randum for the President, "Enrolled Bill H.R. 13893
—
Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1968," Washington, D.C., 26 December 1967, pp. 1-3
Located in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.,
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capitals of lesser developed countries and requested
information for background information for implemen-
tation of both the Symington and Conte-Long amend-
ments. Although the message admitted that the meaning
of "sophisticated weapons systems" was not clear, it
was at least a first step in a serious effort to
1 1 qfulfill the intent of the Congress.
In order to continue this effort, the Senior
Interdepartmental Group (SIG) assigned to the Agency
for International Development (AID) the responsibility
of preparing procedures for implementation of the
Symington amendment. The SIG assigned to the State
Department the responsibility for the Conte-Long
amendment procedures. On January 25, 1968, AID
announced the formulation of what became known as the
Inter-Agency Symington Committee. In addition to State
Department members, the AID Symington Committee con-
sisted of representatives from Treasury, Agriculture,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Record Group 51. Records of the Bureau of the Budget,
Legislative Reference Division, 1965-1968, Series 65.2
File on Public Law 90-249.
13 9
U.S., Department of State, message #106007,
date-time group 271657Z January 1968, pp. 4-5. Origi-
nally classified "Confidential." Declassified and
released to the author through Freedom of Information




120International Security Affairs. The committee's
first meeting was on February 16, 1968, and by
March 14th, an approved screening process had been
121devised. By March 21st, the State Department had
also created a committee and a method for screening
1 22arms sales for possible violations.
The State Department's Conte-Long committee's
functions were eventually accommodated within the normal
functions of the member offices and were formally
terminated. The Inter-Agency Symington Committee was
123disestablished on January 4, 1973. However, the
annual report is still submitted to the Congress by
AID as required by the revised Section 620 (s) of the
120Rutherford M. Poats, Acting Administrator,
Agency for International Development, memorandum,
"Committee to Advise on Economic-Military Matters,"
Washington, D.C., 25 January 1968. On file in
Agency for International Development.
121Paul G. Clark, Assistant Administrator for
Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for Interna-
tional Development, memorandum, "Approved Symington
Procedures and Criteria," Washington, D.C., 14 March
1968. On file in Agency for International Development.
122 . .Arthur D. Foley, Staff Director for Political-
Military Group, Department of State, memorandum,
"Conte-Long Procedures," Washington, D.C., 21 March
1968. On file in Department of State.
12 3John A. Hannah, Director of Agency for Inter-
national Development, memorandum, "Deactivation of the
Inter-Agency Committee on Section 620 (s)," Washington,




Foreign Assistance Act of 1970. The report lists the
evaluations of the performance of the lesser developed
countries in economic and defense expenditures in
light of the Symington and Conte amendments.
Later Evaluations and Complaints
By the Executive Branch
The Administration had a long list of complaints
about the restrictive amendments. With a year's
experience to draw on in attempting to implement the
Conte-Long amendements , the Administration objected to
the deliberate inflexibility of the limitations and
termed them "self-defeating." To the State Depart-
ment, this rigidity was evidenced in four primary ways
First, the concept of "sophisticated" did not take
into account the type of equipment in the inventories
of a nation's neighbors. Second, no allowance was
made for valid security needs of potential recipients.
Third, the only criteria permitted for exception was
"importance to the national security of the United
124States." Again, no allowance was made for the
valid security needs of other nations nor was any
Arthur A. Hartman, U.S., Department of State,
NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Memorandum, NSC-U/SM 9,
"Discussion Memorandum for Meeting of Under Secretaries




latitude given for consideration of U.S. interests
other than national security. Four, the Conte-Long
amendments assumed that the best solution was a simple
case of either-or between defense and economic develop-
ment .
Other problems were pointed out by the State
Department. These included lack of information, the
question of future penalty deductions and the costs
125
of penalties to the U.S. The first problem, lack
of information, was immediately foreseen. The need
for accurate information placed U.S. diplomats in the
awkward position of approaching a host government for
information, the intent of which possibly was to be
used to apply a penalty against that government. It
is small wonder that some governments were less than
candid. The information needed to make a decision
under the Conte-Long restrictions included the exact
equipment involved, the amount to be paid, the time
schedule for payments, the date of the agreement, and
the method of payment.
A second problem area involved the issue of
1 "? f\





During interviews with State Department
officials (not named in the bibliography) , mention
was made of the examples of two nations against which
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the same amount as the purchase price to be deducted
only from that fiscal year's total economic assist-
ance? Or was the deduction to be parceled out over
the series of repayments? A related question was
what target amount was the penalty to be subtracted
from? Also, what if the purchase did not involve
funds but was a barter arrangement?
The application of penalties to technical assist-
ance projects was a third problem. The State Depart-
ment explained that technical assistance projects
were long range in nature, required continuity to
be effective, and involved U.S. technicians and experts
working in the foreign countries. The cancellation of
a project could cost the U.S. more than the amount of
penalties had been taken. In both cases, not in Latin
America, as a result of arms purchases revealed through
intelligence reports, deductions were made from the
following year's economic assistance. However, because
of the highly sensitive nature of the intelligence
sources, these deductions were never revealed to the
subject governments. Several years later it was
learned that the information was erroneous. Just as
quietly the amounts for economic assistance were in-
creased for the next year.
Documentation on this subject was requested via
the Freedom of Information Act in an effort to display
the ludicrous effect of sanctions against a govern-
ment which is unaware it has been the subject of such
penalty. However, because of a desire not to exacer-
bate present relations between the U.S. and the two
countries, the request was denied. Nevertheless, it
reveals the type of problems involved in obtaining
detailed information on a foreign government in an
attempt to apply the Conte-Long amendments.
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the penalty it was trying to impose. After the
penalty period was over, an additional expense was
involved in restarting the project. The disruption
to the U.S. personnel and the companies involved
127
often caused contractural problems.
The Administration's drum-fire against the
restrictions continued. Armistead Selden, while
serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, said that the restric-
tions "impeded our traditionally friendly relations
with the Latin American military. This situation has
helped Communist nations to gain access to the Latin
12 8American military."
Other Administration officials added their
condemnation. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
William Lang testified:
I think it would be fair to say that leg-
islation, such as the Conte Amendment, has hurt
our relations with Latin America. You will
recall that the Conte Amendment says, in effect,
to the lesser developed countries of the word
that they shall not acquire sophisticated equip-
ment, such as jet aircraft, unless we determine
it to be important to our national security that
they acquire such equipment. This has had a
1 27
Arthur A. Hartman, U.S., Department of State,
Memorandum No. NSC-U/SM 9, dated 4 April 1969, p. 10.
12 8
Armistead I. Selden, Jr., "Latin American
Problems of Concern to the United States," Commanders
Digest, 25 November 1971, p. 2.
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substantial negative effect in terms of our
relationships with the Latin American countries.
. . .
it might help to understand why the
larger countries of Latin America—Brazil , in
particular, which fought with us in two world
wars—are going to again react in a negative
fashion
.
[The Conte amendment] creates an antagonis-
tic reaction within the Latin American countries
because of what they consider to be a very
paternalistic attitude on our part trying to
judge what is best for them. We know what
motivated the sponsors of the amendment, and
why the Members of the Congress voted for it.
But the Latin Americans look at it through a
different end of the telescope, particularly
when they see that the sponsors of the amendment
have made it crystal clear that they were aiming
the restrictions primarily at Latin America. 129
Another State Department spokesman reiterated
the Administration's support for the basic motivation
of the Conte-Long amendment. This was given as pre-
venting lesser developed countries from diverting
resources from social and economic development to the
purchase of unnecessary arms. In the area of modern
aircraft, however, he explained that if the U.S. was
not forthcoming, then much more capable and expensive
planes would be purchased elsewhere. The second area
of concern to the Administration was "the cost to our
political relations with these countries of our
129 .U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, New Directions for the 1970' s: Toward a
Strategy of Inter-American Development, Hearings
,
before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 517, 534.
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continued inability to supply aircraft which they
consider reasonable and necessary for the moderniza-
tion of their forces."
The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs continued the criticism:
The marginal nature of our influence means,
however, that its long-term cumulative effect
can be very great— if it is exercised quietly,
wisely and consistently. Our foreign affairs
managers are always being called upon to "use
influence vigorously" in order to effect some
occurrence in Latin America. The call may
occasionally be justified. More commonly it is
a call to do something emotionally satisfying
now at the expense of our long-term capacity to
get a mutually acceptable solution. The origins
to many current problems lie beyond rationality,
and their treatment by diplomatic logic—let
alone threats of force—may delay effective
resolution dangerously.
The case of Latin American military expendi-
tures could become an outstanding example of
short-term satisfaction versus long-term accom-
plishment. Congress has, through directives
having the force of law, tied development assist-
ance to military austerity on the part of the
recipient. The objective is admirable, and it
is rather widely shared by foreign policy-makers
in Latin American executive branches. But the
tactics are deplorable . 131
130John H. Crimmons, as quoted in U.S., Congress,
House, Aircraft Sales in Latin America, Hearings ,
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong.,
2nd sess., 1970, p. 3. Mr. Crimmins was serving as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs
.
Covey T. Oliver, "Foreign Affairs and Human
Relations with Latin America," Foreign Affairs , vol.
47 (April 1969), pp. 523-524.
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As previously mentioned, Nelson Rockefeller, at
the request of the President, made a series of tours
of Latin America in 1969 to make an assessment of the
conditions and to report back to the President. In
his report, Mr. Rockefeller recommended that the
United States adopt a "national policy objective"
to "cooperate with other nations of the Western
Hemisphere in measures to strengthen internal secur-
ity." In his recommendations to achieve this objec-
tive, he specifically mentioned the primary restric-
tions .
The Executive Branch should seek modification
of the Conte and Symington amendments to permit
the United States to sell aircraft, ships and
other major military equipment without aid cut
penalties to the more developed nations of the
hemisphere when these nations believe this
equipment is necessary to protect their land,
patrol their seacoasts and airspace, and other-
wise maintain the morale of their forces and
protect their sovereignty. Realistically, if
the United States doesn't sell such equipment,
it will be purchased from other sources, east
or west, and this would not be compatible with
the United States' best interests.
. . . Each country should be permitted to
buy such equipment through purchase orders
placed with the United States Defense Department
through the Military Assistance Program, in
order that each country may get full value for
its military investment, more reliable delivery
dates, and better maintenance . 132
132Nelson A. Rockefeller, Quality of Life in
the Americas. Report of a U.S. Presidential Mission
for the Western Hemisphere . Reprint by Agency for
International Development. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 52, 54-55.
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In this brief review, it can be seen that
despite its opposition to restrictions on its free-
dom of action, the executive's policy was largely
aligned with that of the Congress as reflected in the
Symington amendment. So much so that the final
wording of the amendment is as recommended by the
Administration. It can also be seen that the Conte-
Long amendments posed a much more serious problem for
the Administration. Despite its opposition, when the
amendments became law, the executive branch quickly
readied the administrative machinery to handle its
business in accordance with the new laws.
Because the issue of Peru's purchase of Mirage
fighters was so central to the arms transfer contro-
versy, it will be examined next as a review of the
Administration's handling of this case within the
confines of the new congressional limits.
In 1963, Fernando Belaunde Terry was elected as
president of Peru in a democratic election which
brought a constitutional government to power. The
advent of his government also brought great hopes for
accelerated social progress and economic development
in a role envisioned by the U.S. as a model govern-
ment in the overall plan of the Alliance for
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133Progress. He was described by Senator Frank Church
as being "a man who qualified as a true Alliance for
134Progress president." By 1968, however, he was
involved in difficult controversies, such as repayment
of large government loans, inflation, and a 40 percent
currency devaluation. A final crisis led to a coup
on October 3, 1968. This crisis was an outgrowth of
the controversy surrounding the expropriation of the
135International Petroleum Company (IPC) . Adding to
Peru's problems at the time, was the dispute over
the purchase of either F-5 jet fighters from the U.S.
or Mirage jets from France.
The issue of Peru and the Mirages was a critical
issue during the congressional discussions of the re-
strictions on arms transfers and seemed to become a
test case after the restrictions became law. It
can now be seen that as early as January 15, 1968, the
U.S., Department of State, Peru Desk, "U.S.
Aid to Peru Under the Alliance for Progress," in
Daniel Sharp, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), p. 423.
134
U.S., Congress, Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
10 April 1970, Congressional Record , vol. 116,
p. 11212.
135
David Scott Palmer, Peru. The Authoritarian
Tradition (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 98-99.
13 6
The Conte-Long amendments became law on
2 January 1968 when the Foreign Assistance Appropria-
tions Act was signed by President Johnson.
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State Department had decided to postpone all pending
and proposed loans and assistance to Peru because of
its undetermined status under the new Symington and
137Conte-Long amendments. This disagreement over
military aircraft was merely new salt in an old wound
between the U.S. and Peru--the problem of the Inter-
national Petroleum Company. The U.S. executive
branch had quietly restricted loans and aid to Peru
for several years in the past to bring pressure to
bear in order to force a solution to this long-stand-
138ing issue. This new delay was to continue, pending
the achievement of an understanding between the U.S.
and Peru as to Peru's intentions in avoiding future
unnecessary military expenditures for sophisticated
aircraft. The U.S. ambassador, John Wesley Jones,
was directed by the State Department, via a telegram,
137
U.S., Department of State, message, number
100372 of 18 January 1968 to American Embassy, Lima,
Peru, pp. 1-3. Originally classified "secret." De-
classified and released to the author through
Freedom of Information Act request of 3 February 1978.
On file at Department of State.
13 8
Richard N. Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," The
New Yorker , 17 May 1969, p. 60. This account provides
fascinating details on the background of the IPC con-
troversy, the Mirage purchase, and the events follow-
ing President Belaunde Terry's overthrow. Also see,
U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Relations with
Peru, Hearings
,
before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969.

233
to inform President Belaunde Terry of the various
aspects of the contemplated delays in U.S. assistance.
Because of the second Symington amendment, which
applied to the operations of the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB) loans, the ambassador was to
inform the President that the U.S. had decided to
request postponement of a scheduled vote on a proposed
IADB loan to Peru "in order to avoid [a] public nega-
tive vote." The State Department suggested a "high
level emissary" visit to Peru to discuss further these
problems with the Peruvian president. Additionally,
concerning the purchase of the Mirages, the ambassador
was told, "You may wish to point out [to President
Belaunde] that news of this diversion of Peru's scarce
resources was a major factor in inducing introduction
and approval of Symington and Conte-Long amend-
139
ments . " It seemed that the Peruvians were to be
saddled with the guilt and were to be blamed for the
Administration's frustrations over being hobbled by
the congressional restrictions.
Ambassador Jones immediately replied to the State
Department that a "high level emissary" would be wel-
come and necessary to "discuss potentially harmful
situation created" by the new amendments. He
U.S., Department of State, message of 18 Janu-
ary 1968, pp. 1, 3.
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recommended that the high level person be Mr. Walt
Rostow, President Johnson's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Mr. Rostow had made an
earlier visit to Peru in an attempt to reach a solu-
tion to the IPC question. Ambassador Jones continued
by stressing that, "We must spare no effort [to]
reach understandings which will not rule Peru out
140
of Alliance for Progress."
Secretary of State Rusk had his own views on
whom the emissary should be and recommended to the
President that it be Ralph Dungan--Rusk ' s first
choice—because he would be "helpful in convincing
Senate and House liberals behind the Amendments"
who were "skeptical that we are taking them seriously."
Mr. Rusk's second choice was Covey T. Oliver, Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
Mr. Oliver was second choice because he "would do as
well with the Latins but—because of his position—will
be less persuasive on the Hill." It was pointed out
that "in selecting an emissary we must keep in mind
that his effectiveness on the Hill will depend on his
140
U.S., Department of State, American Embassy,
Lima, Peru, message, number 3157, date-time group
192122Z, January 1968 to Secretary of State, Washington,
D.C., pp. 1-2. Originally classified "Confidential."
Declassified and released to the author through Freedom
of Information Act request of 3 February 1978. On file
at the Department of State.

235
ability to persuade the liberals." 141 in the end,
Assistant Secretary Oliver made the trip to Lima and
other Latin American capitals to discuss the new U.S.
policy of restrictions. The implications of this
selection process of a government spokesman showed
that there was an awareness and a serious concern in
the executive branch over how to satisfy the liberals
in the legislative branch.
At the end of January, the State Department sent
a telegram to U.S. embassies in all countries receiving
U.S. economic or military assistance. The purpose was
to request information on host countries' military
expenditures, to give background information, and to
explain the new amendments. The message stated, "It
is U.S. policy to discourage arms races, wasteful
military expenditures and diversion of scarce
resources from development, and to use foreign
141Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Memorandum for
the President, "Special Emissary to Discuss Latin Amer-
ican Arms Policy," dated 6 February 1968, Washington,
D.C., pp. 1-2. Originally classified "secret." De-
classified and released to the author through Freedom
of Information Act request of 3 February 1978. On file
at Department of State. Mr. Dungan was the former U.S.
Ambassador to Chile from 1964 to 1967. The recommenda-
tion for Mr. Dungan to be the U.S. emissary is inter-
esting because of his sharply critical views of arms
transfers to Latin America. Note his testimony in
U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Military Policies
and Programs in Latin America, Hearings , before the




assistance programs where appropriate as means of
promoting that policy." Concerning the Symington
amendment, the message stated, "Administration gave
amendment full support." Concerning the Conte-Long
amendments, the message said they applied "technically
to contracts entered into after January 1, 1968,
although we would reserve policy option of imposing
penalties for earlier contracts in certain circum-
stances—for example, where USA [U.S. government]
had registered objections prior to conclusion of
142
contract." From the now declassified documents,
it is obvious that by the time of the January 27th
message, the decision had already been made in
Washington to withhold the loan from Peru. This
"reservation of rights" to apply the sanction retro-
actively was an interesting new rule formulated to
use later in publicly justifying the termination of
the loan.
In response to this request for information,
Ambassador Jones replied:
We believe we have discussed this subject so
much and so long with the GOP [Government of
Peru] that a further approach to GOP not only
unwise but nonproductive. ... In contacts
at highest levels Peruvian Government loan
142
U.S., Department of State, message, date-time
group 271657Z, January 1968, pp. 3-6.
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offer of 40 million became involved and made
subject condition cancel Mirage purchase.
Failure to stop French sale has resulted in U.S.
Executive Branch administrative determination
not to proceed with program loan. ... In addi-
tion attempt was made to use Declaration of
Presidents at Punta del Este against unnecessary
military expenditures to block French Mirage
purchase
.
It is clear that we must recognize here in
Peru all points suggested . . . have been made
and are known by the Peruvian Government but
are deemed not sufficiently valid to overcome
firm decision Peruvian armed forces proceed with
modernization and equipment after several years
of delaying equipment replacement. This is
considered by military as essential to Peru's
security, a view not opposed by anyone and
vigorously supported by many. 143
Only a month after the foreign aid appropriation
bill was signed by the President and the Conte-Long
amendments became law, a State Department memorandum
summed up its views of the restrictive amendments.
While Congress seemed clear in its intent, we
do not believe that individual sponsors of these
amendments foresaw the particularly difficult
and perhaps destructive consequences which might
flow from their implementation in specific
cases. 144
143
U.S., Department of State, American Embassy,
Lima, Peru, message, date-time group 011715Z, February
1968 to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., pp. 1-2.
Originally classified "Confidential." Declassified and
released to the author through Freedom of Information
Act request of 3 February 1978. On file at Department
of State. The exact amount of the loan involved is
unclear. It is reported in various sources as $30
million, $37 million, and $40 million.
144
U.S., Department of State, Memorandum for Mr.
Walt W. Rostow, The White House, "National Security
Council Discussion of Conte-Long and Symington
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Perhaps the "destructive consequences" were not fore-
seen, but perhaps they were. Perhaps because of a
lessened appreciation for U.S. security interests in
Latin America, other interests achieved dominance.
Perhaps in the pursuit of some select interests, it
was worth "destructive consequences" to other inter-
ests if U.S. security was not involved.
The State Department memorandum pointed out that
President Belaunde of Peru did not have the political
strength to ignore the demands of the Peruvian air
force for new planes. A planned coup was reported
during the previous December because of dissatisfaction
with the President's attempts to slow down new pur-
chases of equipment and the handling of the IPC
problem. It was also pointed out that the Peruvian
legislature had overwhelmingly voted the authorization
145for the new equipment. The Mirage purchase was an
extremely popular undertaking in Peru. Not only was
it supported by the armed forces, the Congress, and
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and the
Symington Amendment to the Inter-American Development
Bank Act," Washington, D.C., 6 February 1968, Tab B.,
p. 1. Originally classified "confidential." Declassi-
fied and released to the author through Freedom of
Information Act request of 3 February 1978. On file
at Department of State. The author's Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request to the National Security Council was
denied for the records of the National Security Council
discussions of the new restrictive amendments.
145
Ibid. , Tab C, p. 7.
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the opposition party but also the Catholic Church.
The Archbishop of Lima attended the arrival of the
first Mirages and gave them his blessing. There-
fore if the U.S. was going to counter the Peruvian
current, it would have to convince President Belaunde
to stand firm against demands for new planes. It
also would have to persuade the Peruvian air force
and the Peruvian Congress to reverse their decisions
to obtain modern military aircraft. This would have
taken a high order of persuasion.
One can measure the popularity of the Mirage
purchase by the Peruvian reaction to the disclosure
of the U.S. loan cut-off. The sanction was revealed
in May in an article in the New York Times and caused
147
an uproar in Peru. The Peruvians were enraged.
For example, in retaliation for the U.S. decision,
a motion was entered in the Peruvian senate to cancel
all Peruvian debts to the U.S., expropriate all U.S.
mining concessions, and nationalize all companies
owned by U.S. interests. The New York Times reported
John Goshko, "Liberals Among Latin Bishops
Seek Condemnation of Militarism," Washington Post ,
2 September 1968, p. A21:3.
147Benjamin Welles, "U.S. Ends Peru Aid in
Censure Move," New York Times, 17 May 1968, p. 1:8.
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that "rarely in her history have Peru's political
148groups shown such unity."
Punishment of Peru is a consideration and a
possible motive on the part of Congress as well as a
sacrifice by the executive branch as a demonstration
for congressional consumption. Concerning the
restrictions at the time, the State Department stated,
"While Congress was clear on the penalties to be
applied, we assume that punishment was not the primary
149
motive." If not the primary motive, by implica-
tion it was a secondary motive as inferred by the
State Department. Yet, Peru was the only country to
be punished retroactively under the provisions of
the Conte-Long amendments. The Mirage sale was con-
sumated in the fall of 1967, but the amendments did
not become law until January 2, 1968. If punishment
was not the purpose, then the motive is not clear.
Certainly the State Department's assumption can be
questioned
.
The punishment of Peru, during this same time
period, is even more exceptional when compared with
the handling of two other questions concerning
148
Malcolm W. Browne, "Peruvians Angry Over
U.S. Aid Ban," New York Times , 17 May 1968, p. 7:1.
U.S., Department of State, Memorandum for
Walt W. Rostow, 6 February 1968, Tab C, p. 3.
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the retroactive application of the amendments. Prior
to the enactment of the amendments, two sales of F-5
fighters had been consumated—one to Ethiopia and one
to Morocco. It was proposed by the State Department
that these two cases be handled by reprogramming loan
funds for the aircraft purchases and that the leftover
funds from the fiscal year 1967 budget be used. In
other words, the planes would be financed with 1967
funds, and the originally targeted 1968 funds would
be used to reimburse the depleted 1967 account. In
this way, no technical conflict was encountered with
the intent of Congress. This procedure was even more
unique because it was worked out in Congressman
Conte ' s office with his concurrence.
The Congressman was informed the planes for
Ethiopia were a quid pro quo for the Navy Communica-
tions Station at Kagnew. The planes for Morocco were
to counter the Soviet build-up in Algeria because of
Morocco's strategic location at the entrance to the
Mediterranean and also because the U.S. had an
4- 4. *-u 150important communication state there.
150
U.S., Department of State, Memorandum of
Conversation, "Application of the Conte-Long Amend-
ments: F-5's for Ethiopa and Morocco," Washington,
D.C., 11 March 1968. Originally classified "Confi-
dential." Received through Freedom of Information Act
of 3 February 1978. On file at the Department of
State. In addition to Congressman Conte, the
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In the case of Peru, there was no quid pro quo
involving U.S. national security interests; therefore,
the punishment of $40 million was imposed for the
purchase of foreign jets. Actually, the F-5's for
Ethiopia were financed with fiscal year 1967 funds
through reprogramming
. In the case of the F-5's for
Morocco, a presidential determination, as was provided
for in the amendment, was made, and it was decided
that the sale of planes to Morocco was "important
to the national security of the United States."
In this way, the planes were financed through appro-
priated funds. As a result of these different devices,
a conflict between the executive and the law was
avoided even when the purchases involved the same type
of aircraft originally requested by Peru but refused
by the U.S. The State Department acknowledged that
the Mirage purchase had occurred prior to the amend-
ments, but "as a matter of policy," the decision was
152
made to withhold the loan.
participants were Joseph Palmer, II, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs; William E. Lang,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs; and John S. Leahy, Congressional
Relations Office, Department of State.
151Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Statutes
at Large , vol. 82 (1969), p. 1323.
152
U.S., Department of State, Memorandum for Walt
W. Rostow, 6 February 1968, Tab C, p. 6.
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In effect, since U.S. national security
interests were not involved, the executive branch
decided to sacrifice the constitutional democracy
of Belaunde's Peru to undetermined fate in order
to placate congressional liberals from possibly
enacting further restrictions. The executive
decided it had to "convince the members of




In order to provide a sense of balance to
the issue, it is worthwhile to review briefly
comments and criticisms provided at the same on
the subject of the restrictions. As the debate
increased in the Congress and the press over the
United States arms trade, the differing views of
two of the nation's leading newspapers provide a
stark contrast. On the one hand, the New York
Times supported more congressional restrictions:
Some members of Congress are beginning
to ask searching questions about America's
in
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum for







arms business. It's about time. A series of
events in recent years has cast serious doubt
on some of the basic assumptions that underlie
the arms aid and sales programs. In a number
of situations, it is clear that the decision to
sell or give American arms has done more harm
than good to the interests of the United States.
. . . the search for alternatives, such as
arms limitation and the development of effective
United Nations peace-keeping forces, must be
pressed with vigor and imagination. To continue
to peddle arms with the reckless enthusiasm
that has characterized American policy in the
recent past is to settle for a solution to the
problem of international insecurity that is
demonstrably self-defeating. 155
On the other hand, the Los Angeles Times took
the opposite view and stated:
Members of Congress who should know better
seem determined to hamstring the Executive Branch
in its handling of delicate foreign policy
situations. The lawmakers' motives are good,
but their actions are nonetheless unwise and
potentially dangerous to the U.S. national
interest. . . . The congressional moves are
well intended. They grow, for one thing, out
of a growing conviction that the United States
should avoid allowing military aid programs to
get this country committed to any more Vietnam-
type situations. They also reflect a feeling
that the arms are used, all too often, for
purposes at odds with overall U.S. foreign
policy. Pakistan's use of American weapons
against India, and the similar employment of
U.S. arms against Israel by Jordan are typical
of the problem. Finally, many lawmakers feel
that the Pentagon has used the device of
"Country-X" loans from the Ex-Im to make arms
deals without the knowledge of Congress. All
three concerns are legitimate. If the current
1 5 5
"Feeding the Arms Race," New York Times ,
24 July 1967, p. 26:2.
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furor induces the Administration to take a
more skeptical and hard-eyed view of arms
purchase requests, and to keep Congressional
committees properly informed, a useful purpose
will have been served. It would be a mistake,
nevertheless, for Congress to write rigid
restrictions that would endanger the intelligent
and flexible conduct of foreign policy. As the
Middle East crisis and renewed guerrilla fight-
ing in Latin America demonstrate, this is still
a dangerous world. There are many cases where
supply of U.S. weapons is vitally important.
And, in some instances, the transactions cannot
be broadcast from the rooftops. It should be
remembered that there has been no massive
increase in the flow of U.S. arms to developing
countries. But weapons which previously were
given away are now sold--with a credit boost from
the Ex-Im. The taxpayers benefit thereby.
Congress is not qualified to legislate the
details of foreign policy implementation, and
shouldn't try. 156
In assessing the numerous criticims of the con-
gressional restrictions on arms transfers to Latin
America, a surprising aspect emerges. Some of the
most severe critics of U.S. arms transfers to Latin
America were also critical of the congressional
restrictions on those transfers. Their evaluation is
also probably a much more meaningful and valid con-
demnation of the entire framework of the congressional
limitations on arms transfers which was unbalanced
against Latin America. Their criticism is more signi-
ficant because even though they disapproved of arms
transfers themselves, they were sensitive to the
"Congress Misguided on Arms," Los Angeles
Times, 31 July 1967, Part II, p. 4:1.
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predominantly negative repercussions, ineffectiveness,
and inappropriateness of the congressionally-imposed
limitations which served to reduce the transfers. In
other words, they realized the restrictions were the
wrong means to the same ends.
One example of this, is the case of David
Bronheim. From 1965 to 1967, he served as Deputy U.S.
Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress and later
held the position of Director, Center for Inter-
American Relations in New York from 1968 to 1970.
In a 1972 article, he severely criticized the arms
transfers and derided all of the basic reasons given
by the Congress and the executive branch for trans-
ferring arms to Latin America. In conclusion, however,
his recommendations included a call for "a clear
general rule permitting most Latin American countries
to buy on commercial terms most weapons in whatever
amounts their domestic political process budgets." He
said it should be made clear that the U.S. would not




David Bronheim, "U.S. Military Policies and
Programs in Latin America," in Yale H. Ferguson, ed .
,
Contemporary Inter-American Relations. A Reader in
Theory and Issues (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1972), p. 346. On 15 May 1978, Mr. Bronheim




A second example is reflected in the remarks
by Senator Frank Church, who served as Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs and was a long-term critic of arms
transfers to Latin America. As a result of the hear-
ings held by his subcommittee in 1969, the Senator
concluded that "on balance our military assistance
program in Latin America has resulted in a net loss
to the United States." It is notable that at the same
time he concluded that:
. . . we have inter ferred too much. We have
insisted upon our right to decide what these
countries should do, including the purchase of
military equipment, to the degree that we have
even sought to penalize them, when they decided
differently, and I think that this has exacer-
bated our relationships . 158
The next year Senator Church continued the same
theme on Latin America. He castigated the U.S.
system of grant arms transfers as a "shabby business"
but continued on to condemn the series of restric-
tions which had been built-up by Congress. In his
speech he condemned the congressional restrictions
several times
:
The trouble with attaching such penalties to the
aid program is that, although they might give
1 5 8
U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Mili -
tary Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings ,
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong.,
1st sess., 1969, pp. 88-89.
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us some emotional satisfaction, they do not stop
the behavior against which they are aimed. What
is worse, they provide a series of diplomatic
showdowns that corrode, weaken, and eventually
destroy good relations ... as these punitive
sections have been added, as we have intervened
more and more, trying to direct and instruct our
Latin neighbors as to what action they should
take in given cases, difficulties have been com-
pounded, and indignation toward the United States
has grown. 15 9
After completion of Senator Church's speech,
Senator Fred R. Harris (D-OK) supported Senator
Church's views and added the example of the negative
effects of the U.S. cutoff of aid to Peru. Senator
Church remarked that the illustration of the case of
Peru pointed up the "unfortunate tendency of our govern-
ment to equate our national interest in any given
foreign country with the narrow interest of some par-
ticular group of U.S. investors."
The views of Dr. Abraham Lowenthal are a third
example of this type of evaluation. He found fault
with the system of arms grants; yet at the same time,
disapproved of the congressional restrictions. Dr.
Lowenthal assessed the military assistance program as
being "worse than ineffective" and as a "dismal"
159Frank Church, "Toward a New Policy for Latin
America," U.S., Congress, Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd
sess., 10 April 1970, Congressional Record , vol. 116,
pp. 11212, 11214, 11215.
160 Ibid., p. 11216.
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failure. Nevertheless, he spoke out against the
automatic unilateral economic sanctions because they
were inappropriate between sovereign nations, exa-
cerbated any dispute they were supposed to help
resolve, and undermined the construction of friendly
relationships. He also condemned the U.S. actions
which manipulated the Inter-American Development Bank




The period 1967 to 1969 witnessed an unusual
surge in congressional restrictions on conventional
arms transfers. This new trend was to continue.
Next, the restrictions developed during the remainder
of the decade, through 1976, will be reviewed.
1 fi 1
Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Alliance Rhetoric
Versus Latin American Reality," Foreign Affairs ,
vol. 48 (April 1970), pp. 499, 506.
1 CO
U.S., Congress, Senate, U.S. Relations with
Latin America, Hearings , before the Committee on






FROM 1970 TO 1976
By 1970, the greater part of the most signifi-
cant restrictions on arms transfers to Latin
America had been enacted. In the three years,
from 1967 to 1969, orientations had been set, poli-
cies fixed, convictions solidified, concepts aligned,
congressional enemies identified, and allies selected
During the remainder of the decade--until 1976--there
were elements of continuity as well as trends toward
change in the composite attitude of Congress. Some
of these applied toward arms transfers to Latin
America, specifically; some applied inadvertently;
and some pertained to the arms transfers in general.
One general thread of continuity was a con-
gressional dislike for the granting of arms and
the Military Assistance Program. Gradually, year
by year, Congress came closer to eliminating the
program completely. Another consistent strand was
a steady increase in congressional assertion of its
control of foreign policy through the legislation
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of specifications to be applied to both the grant
and the sale of arms and defense services.
As Congress became more concerned about the
political repercussions of arms transfers, it pre-
scribed more limitations on the executive and became
more involved not only in the setting of policy
parameters but also in the oversight of ongoing
transactions. As this oversight grew, one element
of change was seen in the relaxation of specific
monetary restrictions on Latin America. The change
was in the regional ceilings of grants and sales.
The sales limit was increased, then waived by the
President, then both limits were removed altogether
by the Congress.
In this chapter, the congressional restrictions
which applied to Latin America and those which largely
affected the region will be reviewed. These restric-
tions primarily involved a more restrictive limit
on grants, a reduction in the number of military
advisors, and a reduction in the number of countries
eligible for assistance. The regional ceilings on
grants and sales of arms to Latin America were
raised and then removed. Additionally, the issue
of human rights became a criteria for eligibility
for receipt of arms.
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In 1970, because of problems of interpretation,
the Pelly amendment regarding fishing vessels was
altered. As originally written in 1969, the penalty
was undefined and could be interpreted to mean an
absolutely permanent cutoff of assistance. The new
version specified a one-year moritorium. Mr.
Pelly' s original amendment called for sanctions
against a country who seized "an American fishing
vessel engaged in fishing more than twelve miles
from the coast." As revised, the restriction read:
No sales credits, or guaranties shall be
made or extended under this Act to any
Country during a period of one year after
such country seizes, or takes into custody,
or fines an American fishing vessel for
engaging in fishing more than twelve miles
from the coast of that country. The
President may waive the provisions of this
subsection when he determines it to be
important to the security of the United
States or he receives reasonable assurances
from the country involved that future viola-
tions will not occur, and promptly so reports
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate. The provisions of this subsection
shall not be applicable in any case governed
by an international agreement to which the
United States is a party.
1
Senator Fulbright again entered the Latin American
picture in 1970 with the offer of an amendment to reduce
Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments, Statutes
at Large




the grant of arms from $25 million to $10 million.
It is to be recalled that in 1969 he had suggested the
cut-off of all grant military aid to Latin America.
His suggestion resulted from his anger over U.S.
arms being used by both sides in the El Salvador-
Honduras football war. As approved, his amendment
read
:
Except as otherwise provided in this section,
the value of defense articles furnished by the
United States Government under this Act to Latin
American countries shall not exceed $10,000,000.
Not to exceed $25,000,000 in value of defense
articles may be furnished under this part on a
cost-sharing basis to an inter-American military
force under the control of the Organization of
American States .
2
The new restriction also allowed up to $25 million for
an Inter-American military force. This had been
suggested previously but had been steadfastly ignored
by the Latin Americans.
A separate amendment of that same year was
written for general application and certainly applied
to the Middle East. However, in Latin America it was
interpreted to pertain largely to that region. It
read
Decisions to furnish military assistance made
under this part shall take into account whether
such assistance will--
2Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Statutes at
Large, vol. 86, sec. 201(e), (1973), p. 25.
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(1) contribute to an arms race;
(2) increase the possibility of outbreak
or escalation of conflict; or
(3) prejudice the development of bilateral
or multilateral arms control arrange-
ments . ^
An element of continuity during these years
was the low opinion Congress held for the Military
Assistance Program and its system of military advisors.
It was often pointed out that the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam started with the sending of these advi-
sors to the area. As an indication of this skeptical
judgment on the part of Congress, it was specified in
1971 that the number of personnel assigned to such
military aid missions be reduced by 15 to 25 percent
between September 30, 1971 and September 30, 1972.
Another element of continuity in the congressional
policy was the doubt and anxiety over the results
which might evolve from the transfer of weapons. This
continuity of discontent is indicated by the 1973
amendment which further lowered the number of countries
eligible for grant assistance from 40 to 31. This
was followed in 1974 by the call for the end of the





5Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Statutes at
Large, vol. 87, sec. 12(b)(2) (1974), p. 721.
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. . . the policies and purposes of the
military assistance program
. . . should be
reexamined
. . . and that the program, except
for military education and training activities,
should be reduced and terminated as rapidly as
feasible consistent with the security and
foreign policy requirements of the United
States.
6
The number of eligible countries was again low-
ered to 20 for the fiscal year 1976 and to 12 for the
fiscal year 1977. Among these aforementioned
countries, eight were specifically named by Congress
as eligible recipients, none of which was in Lati n
7America. The eight countries were: Greece, Indonesia,
Jordan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and
Ethiopia. Even if it had been desired, the numbers
specified and the eight countries named left little
room for flexibility by the Administration to include
any of the Latin American countries in the grant
assistance program. In 1976, the Congress continued
the trend by setting the termination date of Septem-
ber 30, 1977 for the Military Assistance Program.
Although the formal program was to be phased out,
Congress could still authorize grants to countries of
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Statutes at
Large
,
vol. 88, sec. 17, pt. 2 (1976), p. 1800.
7 International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Statutes at Large
,
vol. 90, sec. 101, pt. 1 (1978), p. 729. It should be
noted that this act changed the former name "Foreign
Military Sales Act" to "International Security Assist-
ance and Arms Export Control Act."
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its choosing. Congress had said the grant program
should be terminated as "consistent with the security
and foreign policy requirements" and then defined
which countries were important to those requirements.
Congress had made it clear that as far as the grant
of arms was concerned, Latin America was not included
in the serious security interests of the United
States
.
The separate limit on arms grants to Latin
America was repealed by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1973. This act also raised the aggregate limit on
sales, grants and loans from $100 million to $150
o
million. In 1974, the $150 million limit was removed
completely
.
In line with the previous congressional practice
of asserting itself in the making of foreign policy,
the Congress continued to set limits or to prescribe
executive reaction to certain events. Although there
was no change in direction, the new restrictions
might even be described as an acceleration in the
direction of congressional control. By 1974, this
evolved into direct oversight of the ongoing operations
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Statutes at
Large
, pp. 722, 731.





of the Administration's execution of foreign policy.
This oversight prerogative was contained in the
amendment offered by Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI)
and Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (D-NY)
:
In the case of any letter of offer to sell any
defense articles or services under this Act
for $25,000,000 or more, before issuing such
letter of offer the President shall submit to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a statement
with respect to such offer to sell. . . . The
letter of offer shall not be issued if the
Congress, within twenty calendar days after
receiving any such statement, adopts a con-
current resolution stating in effect that it
objects to such proposed sale, unless the
President in his statement certifies that an
emergency exists which requires such sale in
the national security interests of the United
States. 10
In 1976, Congress continued its drive to gain
control of the foreign policy process. This can be
seen in the development of legislation which had as
a goal the enhanced congressional control over the
programs dealing with the transfer of arms and related
services. Its passage was not easy, but the earnest-
ness with which the Congress fought for it, is
indicative of the importance that was placed on
Ibid., pp. 1814-1815. This act also pre-
scribed termination of military assistance to Chile.
For additional background on U.S. actions, see U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations, with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Covert Actions in Chile, 1963-1973 , Staff
Report, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.
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on the legislation and the increased control sought
by Congress over foreign policy and the executive.
The legislation originated in the Subcommittee
on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. The subcommittee chairman was the former
Vice President, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN)
.
He said at the time that the legislation was necessary
because heretofore all manner of arms transfers had
taken place in a "policy vacuum." He also said
that because of "a new attitude and a new perspec-
tive," the Congress now "insisted upon sharing in the
policy formulation of our foreign policy" which was
a considerable change from habits developed in pre-
vious years. The objectives of the bill were listed
as follows:
1. Shift the focus of U.S. arms sales policy
from that of selling arms to controlling
arms sales and exports.
2. To provide the Congress with additional
information about government arms sales
actions
.
3. To provide the public with more information
about government arms sales actions.
Hubert H. Humphrey, "United States Arms
Transfers," Lecture, School of Advanced International
Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington,
D.C., 5 February 1976. A tape recording of his re-
marks is in the possession of the author. An edited
version of his remarks is contained in "The Arms Trans-
fer Problem," U.S., Congress, Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd




4. To reduce significantly the number of mili-
tary grant assistance programs and U.S.
military missions abroad over the next
year and a half and to require a specific
authorization for any grant programs or
missions after that, and
5. To reduce the cost of military assistance
grants
.
After its initial consideration by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the bill was somewhat immodestly
described by its authors as "the most significant
piece of legislation in the field of foreign military
assistance policy since the enactment of the Mutual
12Security Act more than a quarter of a century ago."
In its original version, the bill was passed by
both the House and Senate on April 29, 1976. However,
it was such a strident encroachment on presidential
prerogatives that President Ford vetoed it on May 7th.
The language of the President's veto statement was so
vigorous it can be assumed that the proposed legisla-
tion struck a very sensitive presidential nerve.
The President said that the legislation contained:
. . . unprecedent restrictions . . . mis-
guided provisions . . . unwise restrictions
that would seriously inhibit my ability to
implement a coherent and consistent foreign
policy. . . . was a serious threat to our
system of government . . . [and was] an
1 ?
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 , S. Rept. 94-605, 94th
Cong., 2nd sess, 1976, pp. 4, 6.
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attempt of Congress to become a virtual co-
administrator in operational decisions which
would seriously detract from its administra-
tive role . 13
With regard to human rights, the President said
it would:
. . . impair our ability to deal by more
appropriate means with objectionable practices
of other nations
. . . [and that] such restric-
tions would most likely be counter productive
as a means for eliminating discriminatory
practices and promoting human rights . . .
[thereby] diminishing our ability to advance
the cause of human rights through diplomatic
means
.
As to the termination of grant military aid, the
President said the bill was:
. . . inconsistent . . . would limit flexi-
bility . . . would impair close and long-
standing military relationships
. . . and would
have a severe impact on relations with other
nations whose security and well-being are im-
portant to our own national interests.
America can have only one foreign policy.
Moreover, that foreign policy must be certain,
clear and consistent. For governments must know
that they can treat with the President on foreign
policy matters, and that when he speaks within
his authority, they can rely on his words. 1-
After being rebuffed by the President, the
Congress redrafted the bill to remove most of the
offensive provisions and resubmitted it to the
13 . .Gerald R. Ford, "Veto of Foreign Assistance
Bill," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
,
vol. 12, 10 May 1976, pp. 828-829.
14 Ibid., pp. 829-830.
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President who signed it on June 30th. The bill became
known as the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976. An indication of the mood
of Congress and its objectives is revealed in the fact
that the title of the former legislation, the Foreign
Military Sales Act, was changed to the Arms Export
Control Act when the new legislation was passed. The
legislation, as finally approved, had a number of
prominent provisions:
1. After September 30, 1977, the grant military
assistance program would be terminated
except by specific authorization from the
Congress .
2. It established a procedure for Congressional
termination of security assistance to any
country that the Congress considered engaged
in a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights.
3. No security assistance was to be provided
to Chile.
4. No security assistance was to be provided
which would aid any nation's capacity to
conduct military operations in Angola.
5. It directed the establishment of a Coordina-
tor for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
in the Department of State. The Coordinator
was to be appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
6. It strengthened the Nelson-Bingham provision
from the 1974 legislation and provided Con-
gress with increased oversight of arms
transfers. The 1974 provisions required
that any letter of offer for sale or trans-
fer of defense articles or services be
submitted to Congress if for more than $25
million after which Congress had 20 days
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to take action to formally stop the transfer
In the 1976 legislation the time period was
expanded to 30 days for Congress to act, and
required notification of the Congress of
any proposed sale of $25 million or more of
defense articles or services or any major
defense equipment of $7 million or more. 15
By 1976, the general authority for military
assistance in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, stated that:
. . .
The President is authorized to furnish
military assistance, on such terms and condi-
tions as he may determine, to any friendly
country or international organization, the
assisting of which the President finds will
s trengthen the security of the United States
and promote world peace. 16
With apologies to the Bible, the law as passed by
Congress gives the authorization, but it also taketh
away. On the one hand, the President was authorized
to furnish arms to Latin America (as well as to other
countries), if it strengthened the security of the
United States. But on the other hand, the Congress
restricted the President's flexibility to transfer
arms to Latin America. The logical conclusion is
International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Statutes at Large
,
pp. 729-769. [emphasis added]
"Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,"
U.S., Congress, Senate, House, Committees on Foreign
Relations and International Relations, Legislation
on Foreign Relations Through 1976 , Joint Committee
Print, 1977, vol. 1, p. 72. [emphasis added]
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that Congress did not consider Latin America, or the
need to strengthen the region, important to the
security of the United States.
After reviewing the restrictions themselves
during this period, it is beneficial to examine
briefly the reactions of the executive and the comments
of contemporary observers. During a news conference,
Secretary of State Rogers was asked a question concern-
ing Latin America. As part of his reply the Secretary
of State said:
On the question of military assistance, I don't
want to generalize on that. The President has
made it clear that we are going to try to take
a long view in Latin America and not necessarily
determine every decision we make on the makeup
of the government at that moment.
It is interesting to me that we have had a
study made of how many times we have been able
to influence the policy of another government by
withholding military aid, and we find that it
has not been successful in any instance. 17
The Secretary of State was referring to a secret
study by the Director of Intelligence and Research
which focused on the effectiveness of arms cutoffs
as a means of influencing the policies and behavior
of recipients. The study was based on the experience
of other nations as well as the U.S. It stated that
17William P. Rogers, "Secretary Rogers' News
Conference of December 23," Department of State
Bulletin, vol. 62 (12 January 1970), pp. 27-28.
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in no case had the practice been an unqualified success
and several times had "distinctly negative conse-
quences" for the suppliers. Some of the additional
conclusions of the study were:
(a) Cutting off or suspending military aid
rarely achieves the desired purpose.
(b) Rather than achieving the supplier's
policy goals, cutting off military aid
often has the reverse effect.
(c) Military aid will not provide enough
leverage to force a recipient to take any
actions contrary to his vital interests.
(d) An arms cut-off will not succeed unless
the recipient has no other source of supply.
(e) Arms cut-offs will not succeed unless the
supplier uses all other means at its dis-
posal to reinforce the policy. 18
Despite the lessons from the past or the failure
by numerous supplying nations to influence recipients'
policies through the cutoff of military or economic
assistance, Congress still could not resist trying
it again.
An indication of the contempt President Nixon held
for the congressional restrictions can be seen in his
1
8
U.S., Department of State, Research Memorandum,
"Arms Suspension: A Big Stick or a Weak Reed?"
12 November 1969, unclassified abstract, pp. i-iii.
The study remains classified "secret." A Freedom of
Act request was denied, although the unclassified




handling of the regional ceiling. These ceilings set
a dollar limit on the amount of defense articles and
services that could be sold or granted each year to
Latin America by the U.S. The law provided a waiver
clause which the President could exercise. For
both fiscal years, 1972 and 1973, the President used
the waiver authority to issue presidential determina-
tions which merely stated that the transfers, in his
judgment, were important to the U.S. national secur-
19lty. The President's evaluation of the other
restrictions, in general, is mirrored in his 1973
report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy. When
discussing the restrictions, he said:
I urge the Congress to take a new and
thorough look at existing legislation that
affects our relations with Latin America. We
need to study, for example, whether various
legislative restrictions serve the purposes for
which they were designed. Do they deter other
governments from various actions, such as seiz-
ing fishing boats? Or do they merely make the
solution of such problems more difficult? I
believe some current restrictions are entirely
too rigid and deprive us of the flexibility




"Waiver of Regional Ceiling on Military Assist-
ance and Sales for Latin America (Presidential Determin-
ation 72-13)," Federal Register , vol. 37, 5 May 1972
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972),
p. 9101.
"Waiver of Regional Ceiling on Military Assist-
ance and Sales for Latin America (Presidential Deter-
mination 73-16)," Federal Register , vol. 38, 3 August





Similarly, we should inquire whether current
limitations on military equipment sales serve
our interests and whether they promote or weaken
our cooperation with Latin America. I believe
our unilateral efforts to restrict arms sales
have helped contribute to the rise of national-
ist feelings and to the growing resentment
against remnants of U.S. paternalism. The irri-
tation thus aroused helps explain at least some
of our problems in other matters. I urge the
Congress to take a hard look at this problem
and to take steps to rectify past errors. For
I think we have been hurting ourselves more than
anyone else by insisting on such limitations,
and harming our relations with Latin America in
the process. 20
But not all opponents of the restrictions on
arms transfers to Latin America were in the executive
branch. Numerous others were interested in Latin
America and were opposed to the restraints.
A noted specialist on Latin American affairs,
Dr. Abraham Lowenthal, said that it was only because
the U.S. had such dominant power in the hemisphere
that the U.S. had been "able to get away with" such
actions as the congressional restrictions on arms
21transfers to Latin America. In a similar vein
during Senate hearings, Curtis W. Tarr, Under Secre-
tary of State for Security Assistance, pointed
20Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970 's. Shaping a Durable Peace. A Report to the
Congress
,
3 May 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1973), p. 129.
21U.S., Congress, Senate, U.S. Relations with
Latin America, Hearings , before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, 94th cong
.




out to Senator Fulbright that the restrictions on
Latin America were not normal.
MR. TARR. These restrictions do not exist,
for instance, in the Near East; they do not
exist in the Far East; but they do in Latin
America
.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT. Of course. We would like
to impose them elsewhere, but we couldn't get
by with it . But they are not normal in any
case . 22
There are several implications that can be drawn
from the comment made by the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright.
First, Latin America was singled out as a location
for the application of arms restrictions because it
was a region in which the Congress could exert their
influence on foreign policy in spite of the fact that
this could not be accomplished in other regions.
Second, the U.S. could "get by" with imposing the
restrictions because their interests were not of
sufficient magnitude to worry about the U.S. being
threatened with reprisals by Latin America. By in-
ference, therefore, U.S. national security interests
were not involved. Third, the Congress could posture
rhetorical and moralistic arguments for the domestic
22 U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Assistance
Act of 1973, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign




consumption of business and other special interests;
yet, this still would not affect the mainstream of
U.S. foreign policy. Fourth, Senator Fulbright admitted
that the restrictions on Latin America were not
normal and were an exception to the conduct of U.S.
foreign affairs. In his brief comment, the chairman
voiced an opinion--which, in a different slant, has
been shared by many critics of the congressional re-
strictions on arms transfers to Latin America. If
Congress could not assert itself adequately or could
not make its weight felt sufficiently in other areas,
at least it could vent its frustrations and could impose
its will on a relative backwater such as Latin America.
Such sentiments are reflected in the comment by former
Texas governor and one-time Secretary of the Treasury,
John Connally, when he said: "We can afford to be
tough with Latin America. We don't have any friends
there anymore. "23 Such an arbitrary unilateral exercise
of U.S. dominance and influence in the home hemisphere
is a clear example of arrogance of power--a phrase
24
made famous by Senator Fulbright himself.
2 3John Connally, as quoted in Donna Radcliffe,
"Republicans, Democrats, Cervantes, Shakespeare,"
Washington Post , 18 October 1977, p. B4:l.
24
J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power
(New York: Random House, 1966).
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In line with Mr. Connally's assessment was the
conclusion of a RAND study. It stated that the
"restrictive attitudes toward arms transfers fostered,
perhaps more than any other single element, the de-
terioration of U.S. -Latin American relationships
25during the past decade."
In an article in 1973, U.S. News and World
Report concluded that the restrictions on Latin
America had backfired. It quoted the Secretary of
Defense as saying the restrictions had operated to
everyone's disadvantage. The opinion of the chairman
of the Inter-American Defense Board was quoted:
Our restrictions have not resulted in a direct
switch from "guns to butter," but only in a
switch from the U.S. to Europe as principal
arms suppliers. 26
In 1974, the Center for Inter-American Relations
sponsored a commission of 23 persons chaired by
Sol Linowitz, to conduct a study of U.S. -Latin American
relations. After a five month study, the commission
issued its report. The report took issue with the
congressional restrictions in several instances.
25David F. Ronfeldt, Future U.S. Security
Relations in the Latin American Contexts , Study P-5342,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975), p. 17.
2 f>
"Where Arms Ban Backfired on U.S.," U.S. News
and World Report, 22 January 1973, p. 54.
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For example, the report stated:
The Elimination of Paternalistic and
Discriminatory Policies
In the past, the disparities in size and
power between the United States and Latin Amer-
ica have led the United States to adopt "special"
policies towards Latin America in an effort to
affect the behavior of Latin American govern-
ments. Other legislative policies, although
phrased in general terms, have been in fact
directed primarily at Latin American countries.
Some of these policies--such as restrictions
on military sales—have been meant to be bene-
ficial; others— such as automatic sanctions in
cases of expropriation—have been designed to be
retaliatory. Whatever the intention, in the
changed circumstances of today, such policies
can only be viewed as paternalistic and dis-
criminatory .
Consequently, Congress and the Executive
Branch should, at a minimum, repeal policies
which apply special restrictions or penalties
to Latin America or which seek to impose on
Latin American countries a U.S. conception of
what is good for them. 27
The report continued its disapproval of the
congressional restrictions. Speaking of the U.S.
refusal to transfer arms, the report explained:
Latin American governments . . . simply
turned to European suppliers for equipment
which was often more costly than that origin-
ally requested from the United States. Since
27
The Americas in a Changing World, Report of
the Commission on United States-Latin American Rela-
tions (New York: Quadrangle , 1975)
,
p~. 22 . This
commission was assisted in its efforts by several
persons with association with the School of Advanced
International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, D.C. These persons, all of whom served
as consultants were: Drs . Roger Hansen, Ann Hollick,
Roger Leeds, Theodore Moran, and Riordan Roett.
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1967, 85 percent of Latin American arms expend-
itures have been made outside the United States.
The resulting situation satisfies no one: Latin
American countries resent discriminatory United
States restrictions, and some U.S. critics decry
the decline in the U.S. share of the market,
while others are disappointed that U.S. policy
has failed to curb arms purchases.
Legislative restrictions on arms transfers
to Latin America have been ineffective in
preventing arms purchases and have resulted in
deep resentment among Latin American military
and political leaders, who have viewed such
stipulations as paternalistic. The restrictions
are inconsistent with the attempts this Commis-
sion supports to make policies toward Latin
America mutually respectful. It is also inap-
propriate to discriminate against Latin
America when total military expenditures consume
a much lower percentage of the GNP of that region
than of most other parts of the world.
The commission's report specifically recommended that
"legislative restrictions on arms transfers that dis-
2!
criminate against Latin America ought to be repealed."
There were other subject areas which received the
commission's disapproval. These involved expropria-
tions and disputes over fishing rights. In cases of
expropriations, the commission felt that the U.S.
government "should negotiate with flexibility and
patience and not be forced—through automatic
sanctions— into the position of staking its overall
relations with other countries on the interests of
individual investors." Similarly, a first step in
28 Ibid., pp. 33-35. [emphasis added]
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the resolution of fishing disputes would be the
removal of the automatic sanctions. The commission
held that,
. . . in these cases, as in cases of invest-
ment disputes, the threat of coercive sanctions
is more likely to stiffen the host country's
position rather than induce it to relax its
demands . 2 9
The commission's specific recommendations called for
the repeal of the restrictive amendments and the
automatic sanctions.
During a personal interview with the author,
former President Belaunde of Peru was asked what the
disadvantages were to the congressional restrictions.
He replied:
First, harmony is endangered. Second, under-
standing is endangered, and that affects all
relationships, affects every undertaking which
might need a common frame of mind for success.
As a result, every relationship between us is
affected. And also to a certain extent those
with other Latin American countries. 30
In effect, the former president said that the congres-
sional restrictions on arms transfers were not the
surgical instrument necessary to correct one discrete
portion of overall national policy. Instead, it was
a "meat ax" that had negative repercussions on all
29
Ibid., pp. 37-38.
30 Interview with Fernando Belaunde Terry, Presi-




aspects of relations between the U.S. and a particular
country and other Latin American countries as well.
As has been pointed out, the restrictions could hardly
be considered a deft and agile tool of foreign policy
or international diplomacy.
In his book on Latin America, Herbert Goldhammer
asked how the "unquestionable deterioration of the
United States' ability to influence Latin American
behavior" could be explained. He answered that one
of the contributing causes was the restrictions pro-
posed in amendments, such as the Hickenlooper
,
Symington, Conte-Long and Pelly amendments. He went
on to assert that:
. . . the target of these amendments was not
only Latin America but the United States Execu-
tive, which in congressional views was lax in
using military and economic assistance to pro-
tect United States investments and tuna boats
and in discouraging Latin American purchase of
expensive "sophisticated" weapons. 31
Conclusions - 1967-1976
During the period 1967 to 1976, several consist-
ent trends are discernible in the congressional poli-
cies toward conventional arms transfers to Latin
America. First, Congress perceived Latin America
31 . •Herbert Goldhammer, The Foreign Powers in






as becoming less important to U.S. security. Second,
Congress became more dissatisfied with the results of
the Military Assistance Program and its system of grant
arms transfers. Third, as perceived U.S. security
interests in Latin America declined, the Congress
became more involved with the internal domestic poli-
cies of Latin American nations than with their
external foreign policies, which had been the earlier
concern. It is true that some of these policies and
concerns applied worldwide. It is also true that if
Congress had been concerned about the contribution
Latin America might make in countering a threat to
U.S. security, Latin America would have been exempt
from these policies as were some countries in other
regions. A fourth trend, in conjunction with the afore-
mentioned one, saw the Congress become more involved
in other interests in the area as perceived U.S.
security interests receded in the region. To use a
country similie from the prairies and farmlands of
Kansas from the author's youth, as the security pond
was drained with regard to Latin America, Congress
focused more on the stumps of issues that were
uncovered. In somewhat of a paradox, a fifth trend
saw Congress denigrate the results of programs which
provided arms and ridiculed their influence on
foreign friendly governments; yet, they turned to the
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curtailment and cutoff of these same arms transfers
as a means of influencing these same governments.
Sixth, a trend which was reversed involved the con-
gressionally-imposed regional ceiling on arms that
could be transferred. Upon closer analysis, however,
this reversal can be seen to be consistent with the
other trends in congressional policy. As additional
restrictions were created, they were seen as accom-
plishing the same ends as the regional ceilings. By
removing the explicit ceilings, Congress could avoid
some of the stigma attached to this particular restric-
tion. As a result, the formal specific ceilings were
no longer required.
In further elaboration, the first trend was that
Congress gradually perceived less of a threat to U.S.
security interests from external challenges to Latin
America. As a member of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee asserted in 1947, enemy missiles just would
not come from the direction of Latin America but from
32
across the North Pole. This concept of the decreas-
ing importance of Latin America to U.S. security was
reenforced by Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy
32John Davis Lodge (R-CT) , U.S., Congress, House,
Committee on International Relations, Selected Execu -
tive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1943-1950
,
Military Assistance Programs. Historical Series
,
vol. 6, pt. 2 (1976) , p. 490.
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in 1958 when he said, "The large threat is not
33there." As the external threat declined, Latin
America became increasingly irrelevant to the
congressional appreciation of U.S. security interests.
This can be seen in the establishment and increase
in severity of regional ceilings on grants and sales
and other limitations which inhibited the defense
capabilities of the Latin American nations who might
be used to help defend U.S. interests.
The decline in security interests--which were
based on various criteria which had little, if any,
relevance to U.S. security interests in the Latin
American region--also can be seen in the restrictions
on arms transfers. These criteria were centered on
fishing boats, diversion of local resources, concern
for human rights, and the desire to equate the numbers
of civilian and military students. The evidence of
this decline is further seen in the fact that the
worldwide number of countries eligible to receive
grant arms was set at 40, then reduced to 31, later
to 20, and finally to 12. Congress specified eight
nations to be included in the latter numbers, but no
33U.S., Congress, Senate, Mutual Security Act
of 1958, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 1958, p. 24.
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Latin American country was important enough to U.S.
security to merit this selection by Congress. In the
Foreign Assistance Act, the policy for military
assistance was given:
. . . it is therefore the intention of the
Congress to promote the peace of the world and
the foreign policy, security, and general welfare
of the United States by fostering an improved
climate of political independence and individual
liberty, improving the ability of friendly
countries and international organizations to
deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or
Communist-supported aggression, facilitating
arrangements for individual and collective se-
curity, assisting friendly countries to maintain
internal security, and creating an environment
of security and stability in the developing
friendly countries essential to their more rapid
social, economic, and political progress. 34
As Robert Jefferson Wood has said, "The Congressional
intention thus declared supports the view that the
military assistance program was designed to be in our
own interest." ~ In line with the policy statement,
since arms assistance was designed to bolster "the
security ... of the United States," the curtailment
of that assistance could only mean that the former
recipient was no longer relevant to U.S. security or
"Yankee self-interests," or that other interests had
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Statutes at
Large , vol. 75, sec. 502 (1961), p. 435.
35Robert J. Wood, "Military Assistance and the




come to overshadow the perceived security interests
in the region.
The second trend was the increasing congressional
dissatisfaction with the Military Assistance Program.
This is obvious because the program was reduced and
then finally eliminated by Congress. Any future grant
recipient must be specifically authorized by Congress.
A third trend was the development of a new
phenomenon, a gradual shift in congressional concerns
from the foreign policy orientation of Latin American
countries to uneasiness and worry over their domestic
policies. As evidenced by the criteria of the restric-
tions as they were added, Congress became more attentive
to internal policies in Latin America and the actual
ends for which these arms were being used. These
internal aspects, which gained in importance, included
worry over whether local resources were being diverted,
whether arms acquisitions were unnecessary, whether
the arms obtained were too sophisticated, or whether
military dictators were denying social progress to
their people. (The question of civilian dictators
remained unanswered.) Indeed, the entire issue
For an elaboration of this point with relation
to the Alliance for Progress, see William P. Gerberding,
United States Foreign Policy: Perspectives and
Analysis (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), pp. 351-353.
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of internal policies toward human rights was to
receive magnified attention as the crucial test to
determine if arms could be transferred at all began.
It was natural that any nation giving or selling
arms might want some assurance that the intended use
of such arms matched the actual employment. But as
Professor Gerberding has said, such assurance "raised
with special force the old problem of when acceptable
37monitoring becomes unacceptable meddling." With
the increase in the number of restrictions, the
number and severity of the sanctions and penalties
also grew. If the foreign recipients' internal poli-
cies and actions did not conform to U.S. definitions
and specifications
, then the penalties were imposed.
These penalties ranged from reduction in either eco-
nomic or military assistance to outright termination
of both, plus prohibition of arms sales. It is small
wonder that Latin American nations complained of U.S.
meddling in their internal affairs. It was a natural
result of the Congress focusing its attention and
concern on the internal policies of these countries.
A fourth trend saw Congress become more in-
volved in other interests as perceived U.S. security
interests diminished in the region. During World
37 Ibid., p. 352
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War II, the Korean War, the height of the Cold War,
and immediately after the advent of Castro in Cuba,
to be eligible for arms aid, the U.S. considered it
sufficient if a Latin American nation was anti-Axis,
or anti-Communist. During these times, because a
security threat to the U.S. or its serious interests
was perceived, little or no attention was paid to the
internal policies of a country as long as it was an
ally. In the 1960's--and as the Communist threat
diminished in Latin America--the congressional restric-
tions on arms increased. The fact that a government
was anti-Communist became no longer sufficient justi-
fication for arms transfers. As the security pond
receded, other interest stumps became predominant.
These included the definition of territorial seas,
the right of passage on the high seas, the rights of
fishing boat owners, and the rights of U.S. private
investors in foreign countries.
A fifth trend saw Congress deride the accomplish-
ments of arms transfers in swaying foreign country
policies to align more closely with U.S. desires.
Yet, Congress specified the threat of termination of
the transfers as a means of influencing the policies
of allies as well. At the same time, in some cases
the Congress feared that the results of arms
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transfers were contrary to U.S. interests, such as in
the 1969 Honduras-El Salvador war. Nevertheless,
Congress used the threat of stopping arms transfers
as a means of trying to force the other nations to
conform to U.S. views and judgments.
The sixth trend initially appears as a small
ripple of change on a sea of continuities. The
regional ceilings on U.S. arms grants and sales gradu-
ally became more strict until 1971. In an abrupt
reversal, the limit was repeatedly raised, then
repealed completely. At first glance, this seems to
be a discontinuity in the congressional policy of
restrictions. On closer analysis, however, it can
be seen that ceilings were continued through other
means. The specific regional ceiling on grants to
Latin America was removed in 1973 and included in a
larger overall limit on sales, grants and loans. At
the same time, the number of countries eligible for
grants was further reduced to 31. In 1974, the limit
on sales, grants, and loans to Latin America was
repealed. At the same time, the Nelson amendment
directed that all sales amounting to $25 million or
more were to be reviewed and approved by Congress.
Also in that year, the termination of the grant
program--with the exception of a few countries
authorized by Congress—was specified. So, it can
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be seen that the repeal of the regional ceilings was
actually in consonance with the previous congressional
policy of restrictions. The policy was continued
through new limitations which gave the Congress confi-
dence that the ceilings could not be circumvented and
could be consumated only with congressional approval.
A distinct seventh thread in this fabric of
congressional policy is a determined effort by the
Congress to assert itself into the realm of foreign
policy. This went hand-in-hand with congressional
disapproval of various policies followed by its dis-
approval of the executive, particularly in the area
of arms transfers. The congressional restrictions
were aimed as much at the executive as they were tar-
geted at Latin America.
During the ten-year period, 1967 to 1976, it
cannot be assumed that Congress became less concerned
about U.S. national security interests overall.
However, in view of the record, it can be asserted
that Congress did become convinced that these inter-
ests were no longer seriously hazarded by threats
toward or in Latin America. As the threats to U.S.
security interests receded in the Latin American
region, other interests became predominant. Following
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the dictates of these different interests, restric-
tions on arms transfers resulted.
It can be seen that the executive branch shared
much the same goals as the legislative with regard to
the restrictions on arms transfers to Latin America.
One of the primary objectives was to prevent the Latin
American countries from using their resources on
projects or hardware which would have little if any
beneficial effect on economic and social development.
The primary differences between the executive and the
Congress occurred over what means were feasible,
reasonable, and suitable to reach these goals.
The case of Peru is an example of the Administra-
tion being more concerned about its relationship with
Congress than its relationship with Peru. And with
small wonder. An angry Peru was much easier to handle
than an angry Congress. The Congress was in the
process of hemming-in the executive with legal pre-
scriptions and had the power to do much more. Peru,
on the other hand, was far away and could do very little
to harm the Administration. Peru could do nothing
to inhibit the power or authority of the executive.
The program loan to Peru was cancelled to pacify the
liberals on Capitol Hill and to use the case of Peru
as an example. The executive branch seemed to need
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an example to show the Congress that the Administra-
tion meant business.
In reaction to the restrictions, the executive
made an apparently honest effort to develop means to
apply an established, rational criteria to the imple-
mentation of the restrictions. There is no evidence
that the executive attempted to circumvent the
limitations. The author is somewhat surprised at the
conscientious effort continually expended by the
executive to conform to the legal specifications
used to inhibit the transfer of arms. Even though
the executive was apprehensive about the results of
the restrictions, it obeyed them.
The Congress also had a number of fears regard-
ing the subject of arms transfers to Latin America.
These included the near conviction that U.S. weapons
transfers only led to arms races and coups. The
Congress appeared to have the belief that defense
expenditures were also a pure diversion of resources,
which had predominantly negative effects on lesser
developed countries. It is not evident that the
Congress seriously studied the problems or investi-
gated the potential results of various possible
solutions. Statistical analyses have not supported
the congressional fears relative to the effects of
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arms transfers. These studies have not formed any
consistent pattern as to the negative results of
arms transfers postulated by the Congress. The
restrictions seemed to result from simple, emotional
reactions to situations with little serious thought
as to their effects on numerous other U.S. national
interests
.
As time progressed after the enactment of the
restrictions, their effects became increasingly clear.
To observers both inside and outside the executive
branch, the conviction grew that the restrictions were
inappropriate, did not achieve their objectives, or
were contrary to U.S. interests.
At this point, it is necessary to look at the
actual accomplishments of the restrictions. From
these results it will be possible to judge the effec-
tiveness and to measure the success the restrictions






In order to determine the effectiveness of the
congressional restrictions on arms transfers to Latin
America from 1967 to 1976, it is necessary to estab-
lish more closely the actual results of those
limitations. This chapter will focus, in turn, on
each of the principal aims of the restrictions which
applied exclusively or primarily to Latin America.
Other lesser restraints, which also had an effect,
will be reviewed as well as the unintended results
from the restrictions.
The congressional restrictions on arms trans-
fers to Latin America had several primary objectives.
The aims were.
(a) Stop the diversion of local
resources from economic
and social development,




(b) Prevent the entry of sophisticated
weapons into Latin America.
(c) Stop the Latin American arms race.
(d) Stop the seizure of U.S. fishing vessels.
(e) Prevent coups.
(f) Promote human rights.
The congressional restrictions on the transfer of
conventional arms had a result on each of these ob-
jectives; they will be taken in turn.
Resource Diversion
One of the stated congressional concerns in
formulating the legislative restrictions on arms
transfers to Latin America was a desire to curtail the
diversion of local resources. Congress wanted the
lesser developed countries, particularly in Latin
America, to use their resources for economic develop-
ment rather than to use them to buy needless weapons.
By preventing this diversion, the U.S. could theo-
retically decrease the amount of the economic assist-
ance needed for the lesser developed countries and,
in addition, increase the effectiveness of the aid
actually provided. However, the fears Congress had
of overspending by the U.S. and of possible diversion
of resources by lesser developed countries may have
clouded its outlook. The Congress may have overlooked
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the possibility that there might be some beneficial
results to defense expenditures.
In an article in 1962, Professor Emile Benoit
concluded that "the economic burden of armaments has
been considerably exaggerated in popular thinking.
While burdensome to a degree, defense expenditures
have also made a substantial contribution to the
world's economic progress." Professor Benoit was
later commissioned by the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency to investigate further these rela-
tionships. In 1971, he completed a more thorough
study and reported:
On the basis of all the evidence ... we
suspect that the net effects [of defense programs
on LDC economic growth rates] may have been posi-
tive rather than negative. However, since this
is uncertain, the point to be stressed here is
the surprising fact that higher defense burdens
are not clearly associated with lower growth
rates . 2
As a result of his continuing research and study,
in 1973 Professor Benoit came to the somewhat
Emile Benoit, "The Economic Impact of Disarma-
ment in the United States," in Seymour Melman, ed.,
Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston:
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962)
,
p. 135.
2Emile Benoit, Max F. Millikan, and Everett
E. Haqen, Effect of Defense on Developing Economies
,
prepared for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
ACDA/E-136, June 1971, vol. 1, Summary (Cambridge:
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Insti-






The evidence does not indicate that defense has
had any net adverse effect on growth in develop-
ing countries. It even suggests the possibility,
though this is not strictly demonstrable, that
on balance the defense programs may have stimu-
lated growth.
His research was based on analysis of the defense
expenditures of 44 developing nations between 1950 and
1965. He found that their defense expenditures,
. . . were positively , not inversely, corre-
lated with their growth rates over comparable
time periods, i.e., the more they spent on
defense, in relation to the size of their econo-
mies, the faster they grew and vice versa.
3
The professor listed many qualifications to his
findings and explained that the results may not hold
for a nation in different circumstances. Nevertheless,
his research does indicate that the simple equation
formulated by Congress--that defense purchases were
inherently deleterious to development--may have been
faulty
.
The stated intent of the original Symington
amendment in 19 67 was to prevent the diversion of
resources in local lesser developed countries in order
that these resources might be devoted to enhancing
the subject nation's own economic and social
3
Emile Benoit, Defense and Economic Growth in
Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: Heath & Co.,
1973), p. xix. [emphasis in the original]
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development. It called for termination of develop-
ment assistance if a recipient nation was found to
be diverting such assistance or its own resources
to unnecessary military expenditures.
In order to determine the effectiveness of the
Symington amendment in meeting its objective, a review
was conducted of the records of the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID) . AID has the responsi-
bility for monitoring the conduct of all nations and
ascertaining their conformance to the specifications
of the amendment. The review included the annual
reports of the status of the implementation of
the amendment and covered all reports since 1970,
which were submitted to the Congress by AID. This
review, by the author, revealed that the Symington
amendment has never been used in dealing with a
foreign country.
One interpretation could be that Section 620 (s)
was so effective that the threat of its possible
use deterred all worldwide recipients of U.S. assist-
ance from diverting resources to unnecessary military
purchases. A more realistic view would first question
the amendment itself. The concept of diversion is
elusive and difficult to determine with accuracy.
This would be especially true for a foreign nation
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without access to the detailed information possessed
by the subject country. There is also the question of
the level at which arms become unnecessary. Without
walking the mile in the other man's shoes, it is dif-
ficult for outsiders to accurately determine the
extent of one's actions, and thus convince a sovereign
nation that its governmental thought processes are
biased and faulty if not completely wrong. With such
ill-defined concepts as diversion and necessity as
the basis for sanctions, it is more understandable
why the Symington amendment has never been used.
As far as actually using the sanctions, the
executive branch would be extremely reluctant to use
formally the provisions of the Symington amendment.
Because of negative repercussions, which would result
from the use of Section 620 (s), numerous other means
and devices would logically be tried first to avoid
exacerbating relations. The case of the cancellation
of the $40 million loan to Peru may be recalled. The
sanctions for the purchase of sophisticated weapons
were taken against Peru under provisions of the
Conte-Long amendment. The penalty was not for the
diversion of resources, which the Symington amendment
was designed to prevent.
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An example of the difficulty of applying the
Symington amendment can be seen in the AID report
to Congress. The report stated:
Where sophisticated weapons have been purchased
by recipient countries it has not been with
funds intended for economic development, nor
have such purchases been found materially to
interfere with development .
4
From this it can be seen that, at best, Section 620 (s)
would be effective only to nullify the behavior of
those nations which were also recipients of U.S.
development assistance. Another difficulty, which
becomes apparent, is how to determine which funds were
earmarked for development; which were destined for
defense; when this determination was made; and when,
and if any, changing of funds occurred. Since money
is fungible, it is difficult to follow. That is, a
dollar or a peso could enter a national treasury from
any source. Later a dollar or peso is expended on
weapons. Who can determine with accuracy the source
of the money spent on these weapons?
U.S. Agency for International Development,
"Annual Report of Implementation of Section 620 (s)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
and Section 120 of the Foreign Assistance and Related
Programs Appropriation Act, 1970," p. 2. Report
contained as an enclosure to AID letter to Senator
J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations




The Agency for International Development has
more experience than any other government agency in
monitoring the actions of foreign countries for con-
formance with the provisions of the Symington and
Conte amendments as combined in 1969. From the
experience in attempting to apply the restrictions
as directed by Congress, AID found:
• no rule of thumb to determine when a country
is spending "too much" on defense;
• each country's special concerns, character-
istics, and environment must be examined
separately
.
• that governments consider security as first
priority and their perception of their own
defense needs will prevail;
• economic aid levels are not sufficient to
change military intentions;
• the withholding of economic aid could have
a negative effect on needy people without




triggering an increase in military prepara -
tions . 5
The results of the congressional restrictions
in preventing diversion of resources by Latin American
countries can be seen in the oft-exampled case of Peru
and the Mirages. In its initial search for a suitable
replacement for its aging and varied collection of
5Agency for International Development, "Military/
Economic Coordination and 620 (s)," Briefing Paper,
dated 3 June 1975, p. 2. On file at Agency for Inter-
national Development. [emphasis in the original]
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airplanes, Peru first requested the F-5 from the U.S.
The fly away cost of the F-5 was approximately $1.1
million. The fly away price was for the complete,
operable aircraft. To that price would be added the
cost of the support package of initial spares, train-
ing aids, and ground support equipment. In the case
of an F-5, this support package cost approximately
$400,000, bringing the total cost per plane to $1.5
million. The sixteen Mirages for Peru, on the other
hand, were reported to have cost approximately $2.5
million each, including the initial spares. Therefore
for the same number of planes, the F-5's would have
cost $24 million; whereas, the Mirage purchase was
approximately $40 million. As a means of contrast,
the sixteen used A-4B jet fighters previously sold to
Argentina had a price of some $300,000 per copy, with a
total package price in the neighborhood of $5
million. Not only was the Mirage more expensive than
the F-5, it was also twice as costly to operate. The
operating cost of the Mirage was listed at $380 per
7
hour; the F-5 was listed at $190 per hour.
U.S., Congress, House, Aircraft Sales in Latin
America, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong. , 2nd sess., 1970, pp. 4, 7, 25.
7Benjamin Welles, "U.S. Plans to Sell F-5
Tactical Jets to Latin Nations," New York Times ,
18 October 1967, p. 18:8. This source listed the

295
But Peru was not an isolated case. After this
initial entry of supersonic aircraft into Latin
America, a number of other countries followed suit.
Since modern aircraft were not available from the U.S.,
Latin America made their purchases in Europe. By
p1977, four other countries had bought Mirages.
It is evident that the congressional restrictions
caused the Latin American nations to purchase higher
priced aircraft, which were more costly to operate
than U.S. planes. Even though diversion of the arms
purchases of any foreign nation has never been found
officially by the United States government, it is quite
clear that Latin American nations used more of their
resources for the arms they did purchase than if the
weapons had been purchased in the U.S.
Arms restraint or disarmament is not necessarily
an unmixed blessing. It must be realized that, con-
trary to what some congressional members seemed to
have believed, the deliberate reduction in the
expenditure for arms by a nation does not
price of the two planes as $1.8 million each for the
Mirage and $1.04 million each for the F-5. The
higher price listed in the House hearings is pre-
sumably more accurate because it is later, came from
an Administration official, and included the important
detail of the support package cost.
p
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 67-73.
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automatically ensure the same amount will be devoted
to economic development. The funds not spent on
defense items could be disbursed in a large number
of ways but would not benefit the development of the
local economy. As Nobel Laureate Wassily Leontief
has pointed out, "Swords do not serve readily as
9plowshares .
"
Also, funds that are not spent on the purchase
of sophisticated weapons by a Latin American nation
will not create a sudden windfall for the population.
Dr. Luigi Einaudi has computed (using 1970 for a
sample year) the effect that would result from a five
percent reduction in military spending. His sample
included the six major countries of Latin America:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and
Venezuela. Even if the five percent had been spent
in exactly the optimum way, the result on the gross
national product (GNP)
,
per capita, would have been
small. Allowing for a number of variables, the
minimum effect would have been a change of ten cents
in the gross national product, per capita, and the
Wassily W. Leontief and Marvin Hoffenberg,
"The Economic Effects of Disarmament," Scientific
American, April 1961, p. 47.
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maximum would have been forty cents. Although the
calculations are rough, they indicate that in the
case of the Peruvian purchase of the Mirages, which
brought such pressure and criticism on Peru for
diversion of resources, the purchase probably had
little, if any, significant negative effect on Peru's
development. The dubious effects of the purchase
came from the response of the U.S. Congress in its
knee-jerk reaction to a Latin American nation
because they did not follow the express wishes of the
U.S. when purchasing jets from a third country.
On the other hand, this is not to advocate arms
at any price or to propose that unlimited arms will
provide unlimited butter. There are many considera-
tions for any government to take into account in
reaching its decisions on the amount and type of wea-
pons which are necessary and are sufficient. These
include political, economic and security factors as
well as moral considerations. What this approach
encourages is a realization that the question of
arms transfers to Latin America is more complex
than simply a "less is better" attitude.
Luigi Einaudi; Hans Heymann, Jr.; David
Ronfeldt; and Cesar Sereseres , Arms Transfers to
Latin America; Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect




One of the major objectives of the Conte-Long
amendments was to prevent the entry of sophisticated
military equipment into lesser developed nations,
particularly Latin America. The amendment's defini-
tion of sophisticated included jet aircraft for
military purposes. As a consequence of the contro-
versy in 1967 over arms transfers, the U.S. denied
such aircraft to Peru. Peru, as a consequence,
purchased the French Mirage, thus bringing supersonic
military jets to Latin America for the first time.
The United States' attempt to prevent the entry of
such aircraft resulted in the increased alienation of
Peru but did nothing to prevent the acquisition of
supersonic jets. The U.S. then cancelled a planned
$40 million loan to Peru as punishment for consumating
the deal for the Mirages. This further aggravated
the Peruvians and undoubtedly caused other Latin
American nations to pause and to ponder the wisdom
of their involvement with the United States. However,
the situation still had absolutely no positive effect
toward solving the problem of prevention of jet air-
craft entering Latin America. When other Latin
American nations wanted to modernize their air forces,
jets were not available from the U.S. In order to
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obtain jets of sufficient modernity and capability
and to locate a dependable source of planes and parts,
the Latin Americans turned to third country suppliers.
As a result, at least four other Latin American
nations procured varying numbers of the supersonic
Mirage jets. In addition to Peru, these nations were
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. 11
Using the measure specified in the Conte-Long
amendments— that "jet" was synonymous with "sophisti-
cated"
— the legislation plainly failed in its objectives
and, therefore, was ineffective. The amendments not
only failed to keep supersonic or sophisticated jets
out of Latin America, but also the restrictions
probably were counterproductive as well.
The restrictions may have acted as a catalyst
and encouraged the purchase of increased numbers of
more expensive and more capable aircraft. As the U.S.
(that is, Congress) increased its restrictions on the
transfer of weapons, its image deteriorated as a
reliable source for modern aircraft. Into the void
left by the U.S. withdrawal from the market, the arms
dealers from third countries were eager to rush.
Robert C. Sellers, ed. The Reference Hand -
book of the Armed Forces of the World , 4th ed. (New
York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 11, 30, 50, 242.
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The capabilities of the more advanced aircraft and
the more advantageous financing arrangements offered
by the other suppliers were attractive to the Latin
Americans, who turned to the new sources of supply.
As far as overall results, in attempting to prevent
the entry of sophisticated weapons into Latin
America, the congressional restrictions were clearly
ineffective and, in all probability, were counter-
productive .
As a result of the congressional restrictions
on arms transfers and Peru's dissatisfaction with
the U.S., the Soviets were able to enter the Latin
American market for the first time. The new govern-
ment in Peru, irritated by the treatment by the U.S.,
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet
12Union on February 1, 1969. The first trade agree-
ment between the two countries was signed a few weeks
13later on February 17th. Relations between the
U.S. and Peru fell to a new low.
Relations between the U.S. and Peru were
severely strained by the International Petroleum Company
"Soviet and Peru Set Up Diplomatic Relations,"
New York Times , 2 February 1969, p. 4:2.
1 3
"Peruvians and Soviet Sign Their First Trade
Accord," New York Times, 18 February 1969, p. 1:2.
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problem and the Mirage controversy. There was also
the continuing friction over Peruvian seizures of
U.S. fishing boats inside Peru's 200-mile territorial
zone. As a result of these seizures, the U.S. en-
forced the Pelly amendment in May 1969 and cut off
the sale of military equipment to Peru. In
retaliation, Peru withdrew its invitation for Governor
Rockefeller's visit and expelled the U.S. military
missions, the oldest one dating from 1922.
In June 1970, Peru was struck by a serious
earthquake that warranted humanitarian response from
around the world. As part of the international relief
efforts, the Soviets sent three military helicopters
that were eventually presented as gifts to the
Peruvian air force. This was the first Soviet
military equipment to enter Latin America. In 1973,
one account called attention to the Soviet efforts
to sell jet aircraft in Latin America, particularly to
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Russian interest in such
sales can be seen in the terms offered--a fifty-year
14 . .
"Information on the Suspension of U.S. Mili-
tary Sales to Peru," Department of State Bulletin
,
vol. 60 (16 June 1969), p. 509.
Norman M. Smith, "The Buildup of Soviet Gear
in Peru's Army and Air Force," Armed Forces Journal
International, May 1977, p. 23.
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loan period with one percent interest. 16 In 1976,
the Central Intelligence Agency reported consummation
of a $250 million order by Peru for thirty-six Soviet
supersonic SU-22 Fitter fighter-bombers; these planes
were considered to be more sophisticated than the
17French Mirage. This was the first occasion that
a Latin American country had purchased arms from the
Soviet Union. Peru also was reported to have pur-
chased from the Soviet Union some four hundred T-54
medium tanks, long-range artillery, howitzers, radar
controlled anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air
1
8
missiles. This entry of the Soviets into Latin
America is a clear result of the congressional
restrictions on arms transfers, even if it was not
clearly foreseen.
1 6
Cecil Brownlow, "Soviets Push Fighters in
South America," Aviation Week and Space Technology
,
28 May 1973, p. 163.
17
U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Communist
Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World
,
1976 , ER-77-10296 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1977), p. 25.
1
8
Tad Szulc, "Russia Arms Peru. Meanwhile, the
U.S. Refuses Planes to Ecuador," The New Republic
,




The issue of an arms race in Latin America was
a primary topic in 1967 during congressional consider-
ation of the restrictive amendments. This concern
was to continue. Shortly after the President signed
the bill making the Conte-Long amendments part of
U.S. law, the Washington Post warned that "Latin
19Decisions to Buy Jets Could Trigger Arms Race."
The concern of the Post was not shared by all commen-
tators, some of whom referred to the activity in Latin
America as an "arms walk" or an "arms crawl."
Several months later, U.S. News and World Report
asked the question: "Is There Really an Arms Race
in Latin America?" The article concluded that "such
fears are unfounded" and that it was not until "other
nations turned to Europe for arms that the cry of
20Latin American Arms Race 1 arose."
The relatively little money spent for arms
by Latin American nations was portrayed by several
spokesmen. While serving as U.S. Representative
19 . .Warren Unna , "Latin Decisions to Buy Jets
Could Trigger Arms Race," Washington Post , 22 Janu-
ary 1968, p. A4:l.
20
"Is There Really an Arms Race in Latin




to the Organization of American States, Sol Linowitz
spoke on the subject. He stated:
Latin America spends less on arms than any
other part of the world. Approximately 90 per-
cent of its military expenditures is for upkeep
of military and defense establishments, and
only 10 percent is for acquisition of new mili-
tary equipment.
. . . The current headlined
effort on the part of one or two Latin American
countries to acquire more sophisticated equip-
ment arises from the desire to replace outmoded
and obsolete equipment which is both uneconomical
and inef fective . 21
In an address at Stanford University, Under
Secretary of State Katzenbach said:
Actually, the Latin American record on arms is
a good one. ... In relative terms, hemispheric
defense budgets have declined by some 50 percent
over the last 20 years. . . . The number of
operational fighter squadrons has declined from
29 to 16. And Latin America's total annual out-
lays for military equipment are less than $200
million--which, for those of you who enjoy
comparisons, is about half the annual cost of
the New York police department . 22
He concluded by pointing out that by adhering too
rigidly and unswervingly to what is our basic policy--
to avoid the supply of expensive and sophisticated
military equipment to developing countries—might
,
in fact, help to defeat the aims of our policy.
21
Sol M. Linowitz, "Hemisphere Cooperation
through the Alliance for Progress," Department of
State Bulletin , vol. 62, (6 November 1967), p. 619.
22Nicholas deB . Katzenbach, "U.S. Arms for the
Developing World: Dilemmas of Foreign Policy," Depart -




Secretary of State Dean Rusk was very concerned
about the repercussions of the Conte-Long amendments.
He said if their aim was to prevent arms races and
unnecessary military expenditures, he and the execu-
tive branch could share the aim. However, he saw
"serious dangers" in them because they would go:
far beyond their apparent intent by (a) de-
priving the President of flexibility, (b)
applying rigid and arbitrary standards which
ignored different situations and needs of
various nations and (c) confusing sophisticated
weapons with modern weapons in that by being
jet did not make an aircraft "sophisticated."
He concluded by saying:
We cannot legislate unilateral disarmament for
other nations--whether small or large, poor or
rich . 23
During a speech to the Pan American Society of
New York, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Covey T. Oliver, responded to accu-
sations that the U.S. was contributing to a Latin
American arms race. He asserted that the U.S. poli-
cies and the program of military assistance had been
a success in helping to hold down Latin American
defense expenditures. He pointed out that such ex-
penditures amounted to 23.5 percent of the Latin
23Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk Urges Appropria-
tion of Full Amount Authorized Under the Foreign
Assistance Act," Department of State Bulletin , vol.
57 (11 December 1967), p. 806.
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American governmental budgets in 1947, but this figure
had dropped to 12.7 percent by 1966. He went on to
express his concern that if the U.S. refused to
transfer modern replacement equipment, such as air-
craft, it could result in the Latin American purchase
of much more expensive equipment from other countries.
This would result in exactly the opposite effect from
what was desired. He said, "It could also force the
purchase of aircraft, with performance characteristics
Latin America agrees it does not need, just to




Former Secretary of State Lincoln Gordon served,
in the past, as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, and
as President of The Johns Hopkins University. In his
analysis of the situation, he called the existence of
25
an arms race in Latin America a "widespread myth."
His successor, Covey T. Oliver, when he was Assistant
Secretary of State, said:
24 ...Covey T. Oliver, "Our Continuing Commitment
in the Home Hemisphere," Department of State Bulletin ,
vol. 57 (25 December 1967), pp. 871-872.
25Lincoln Gordon, "Punta del Este Revisited,"
Foreign Affairs, vol. 45 (July 1967), p. 630.
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There have been a few outstanding and well-
publicized acquisitions of a relatively few
pieces of expensive, modern military equipment,
but there has been no arms race ; and there will
be none unless the moderating influences within
the hemisphere come to lose acceptance. 26
There was no arms race in Latin America, despite
the apprehensions of the Congress. Some may argue that
it was only through the action of Congress in passing
the restrictions on arms sales to Latin America after
1967 that prevented such an arms race. Such a problem
of identifying causes is reminiscent of the man who
rationalizes his consumption of martinis each evening as
preventing a toothache. Just because he has never
been afflicted with a toothache does not mean that
the martinis prevented such an occurrence. Likewise,
because a major arms race did not develop in Latin
America, does not mean that the congressional restric-
tions prevented it. In fact, there is evidence that
some arms racing did occur between certain Latin
American countries only after the congressional
restrictions were initiated .
One analysis in 1974 found a definite relation-
ship between increased weapons procurement by certain
Latin American countries and the acquisitions by
fc\
Covey T. Oliver, "Foreign and Human Relations
with Latin America," Foreign Affairs , vol. 47 (April
1969), p. 524. [emphasis added]
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specific rival neighbors during the 1960-1970
27period. in 1976, using multiple regression analysis
and refined time intervals, Professor Edward Laurance
found no evidence of arms races during the period
from 1963 to 1967. But during the period from 1968
to 1973, the picture changed. For the latter period,
he found that Argentina, Colombia and Chile increased
their arms purchases in reaction to purchases by
their respective rivals, Brazil, Venezuela and
2 8Peru. But the reverse was not true; that is, the
latter three nations did not react to increased
purchases by the former. The earlier period of stable
relationships and no arms races was replaced, coin-
cidently, by the formulation of the congressional
restrictions, with a less stable period of increased
rivalry between some Latin American nations. It is
important to note that the period of reaction of
neighboring states to arms purchases by rival states
occurred only after the initiation of the congressional
restrictions. This same period also saw the quick
27Jerry L. Weaver, "Arms Transfers to Latin
America: A Note on the Contagion Effect," Journal of
Peace Research , vol. 11, no. 3 (1974), pp. 213-219.
2 8Edward J. Laurance, Arms Transfers and Influ-
ence in Latin America: 1961-1973 . Paper presented
to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies
Association, February 25-29, 1976, Toronto, Canada,
pp. 2 4-2 6.
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reduction of U.S. influence in the area of arms pro-
curement by Latin American nations and the rapid
domination of the market by Western Europeans.
In effect, the results of the cure for the ill-
ness of arms races—prescribed by Congress—turned
out to be worse than the diagnosed disease. If the
analysis performed by Professor Weaver and refined by
Professor Laurance approximates reality, then the
effects of the congressional restrictions were oppo-
site to their intended results on arms races. The
evidence is very convincing that the congressional
restrictions were not only ineffective but also
counterproductive with regard to controlling arms
races in Latin America. In this case, the congres-
sional martini was the direct cause of the toothache.
Prevention of Seizures of
Fishing Vessels
The objective of at least three pieces of
legislation was the prevention of the seizure of U.S.
fishing vessels. These pieces of legislation were
the Kuchel amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1965, the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, and
the Pelly amendment to the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968. In all of these articles, the means
of ensuring compliance involved the negative action
of termination or the withholding of U.S. economic

310
or military assistance. It is the author's contention
that such specifications were ineffective.
In order to judge the effectiveness of the
congressional legislation, it is instructive to
review the total number of U.S. fishing vessels seized















In sheer numbers, it can be seen that the quantity of
the seizures actually increased after enactment of
the congressional restrictions. Any deterrent effect
is certainly not evident.
Following a series of seizures in 1973 and 1974,
the U.S. informed Peru and Ecuador that the U.S. had
paid reimbursements on three occasion to U.S. fishing
29
"Seizure of U.S. Vessels," dated 11 November
1975, compilation provided to the author by the Office
of International Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries




vessel owners following seizures by the two countries.
In accordance with the Fisherman's Protective Act,
the amount of the reimbursements should have been
deducted from U.S. economic and military assistance
destined for the two countries. On each occasion,
however, the executive branch determined that it would
not be in the national interest to make such deduc-
tions. These determinations were based on the
following reasons:
a. The deduction of funds would not assist in
resolving the several issues on which the
U.S., Ecuador, and Peru were in disagree-
ment. To the contrary, such action would
have reduced the possibility of reaching
a negotiated settlement of the issues.
b. The deduction would have adversely affected
other important U.S. interests in U.S.
relations with Ecuador and Peru.
c. The deduction would have prejudiced a broad
range of U.S. interests in countries of the
hemisphere other than Ecuador and Peru. 30
The Pelly amendment to the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968 has been applied several times, particu-
larly against Peru and Ecuador. Application toward
Peru was enforced in: May to August 1969, March
1971 to March 1972, and from December 1972 to
May 1973. Application against Ecuador was
3
U.S., Department of State, Memorandum, "Fishing
Vessels Seizures. Application of Sanctions Provisions,"




enforced from May to August 1969, and from January 1971
to January 1974. In a review of the subject, the
State Department concluded:
The general approach has been that our actions
should contribute to a negotiated solution of
the fishing boat seizure problem. Sanctions
have been clearly ineffective as a means of
promoting a settlement. There is no evidence
that either Ecuador or Peru has ever modified
its position on this issue as a result of sanc-
tions we have applied. In fact, the sharp es-
calation in fishing boat seizures in 1970-72,
following the suspension of FMS [Foreign
Military Sales] eligibility, would indicate
that the Government of Ecuador is only too
willing to take up the gauntlet whenever it
feels compelled to defend what it conceives
as its national sovereignty. On the other hand,
it is clear that sanctions when imposed have
blocked possibilities for negotiation. Ecuador
in particular has taken firm position of refus-
ing to discuss the issue when sanctions were
in force. The use of sanctions' has made it more
difficult to resolve other bilateral issues with
Ecuador and Peru and has also had a negative
effect on various multilateral issues. 31
Coups
Another area in which the Congress was concerned
involved the subject of the influence of arms trans-
fers on the stability of governments and the incidence
of military coups. It had been asserted many times
by congressional critics that the transfer of arms
led directly to the use of these arms in the overthrow
31 Ibid., pp. 2-3, 5
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of established governments or to the increase in
militaristic and authoritarian regimes. Among these
critics is Professor Edwin Lieuwen of the University
of New Mexico. His book, Arms and Politics in Latin
America
,
is one of the well known, early non-statis-
tical criticisms of U.S. military-aid policy toward
32Latin America. In 1965, in a non-statistical
analysis, John Duncan Powell concluded that the grant-
ing of arms contributed to the rise of militarism
T *. • 33in Latin America.
In 1967, Professor Lieuwen prepared a study for
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which he
was even more critical of U.S. policies toward arms
transfers to Latin America. In order to make Latin
American countries align with U.S. desires, he advo-
cated the cutoff of both economic and military aid
in addition to non-recognition of governments. He
further recommended the abolishment of the Inter-
American Defense Board, the Inter-American Defense
College, U.S. -Latin American anti-submarine
32 ....Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin
America (New York: Praeger, 1960).
33John D. Powell, "Military Assistance and
Militarism in Latin America," The Western Political
Quarterly, vol. 18 (June 1965), p. 388.
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programs and all grant programs of military assist-
34
ance. The next year during Senate hearings,
Professor Lieuwen again strongly advocated the cutoff
of economic and military aid to Latin America because
of the "leverage" which could be wielded by the U.S.
He also stated, "I don't think there is any reason
to sell conventional arms in Latin America." 35
In line with Professor Lieuwen' s thinking,
there have been a number of indictments made by critics
of arms transfers to Latin America. These seem to have
been based on emotion or intuition and have a ten-
dency toward hysterical reaction to the transfers.
Recently, a more balanced non-statistical examina-
tion was made by Elizabeth Hyman. She concluded
that:
The influence of foreign military aid is
generally stressed more by critics than by
those friendly to the military. . . .
Specifically, the recent country studies
find that military men mirror their societies.
Over the long run they resist foreign influ-
ences. They exhibit a high degree of adapta-
tion to domestic political life; they are not
self-determining political entities or super-
powers, but interact closely with the civilian
34 ...Edwin Lieuwen, The Latin American Military .
A study prepared for the U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Survey of the Alliance
for Progress , 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 30-31.
35U.S., Congress, Senate, Survey of the Alliance
for Progress, Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, pp. 84, 87.
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sector. Their political behavior is unrelated
to the absolute or relative size and firepower
of the armed forces nor does it seem related
to their class origins or to degrees of so
called professionalism. 36
A number of statistical studies also have been
conducted in an effort to answer questions related to
the effects of arms transfers, the increase in authori
tarian governments, the increase in the incidence of
military coups, and the demand for more sophisticated
hardware. However, the results fall on both sides of
the answer fence. For example, in 1963, Charles Wolf,
in a statistical analysis, found no association
between larger military programs and authoritarian
governments. He concluded that:
Dictatorships, military and otherwise, are a
frequent and disturbing phenomenon in Latin
America. But their occurrence and recurrence
is not properly attributable to simple causes
like military aid or defense programs. 37
Philippe Schmitter found a positive correlation
between military intervention and defense
Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Solders in Politics:
New Insights on Latin American Armed Forces."
Political Science Quarterly , vol. 87 (September 1972),
pp. 406, 417.
37Charles Wolf, Jr., The Political Effects
of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin




expenditures. At the same time, a statistical
examination of the subject by Miami University's
Center for Advanced International Studies found no
relationship between defense expenditures and mili-
39tary intervention. in a later study, Philippe
Schmitter found mixed results. "The impact of mili-
tary aid varies from highly significant and positive,
to indifferent, to highly significant and negative."
He concluded that "none of the hypotheses linking
military aid and military rule are exclusively and
significantly supported by the . . . data."
In order to find a better answer to such ques-
tions, Dr. Milton Leitenberg of Cornell University's
Peace Studies Program compiled and reviewed more than
80 studies which were conducted by other authors
and dealt with the occurrence of wars and also
3 8Philippe C. Schmitter, Military Intervention .
Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin
America, 1950-1967 . Cambridge, Mass.: Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1970.
39Center for Advanced International Studies.
The Political and Socio-Economic Role of the Military
in Latin America (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of
Miami, 1970)
.
40 . .Philippe C. Schmitter, "Foreign Military
Assistance, National Military Spending and Military
Rule in Latin America," in Philippe C. Schmitter, ed
.
,
Military Rule in Latin America. Function, Conse -
quences and Persepctives (Beverly Hills: SAGE




coups. From this data base, he asked several
questions, such as: (1) Do arms transfers make war
in the Third World more likely? and (2) Do arms
transfers make military coups more likely? In
answer to the first question, he said his presumption
would be in the affirmative, but the data did not
reveal such an answer. Such a conclusion could not
be proven. The answer to the second question was
similar--the data did not support such a finding. He
reported that the implication was that arms transfers
43had very little to do with the frequency of coups.
During Senate hearings, Assistance Secretary of
State Charles Meyer was quizzed on the subject of
coups. He replied:
. . . since 1961 there have been 15 coups d'etat
Since 1930, and using a nice phrase called il-
legal and unscheduled changes of heads of state,
41Milton Leitenberg, A Survey of Studies of Post
W.W. II Wars, Conflicts, and Military Coups . Paper
Presented to the Symposium on Armament, Tension and
War, September 26-28, 1977. Sponsored by the Nordic
Cooperation Committee for International Politics,
Hanaholmen, Finland.
Milton Leitenberg, The Military Implications
of Arms Sales to the Third World . Paper Presented to
the Conference on International Arms Trade, April 22-
23, 1978. Sponsored by the Institute for Policy
Studies, Washington, D.C.
Milton Leitenberg. Remarks made during the
Conference on International Arms Trade, April 22-23,




there have been 110 such upsets, or cessation of
constitutional government, in Latin America.
In the decade or the period 1930 to 1939,
inclusive, there were 35. In the decade, 1940
to 1949, inclusive, there were 28. In the decade
1950 to 1959 there were 29. In the decade 1960
to this date [1969] there have been 18 or al-
most exactly half of those suffered from 1930
to 1940.
Of those 18 in the year 1960 to date, three
have occurred in Ecuador which is a civilian
constitutional government now; three in the
Dominican Republic, and the comment pertains
still; one in Bolivia which is a civilian con-
stitutional government now, and two in Peru,
and Peru is a military government; two in
Argentina, Argentina is a military government;
one in Brazil, a military government; and one
in Panama, a military government; one in
Guatemala, and one in Honduras, both consti-
tutional governments . 44
What Mr. Meyer pointed out was that there was no clear-
cut case to prove that the transfer of arms by the
U.S. precipitated coups in Latin America.
The general conclusion of the number of analyti-
cal studies shows that the congressional fears were
unfounded. Congress was apprehensive over what was
considered to be U.S. responsibility for causing arms
races, wars , and coups in Latin America. It appears
that the persons in Congress were directed by emotional
responses rather than a hard-headed attempt to study
the problem and to find valid answers. In effect,
44
U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Military
Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings ,
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st
Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 68.
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through simple reasoning, the persons leading the
charge against arms transfers to Latin America for-
mulated a simple solution to a complex problem and
applied a bad answer to a good question.
Human Rights
The promotion of human rights became an in-
creasingly important factor in U.S. foreign policy
during the decade 1967-1976. As delineated in
Chapter III, there were a number of reasons which
lead to this elevation of human rights consideration.
First and foremost was the influence of the war in
Vietnam on the Congress and public opinion. As pre-
viously discussed, another major element included the
increasing confrontation between the Congress and the
executive branch and a desire in the Congress to
restrict the executive's power in foreign policy.
Enhancement of human rights was the reported
goal of a number of articles of legislation during
the subject decade. However, due to the vagueness of
the goals and the subjective nature of any evaluation
of the accomplishments of these initiatives, it is
difficult to evaluate the results of these congres-
sional efforts to promote human rights. Nevertheless,
to assist in the assessment, the results can be
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divided into domestic and international results,
particularly with regard to Latin America.
On the domestic side, there were several con-
crete results. First, the public and the Congress
itself were made more aware of the wide range of
elements within the subject of human rights. Numerous
books and articles were written on the subject.
Representative Donald Fraser's House Subcommittee on
International Organizations and Movements held more
than 150 hearings between 1973 and 1978 on the sub-
ject and produced numerous reports and records of
the hearings.
Second, the administrative structure of govern-
ment was changed to help ensure that human rights
concerns were included in future deliberations. By
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, the Congress specified the estab-
lishment of a Coordinator for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs in the Department of State. This
led to additional human rights officers being stationed
throughout the State Department and in U.S. diplomatic
posts overseas. This act specified that an annual
report was to contain an analysis of human rights
practices within those countries receiving security
assistance from the United States. The act also
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included the direction that if the Congress requested
a report of human rights practices on any specific
country, the State Department had to respond within
30 days or else all security assistance to that
country would be terminated. 45
Third, the Congress established human rights
considerations as absolutely mandatory in foreign
policy by including them in various public laws.
These new laws provided legal guidelines for the
executive to follow in foreign policy decisions. The
laws dictated U.S. policy in specified cases involving
arms transfers or in instances of U.S. participation
in monetary loans by international monetary insti-
tutions such as through the Inter-American Development
Bank.
On the international scene, a tabulation of
concrete results is much more difficult due to the
subjective nature of such an evaluation. Undoubtedly,
there were positive results, and in many cases, the
positive results may not be realized until some future
46time. However, examples of less than successful
45 International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, Statutes at Large , vol.
90, sec. 301, pt. 1 (1978), pp. 748-750.
46Assessment of the results of the congressional
activism in the field of human rights through 1976 is
brief. This is because the subject became an item
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results exist, such as the effects of the Jackson-
Vanik amendment which reduced rather than expanded
the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. His-
torian Arthur Schlesinger summed up the charges against
these human rights initiatives as including "Hypo-
crisy, double standards, undermining detente, under-
mining stalwart anti-communist allies, of cultural
-, •
• . . 47imperialism, racism, messianism and so on." Dr.
Riordan Roett, during testimony to the House Sub-
committee on Inter-American Affairs, stated his
conclusion:
The continual effort to employ U.S. policy
in Latin America as a weapon in the struggle
to achieve respect for human rights is counter-
productive. It creates bilateral tension
that prevents the negotiation and settlement
of other outstanding issues. It reduces the
possibility of quiet, effective pressure
being brought to bear by the U.S. Government,
of even increased controversy and policy change under
the direction of President Jimmy Carter. The issues
of human rights and arms transfers provide numerous
opportunities for future dissertation research and
evaluation. Such subjects could be, for example, the
effect on U.S. foreign policy of President Carter's
views on human rights, the international results of
his human rights policies, or the announced and actual
policies that were to govern human rights considera-
tions and the effects on U.S. arms transfers. Addi-
tionally, an area that could be investigated for the
period of the Carter presidency would be the motiva-
tions, changes, and results in the congressional-
executive conflict over the setting of U.S. foreign
policy.
47Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Human Rights and the
American Tradition," Foreign Affairs, America and the
World 1978, vol. 57 (1979), p. 518.
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through its diplomatic representatives in
Latin America, on governments thought to violate
human rights. The recommendation that policy
be removed from the struggle for human rights
is not to reduce the importance of those
rights; it is to recognize the realities of
power and sovereignty in the late 20th century
in Latin America. 48
Fulbright Training Amendment
The Fulbright training amendment was a restric-
tion which, although not aimed at Latin America, had
its primary effect there. Its primary accomplishment
was to serve as an irritant in U.S. -Latin American
relations
.
The amendment limited the number of foreign
military personnel trained in the U.S. to the same
number of foreign Fulbright scholars present in the
U.S. during the previous year. In its execution, the
amendment was to have more effect on Latin America
than anywhere else. As applied by the Pentagon, each
major command conducting military training was to
have its number of trainees cut by a fixed percentage
of the number previously trained. There was no
attempt at setting priorities or establishing the
merit of each instructional course. A group of
Riordan Roett, Testimony, in U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States
and Chile During the Allende Years, 1970-1973 , Hearings ,
before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs
,
93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1975, p. 208.
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congressmen studying the problem lamented about how
such an arbitrary ceiling could be so arbitrarily
49
applied. In the actual event, for the first full
year of application of the restriction, the worldwide
reduction in the number of foreign military students
trained in this country was 1,398. But of the 1,398
students deprived of training, 1,332 were from
50Latin America! Although Senator Fulbright orig-
inally did not intend to reduce the number of military
students or to eliminate any from Latin America,
inadvertently more than 95 percent of the cut was
applied to Latin America. The resentment of the Latin
American military services involved is readily under-
standable. During congressional hearings on the
subject, Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Professor and head
f the Department of Social Sciences at West Point,
s called to testify. He said that the Fulbright
restriction had "absolutely no relationship to needs
or to any other rational criterion." He went on to
o
wa
49 . „ .
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Reports of the Special Study Mission to
Latin America on Military Assistance Training and
Developmental Television , 91st Con. , 2nd sess. , 19 70,
p. 23.
U.S., Congress, House, Military Assistance
Training , Hearings , before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 141.
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state that the "meat axe approach to asserting
legislative influence over the executive branch,
which this amendment represents, raises political
problems as well as hamstringing defense programs." 51
The goal of the Fulbright training amendment—to
increase the funds for the scholarship program bearing
the senator's name—clearly was not achieved. In
addition to unsuccessfully accomplishing its objective,
it was also counterproductive from the national
point of view. Its effect could only have been a




Still another unintentional result of the re-
strictions was the development in Latin America of
indigenous capabilities for arms production beyond
U.S. control. The demonstrated unreliability of the
U.S. as a source of weapons was clearly a major factor
in Argentina's commencement of its Plan Europa in
1967. The plan had as its primary objective the
development of local weapons production capabilities
to reduce Argentina's dependence on the U.S. as the
dominant source of arms.
C "3




Brazil also has developed her capability to
manufacture a sizable portion of her own requirements
and has now entered the export market. As a result
of local production of weapons, the U.S. has even
less control. Not only are weapons sold within Latin
America to customers the U.S. may not have approved
of, but also sales are made to other Third World
nations the U.S. definitely would have opposed if
52it possessed any measure of control.
The counterproductive nature of the congres-
sional restrictions can be seen in the development
of Latin American arms production and their independ-
ence from U.S. control. Congress imposed the restrict-
ions in an attempt to gain control over Latin American
arms purchases. The Congress thereby forced the larger
Latin American countries into making their own weapons
in order to be free from the restrictions. As a
result, the U.S. lost all control, and the arms may now
be sold to nations who possess national ideologies in
strict opposition to the U.S. values and national




Larry Rohter, "Brazil Sells Armored Cars to
Libya, Warplanes to Chile," Washington Post , 19





During the period 1967 to 1976, a number of
events, influences, and perceptions led to a resurg-
ence in congressional participation in United States
foreign policy. A series of international events
such as the Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973,
the Cyprus Crisis of 1974, and the crisis in Angola
in 1975 served to heighten congressional concerns
over the direction of U.S. foreign policy and the
international commitments made by the executive.
Domestic events such as Watergate aggravated the rela-
tionship between the two branches and led to increased
distrust of the executive. Issues such as human rights
became a major influence on congressional thinking.
The combination of the effects of these events,
influences, and factors led to a congressional desire
to "do something—anything" in the field of foreign
policy. This desire, coupled with the perception
that Latin America was on the margin of U.S. interests,
resulted in new legislation targeted at Latin America.
Latin America was only a convenient and secondary
target. Because of major U.S. security and political
interests in other regions of the world and the
relative lack of such concerns in Latin America, it
became the focus of the new congressional activism
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in the field of foreign policy. Numerous rationales
were devised to restrict arms transfers to Latin
America. These restrictions doubly served to reduce
the flexibility of the executive. This gives founda-
tion to the conclusion that the executive was as mcuh
of a target of the congressional restrictions as was
Latin America, if not more!
The results of this mistargeting was a distinct
disadvantage to the United States. The reported
objectives of the restrictions were not achieved;
the restrictions were often counterproductive; the
Soviet Union gained entry into Latin America and its
arms market, and the political and military relation-
ships of long standing were quickly lost or damaged.
The Constitution affords the Congress and
the President the joint responsibility in foreign
affairs. In this episode of U.S. foreign policy,
it is clear that the deep congressional involvement
in the execution of foreign policy was the blunt
instrument approach; whereas, it should serve as
the scalpel during the formulation of future policy.
A major improvement in the process would be increased
consultation between the two branches during policy





This review of the past has relevance for the
future. The present world situation is even more
complex than during the subject decade. New political
developments will confront U.S. objectives in many
regions. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War
have changed political and security alignments in
that region. Increased activities of Castro's Cuba
with Soviet support have challenged the status of
previous U.S. concepts applied to Africa as well as
Latin America. The growing capabilities of the
Soviet military power present an increasing challenge
to U.S. interests worldwide. If the United States
is to remain externally competitive in the inter-
national political arena and influential in events
that affect its future and its interests, it must be
internally as competent and well-ordered as can be
devised. Under current world conditions, the U.S.
government cannot afford such debilitating internal
confrontations as evidenced in these pages. The U.S.
must be efficient in the formulation of its foreign
policy and effective in the execution of that policy.
To waste its energies in distrust and internal struggles
may place its current objectives at risk and may
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